The Origins of the Special Jury
James C. Oldhamt
Special juries do not exist, as many people seem to suppose, by the
authority of a modern statute; on the contrary, they are as ancient as the
law itself, and were always struck, as they are at this day, by direction of
the Court, when trials were had at the bar and not at nisi prius.
Thomas Erskine, Esq., November 15, 17931

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the special
jury emerged in English common and statutory law as a familiar
feature of the civil trial. 2 Ordinarily the term "special jury" appeared in case reports and statutes without explanation or definition, suggesting a concept that was widely understood.3 As the Erskine quotation indicates, however, the origins of the special jury
were not well understood as of the late eighteenth century. Its origins had not then, nor have they since, been subjected to careful
4
historical study.
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. In addition to indispensable
library support, see infra note 11, I wish to acknowledge with special thanks the following
colleagues in history and law departments elsewhere who took the time to read all or part of
this article in draft, and who extended to me valuable criticism and suggestions: Professors
John Langbein, Richard Helmholz, James Cockburn, John McCusker, Charles Donahue, and
Dr. J.H. Baker. Also, I have benefitted from the excellent assistance of Georgetown law
students Violette Fernandez, Sarah Teslick, and Katharine Gresham, and I am grateful to
the Georgetown University Law Center for research funds that made possible the essential
detective work in sixteenth- to eighteenth-century English legal literature.
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THE CASE OF LIBEL, THE KING V. JOHN LAMBERT AND OTHERS, PRINTER AND PROPRIE-

16 (2d ed. London 1794). A trial at bar was a trial conducted in London before all of the judges of a particular court, contrasted with a trial at nisi
prius conducted before a single judge in the country on assize or at special sittings in
London and Westminster.
I As will be shown, infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text, the special jury was used
in criminal trials, especially during the formative era of the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Except for high treason and seditious libel cases, civil usage was much more frequent than criminal usage by the mid-1700's.
3 This article does not deal with the "special verdict." For a discussion of the special
verdict, see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *377-78. Except in the loose sense that a special verdict might be requested as a way of getting a meaningful jury response to complicated facts, the concepts of special verdict and special jury are unrelated.
4 Many of the standard works on the history of the jury contain useful sketches of the
special jury. See, e.g., THE COMPLETE JURYMAN: OR, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS RELATING TO
JURORS 69-72, 92-93, 126-28 (Dublin 1774) [hereinafter cited as THE COMPLETE JURYMAN];
W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL By JURY 173-75 (London 1852); J. KENNEDY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF JURIES 80-89 (London 1826); R. PHILLIPS, ON THE POWERS AND
DUTIES OF JURIES, AND ON THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF ENGLAND 28-38, 66-68 (London 1811); J.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 94-97, 419 n.1 (1898 &
TORS OF THE MORNING CHRONICLE
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The history of the special jury has contemporary relevance to
the ongoing debate in the United States over the right to a jury
trial in complex civil litigation. More important, the special jury
demonstrates that the jury cannot be viewed as a simple institution with a limited fact-finding role. Unsuspected layers of com-

photo. reprint 1969).
Standard eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practice books contain passages on the
special jury, although they do not ordinarily discuss the special jury in historical terms. See,
e.g., 1 J. ARCHBOLD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH IN PERSONAL ACTIONS,
AND EJECTMENT 180-91, 203-05 (2d ed. London 1826) (lst ed. London 1819); J. IMPEY, THE
NEW INSTRUCTOR CLERICALIS 281-82 (4th ed. London 1788) (1st ed. London 1784); [R. RICHARDSON], THE ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 123 (London 1739); 1 B.
SELLON, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS 442-47, 455-57
(Dublin 1793); J. SHERIDAN, THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 261-65
(Dublin 1792); 2 W. TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE. COURTS OF KING'S BENCH, AND COMMON
PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 787-94 (3d Am. ed. from 9th London ed. 1828,
Philadelphia 1840) (1st ed. London 1790-1794).
Occasional twentieth-century articles have advocated the revival of the special jury, and
these pieces contain some historical discussion. See, e.g., Baker, In Defense of the "Blue
Ribbon" Jury, 35 IowA L. REV. 409 (1950); Thatcher, Why Not Use the Special Jury?, 31
MINN. L. REV. 232 (1947); see also sources cited infra note 5.
5 This issue recently has received considerable attention in the law reviews. Morris Arnold and Patrick Devlin, each commissioned to write articles in connection with then-pending cases, provide especially provocative and opposing views. See Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829
(1980); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980). Devlin's article contains a short passage on the
special jury. See id. at 80-83.
For a sampling of related studies, see Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and
Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980); Harris & Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 611
(1979); Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIF.
L. REv. 1 (1981); Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment,
80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Luneberg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887 (1981); Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in
Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 (1980); Note, Unfit for Jury Determination:
Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C.L.
REV. 511 (1979); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation,92 HARV. L.
REv. 898 (1979); Note, Preservingthe Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 99 (1979); Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation,20 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 329 (1978).
One study has argued specifically for the use of special jurors in complex civil litigation.
Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980);
see also Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra, at 899-950 (proposing the same thing).
The special jury may be seen as a compromise solution to the present debate over the
"complexity exception" to the seventh amendment. As this study shows, common law courts
have been familiar with the use of special juries to decide issues requiring expertise. This
usage reached its zenith in the merchant juries impaneled in Lord Mansfield's court (see
infra note 13; infra note 451 and accompanying text), an era just before the period relevant
to the American constitutional inquiry. Perhaps, therefore, these historical patterns deserve
more attention in the ongoing constitutional debate.
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plexity present a rich and varied history deserving of further
study. This article goes part way by isolating the origins of the special jury in English law and tracing its evolution until the mideighteenth century.
Close examination of the usage of the term "special jury" since
its appearance in cases and legal literature during the second half
of the seventeenth century reveals two fundamental points. First, a
special jury might satisfy any or all of the following definitions: a
jury of individuals of higher class than usual; a jury of experts; and
a "struck jury," that is, one formed by a special procedure allowing
parties to strike names from an unusually large panel of prospective jurors.' Second, various juries were formed before and after
the seventeenth century that met the first two of the above definitions, even though these juries were never expressly denominated
"special." For example, in cases of national importance, grand juries often consisted of leading citizens.' The same was true of petit
juries in cases involving such issues as high treason or seditious
libel." Juries of experts ranged from panels of cooks and
fishmongers 9 to the all-female jury impaneled to ascertain whether
a female defendant was pregnant.1 0 Only the third definition, the
struck jury, came to be consistently identified as the "special jury."
This article traces the history of all three kinds of "special
jury" from the earliest era for which meaningful records were accessible1" to 1730, the year of Parliament's first significant enact6 The struck jury procedure was associated early with trials at bar. See infra notes 31661 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
1' Apart from the useful and varied English law collection of the Georgetown-University Law Library, my chief resources have been the extensive holdings of the Library of
Congress and the Harvard Law School. Extraordinarily helpful to me at the Library of Congress were Kersi Shroff of the American-British division, R.M. Clemandot of the processing
section, and Philip Berwick of the law library. Special thanks are due to Professor Harry S.
Martin, Law Librarian at the Harvard Law School. Also helpful was the rare book collection
of the University of Michigan Law School, which Professor Beverly Pooley kindly made
available to me. Other printed sources in this country and in England would undoubtedly
add to the work that I have done, but I am reasonably confident that no major change in
findings would be necessary after canvassing those sources.
Manuscript records are, of course, another matter. I have used manuscript and
notebook reports of cases held by the Harvard Law Library [hereinafter cited as Harvard
MS; Harvard NB] and manuscript reports held by Gray's Inn [hereinafter cited as Gray's
Inn MS]. These reports, and many more, are available on microfiche in the English Legal
Manuscripts Project, edited by Dr. J.H. Baker and published by Inter Documentation Company AG, Zug, Switzerland. The Project, which reprints collections held by the Harvard
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ment concerning the special jury. 2 Part I deals with the first two
kinds of special juries identified above: juries of higher-than-ordinary social standing and juries of persons with special knowledge
or expertise. Part II examines the emergence and characteristics of
the struck jury culminating in its statutory recognition in 1730.
The history of the special jury after 1730, when it became synonymous with the struck jury, remains the subject of future research."3
I.

QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS

Several identifiable themes recur in the statutes and rules of
court establishing qualifications for jurors. First, the statutes and
rules sought to ensure that persons of understanding and intelligence served on juries, even though the level of concern varied acLaw School, the Bodleian Library, Lincoln's Inn, and Gray's Inn, is catalogued in 1 J.H.
BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS (1975); 2 J.H. BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS
(1978)..

Valuable manuscript material other than case reports may exist. I am advised, for example, that fiscal records for the King's Bench from the seventeenth century onward may be
available at the Public Records Office in Chancery Lane, London. Because special jurors
were paid greater fees than were ordinary jurors, and because court officers received corres'pondingly greater fees, these records, particularly Secondaries' Rate Books, might yield
special jury data that would be uniquely helpful in establishing patterns of actual usage.
12 An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730).
13 In future work I expect to study eighteenth- and nineteenth-century use of the special jury. Special jury usage increased steadily after 1730. Its height of popularity occurred
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, prompted considerably by Lord Mansfield during his tenure as Chief Justice of King's Bench (1756-1788). See E. Foss, BiOGRAPHIA JURIDICA 469-72 (1870). In this future work I will also largely draw upon printed
sources; however, I will establish the patterns of special jury usage in Lord Mansfield's court
in part by manuscript material. With the permission and cooperation of the current (8th)
Earl of Mansfield, I have obtained a complete microfilm copy of surviving notebooks kept
by Lord Mansfield of jury trials he conducted during his tenure on King's Bench. A great
many of the cases were tried before a special jury. Currently I am editing selected cases
from the trial notebooks which, together with additional legal papers, will be published during 1984 or 1985 as a title in the Studies in Legal History sponsored by the American Society for Legal History.
In future work I will also examine the disfavor into which the special jury fell during
the nineteenth century, most notoriously exemplified by Jeremy Bentham's attack, see J.
BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES, PARTICU-

(London 1821), and the procedural reforms that followed, both
in Parliament (for the country at large), see H.C. SELECT COMM. ON SPECIAL AND COMMON
LARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW

JURIES, REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL AND COMMON JURIES at iii-v

(H.C.

Comm. Print 1868), and in the City of London. The London experience is illustrated by the
work during the summer of 1817 of the "Especial Committee appointed to examine the

Books and Lists of Persons qualified to serve on Juries in and for the City of London." 1817
MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF COMM9N COUNCIL 209 (London). For the
printed text of the committee's final report see id. at 209-16. Both the printed report and
the full report in manuscript are held by the Corporation Records Office of the City of

London.
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cording to the nature and importance of the litigation.14 Second,
they sought to ensure that jurors had sufficient wealth to be presumptively immune from bribery.1 5 Third, they sought to curtail
the avoidance of jury service by "men of quality." Finally, these
measures were meant to prevent impaneling officers-usually sheriffs and coroners-from manipulating jury panels or from accepting payoffs from persons wishing to avoid jury service.", The
first theme-ensuring that persons of understanding and intelligence served on juries-is the primary object of this study, but
each of the remaining themes will be touched upon.
A.

The Problem of Filling Juries With Capable Individuals

Encomiums heaped upon the English jury by law writers over
the centuries presuppose the availability of able, intelligent men to
serve as jurors.1 7 Occasional sources, however, portray common juParliament chose statutory requirements of minimum property holdings as the device to ensure that jurors be reasonably intelligent and honest. The scope and success of
those requirements are explored infra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
15Bias in jurymen has been handled largely through detailed rules allowing parties to
challenge prospective jurors, both peremptorily and for cause. These rules will be discussed
infra note 251. It is important to observe, however, that the earliest jurors were expected to
be biased. Jurors were called upon as individuals with knowledge of events in dispute. They
thus performed a role much different from their modern function; "bias" in the sense of
predisposing foreknowledge was expected. It has been suggested that in the early phases of
jury history most jurors had their minds made up before traveling to court, or at least this
was true for jurors required to travel from the country to Westminster, where they would
hear no new evidence. See 18 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at xv-xvi (W. Bolland ed. 1920).
The jury's modern role as a fact-finding body responding to evidence presented in court was
not established until at least the fifteenth century. See J. THAYER, supra note 4, at 85-182.
" The problem of avoidance of jury service by the landed gentry was addressed, largely
ineffectively, by royal exhortation or Parliamentary investigation, some instances of which
are mentioned infra notes 18, 31-61 and accompanying text. The problem of corrupt sheriffs
or coroners was addressed by royal proclamation and by statute, and is treated to a limited
extent infra notes 18-25, 44, 48, 455-57 and accompanying text.
14

1'7 See, e.g., E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAwEs OF ENGLAND. OR,
A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLErON § 234, at 155a-56b (2d ed. London 1629) (1st ed. London

1628); W. WALWIN, JURIES JUSTIFIED 4 (London 1651); E. WATERHOUS, FORTESCUTUS ILLUSTRATUS 252, 342 (London 1663). The extent of wishful thinking (or of hopeless naivete) is
well illustrated in J. HAWLES, THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT; A DxALOGUE BETWEEN A BARRISTER
AT LAW AND A JURYMAN (London 1844) (1st ed. London 1680). Hawles included the following
as his sixth qualification for the common juror:
Endeavor, as much as your circumstances will permit, at your spare hours to read,
and understand, the fundamental laws of the country; such as Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the late excellent act for Habeas Corpus's, Home's Mirror of Justices,
Sir Edw. Coke, in his 2d, 3d, and 4th Parts of the Institutes of the Law of England,
and judge Vaughan's Reports. These are books frequent to be had, and of excellent use
to inform any reader, of competent apprehension, of the true liberties, and privileges,
which every Englishman is justly entitled unto ... as also the nature of crimes, and
the punishments severally, and respectively, inflicted on them by law; the office, and
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rors as a dismal rabble. A 1607 Proclamation for Jurors by James I
declared that jury service
oftentimes resteth upon such as are either simple and ignorant, and almost at a gaze in any cause of difficultie, or else
upon those that are so accustomed and inured to passe and
serve upon Juries, and they have almost lost that tendernesse
of Conscience, which in such cases is to bee wished, and make
the service, as it were an occupation and practice.18
Later seventeeth-century voices were heard to the same effect. 19
This problem often was attributed to corrupt sheriffs, who excused all who could afford to pay, leaving only the poor and the
ignorant to serve on juries.20 Several of the jury statutes identified
in the Appendix reflect this theme. For example, in An Act agaynst
Shreifs for abuses, 21 Parliament referred to "grete [great] extorduties, of judges, juries, and all officers, and ministers of justice, &c ....
Id. at 76-77 (emphases in original).
18 A Proclamation for Jurors, by James I (Oct. 5, 1607). A copy of this proclamation
printed later that year by Robert Barker in London is held in the Rare Book Room of the
University of Michigan Law Library.
1" After discussing the characteristics enumerated by Coke as desirable in jurors, John
March still was unconvinced: "Yet for all this, when I again consider what weak and ignorant Juries are for the most part returned, I cannot sufficiently wonder and lament, that
mens lives and fortunes should depend upon such mens verdicts." J. MARCH, THE COMMONWEALTH'S FRIEND 102 (London 1651). According to another tract writer, "[fin ordinary
Cases, the Jurors are of the meanest of Free-holders, both in Understanding, Credit, and
Estate; and, for the most part, such as will give the Bayliffs nothing to excuse them." [A.
BOOTH], EXAMEN LEGUm ANGLIAE 77 (London 1656). The first of Henry Robinson's wellknown seven objections to trial by jury was that "[t]here is not a competent number of
understanding and fit men to be had in the lesser Divisions of a County, for tryall of all
Causes upon all occasions." H. ROBINSON,

CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS

IN ORDER TO A MORE

Speedy, Cheap, AND Equall DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICE THROUGHOUT THE NATION 2 (London
1651) (emphasis omitted). Robinson added in his fourth objection that "[m]ost commonly
one or two active & nimble-pated men over-sway all the rest, of the Jury, and too often for
the worst." Id. Coke's juror characteristics referred to by J. MARCH, supra, at 100-01, were:
First, he ought to bee dwelling most neere to the place where the question is
moved.
Secondly, he ought to bee most sufficient both for understanding, and competencie
of estate.
Thirdly he ought to bee least suspitious, that is, to be indifferent as he stand unsworne, and then he is accounted in Law liber et legalis homo, otherwise he may be
challenged & not suffered to be sworne.
E. COKE,supra note 17, § 234, at 155b (footnotes omitted).
20 See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. Consider also Duncombe's allegation
about sheriffs' abuses and jury service as a means of sustenance, quoted infra text accompanying note 30. This language was "borrowed" by Sir James Astry in his early eighteenthcentury monograph on juries. See J. ASTRY, A GENERAL CHARGE TO ALL GRAND JURIES, AND
OTHER JURIES 6 (2d ed. London 1725) (1st ed. London 1703).
21 3 Hen. 8, ch. 12 (1511-12).
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cions and oppressions" caused by "subtilie and untrue demanor of
Sherevis [Sheriffs] and their ministers" and as a remedy provided
that justices of the peace at criminal quarter sessions might reform
jury panels to ensure panels that were "good and lawfull."22
Parliament did not solve the problem. As Professor Cockburn
observed in his illuminating history of English assizes, sheriffs and
undersheriffs in the mid-seventeenth century "were repeatedly
censured . . . for returning insufficient freeholders for jury service,
and ordered to compile new books of freeholders."'s More
particularly,
seventeenth-century undersheriffs commonly oscillated between two equally unacceptable courses: they either warned
indiscriminately all the county's freeholders to attend for jury
service, or failed to summon any at all. In consequence bailiffs
customarily took up "men of all sorts" at assize time to form
1 24
the tales de circumstantibus
3 by
which deficient juries
might be made up.. . . By the 1620s, "contrary to the ancient writs and forms of law". more Western Circuit causes
were tried by tales-men than by jurymen proper.2 5
The evidence is not entirely one-sided and is subject to demographic variations. In his study of seventeenth-century grand jury
practice in Cheshire, Professor Morrill concluded that grand jurymen "came from a coherent social group, the middling freeholders
22 Id. This statute reenacted an earlier version that had expired. See An Act for Writts
of Attaynt to Be Brought Agaynst Jurors for Untrue Verdicts, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 24 (1495).
Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century local practice manuals faithfully described the 1512
statute. See, e.g., M. DALTON, Tim OFFICE AND AuTHORTY OF SHERIFFS 310 (London 1682
ed.) (Dalton or the printer mistakenly identified the statute as "33 H.8. c.12" instead of 3
Hen. 8, ch. 12 (1511-12)); [A. FrrZHERBERT], THE NEW BoKE OF JUSTICES OF THE PEAS fol.
129 (R. Redman comp. 1538 & photo. reprint 1972). Fitzherbert's authorship has been challenged, although he may have translated the work from a contemporary French original.
Glazebrook, Introductionto [A. FrrZHERBERT], supra, at 10-20. Parts of this work, including
the cited passages, were reprinted in 11 editions between 1540 and 1573 in a separate book.
See, e.g., THE OFFYCES OF SHYRYFFS, BAYLYFFES OF LYBERTYES, EscHEATOuRs, CONSTABLES
AND CORONEaS (London 1545).
Much later the statute was dusted off to illustrate how official sanction historically had
been given to jury-packing. See L. SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRAL By JURY 149 (Boston
1852 & photo. reprint 1971).
13 J. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIzES 1558-1714, at 112 (1972) (footnote
omitted).
24 The term "tales de circumstantibus"refers to people who are drawn from among the
bystanders at the court to fill up a jury in circumstances where insufficient prospective jurors named on the panel have appeared or where the number of jurors has been reduced
below 12 by virtue of challenges. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *364-65.
" J. COCKBURN,supra note 23, at 118 (footnotes omitted).
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. . . [who] were separated from the humbler freeholders less by

wealth than by official recognition of their capacity to perform disinterested tasks for the good of the local community." 6 In
Cheshire, moreover, "trial juries were drawn from exactly the same
group as grand juries. The point is worth making because it has
been commonly assumed that trial juries comprised men of lower
status. '27 But if not one-sided, the evidence is surely lopsided in

suggesting a more than occasional problem throughout the seventeenth century and earlier in obtaining honest and intelligent
jurymen.
B.

Juror Qualifications: Property-Holding and Quality
It is the general course of the World, to esteem men
according to their Estate; For Quantum quisque sua nummorum servat in arca, Tantum habet et fidei; And sure I
am; the makers of this Law,[2 '1 had cause enough to do so,

in this Case; for if men of less Estates should serve in
Juries, such Fellows would only be shifted into Enquests,
as had more need to be relieved by the 8d.[29 1 than discre-

tion to sift out the truth of the fact: 'Tis hard to get an
unbyassed Jury now; But surely, less rewards would
sooner bribe and bypass meaner men, than these.30
1. Specific Property Requirements. Through the reign of
26 J. MORRILL, THE CHESHIRE GRAND JuRY

1625-1659, at 19 (1976).
Id.
" The reference is to legislation requiring jurors to own a specified amount of freehold-probably the four-pound freehold requirement of An Act for the Returninge of sufficient Jurors and for the better Expedicion of Trialls, 27 Eliz., ch. 6 (1584-85). See infra
Appendix.
11 Eight pence was the customary fee earned by a common juror at nisi prius at Guildhall for his service during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Jurors at Westminster
Hall earned more-one shilling apiece. See, e.g., THE PRACTICK PART OF THE LAW 53-54 app.
(4th ed. London 1711) (1st ed. London 1654).
1o S.E., TRYALs PER PAis 72 (London 1665). Later editions were claimed by Giles Duncombe and lead to the conclusion that Duncombe authored this book. See, e.g., G.D. [G.
DUNCOMBE], TRYALS PER PAIS (2d ed. London 1682). The "S.E." in the first edition refers to
Samson Euer, but whether Euer or Duncombe is the original author is unclear. See 57 BsrrISH MUSEUM CATALOGUE OF PRINTED BooKs 376-77 (Trustees of British Museum 1961); 58
id. at 512 (1960); 1 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY
581 (Harvard Law School 1909); W. SPILSBURY, CATALOGUE OF PRINTED BOOKS IN THE LiBRARY OF HON. SocIETY OF LINCOLN'S INN 843 (London 1849); 2 D. WING SHORT-TITLE CATA27

LOGUE OF BOOKS PRINTED IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, IRELAND, WALES, AND BRITISH AMERICA

1641-1700, at 19 (rev. 2d ed. T. Crist
ed. 1982). To avoid unnecessary confusion, further citations to the 1665 edition will be desAND OF ENGLISH BOOKS PRINTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES

ignated G. DUNCOMBE,1665 edition.
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Elizabeth, Parliament sought to ensure that jurors were drawn
from the vicinity of the trial and that jurors were men of property.
The first of these goals was never vigorously pursued, and after
Elizabeth's reign the emphasis was almost entirely on property
holdings. Dr. J.H. Baker recently explained that
[a]ccording to medieval thinking, the likelihood of corruption
varied in inverse proportion to wealth, and so the root cause
of perjury in jurors was considered to be the impanelling of
men of insufficient substance. .

.

. A typical fifteenth century

reaction to the prevalence of corruption was to make the qualification even more exclusive ....
1
The Appendix to this article presents the attempts by Parliament from Magna Carta until 1730 to produce responsible and effective jurors. As the table and accompanying narrative indicate,
Parliament experimented with a variety of formulae in different
courts and in different types of cases, but a forty-shilling requirement was the general rule in the royal courts for over three centuries. 2 The statute of 27 Eliz., ch. 6 (1584-85) 38 doubled the standard to four pounds, and the new figure was retained for almost
eighty years. Then, in 1664, Parliament raised the requirement to
twenty pounds "for reformation of abuses in Sheriffes and other
Ministers, who for reward doe oftentimes spare the ablest and sufficientist, and returne the poorer and simpler Freeholders lesse
able to descerne the Causes in question, and to beare the charges
of appearance and attendance thereon." ' By its own terms the
SI 2 THE REPORTs OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 107 (J.H. Baker ed. 1978). In fact, expository

language in successive juror qualification statutes shows that jury perjury was perceived as a
recurring problem. For example, in the statute of 2 Hen. 5, Stat. 2, ch. 3 (1414), one of the
"great Mischiefs" described was the return of common jurors who "have but little to live

upon but by such Inquest, and which have nothing to lose because of the false Oaths
whereby they offend their Consciences the more [largely]" (brackets contained in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 188 (1816); compilers substituted "largely" for "lightly," id. at n.5). The
statute of 15 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1436-37), describes the "great ...

Perjury" as being "[ ... most

likely to tend to the greatest] Mischief which may fall to the said Realm" (brackets contained in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 29 (1816); compilers substituted this phrase for "to the
grettest likly," id. at n.5). For additional examples, see An Act for retornynge sufficient
Jurors, 1 Rich. 3, ch. 4 (1483-84) ("greate inconvenienceez and pjuries daily happen"); An

Act agaynst Perjurye, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 21, § 1 (1495) ("pjurye is muche and custumably
used").
32

See infra Appendix.

3' An Act for the Returninge of sufficient Jurors and for the better Expedicion of Trials, 27 Eliz., ch. 6 (1584-85).
34 An Act for the returning of able and sufficient Jurors, 16 & 17 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 1 (166465). The quoted language is virtually identical to the preamble of the Elizabethan statute
cited supra note 33.
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new requirement expired thirteen years later,3 5 after which, presumably, the four-pound requirement of the statute of 27 Eliz., ch.
6, revived. But in 1692, expressly as a replacement for the expired
twenty-pound rule of the statute of 16 & 17 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 1 (166465), Parliament required a ten-pound freehold for jurors in all
royal courts (at Westminster, on assize, and at nisi prius), as well
as in quarter sessions, oyer and terminer, and gaol delivery,3 6 cities
and towns excepted.3 7 This standard remained in effect until a decade ago,38 though intermittently Parliament determined that certain leasehold or personal property holdings were the equivalents
of the ten-pound freehold for purposes of jury qualification.3 9
Overall, the freehold requirements 40 were, if not a complete

35

An Act for the returning of able and sufficient Jurors, 16 & 17 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 6 (1664-

65).

36 Statute of 4 W. & M., ch. 24, § 16 (1692). Freehold requirements in Wales have
traditionally been lower than those in England. Thus an Acte for certaine Ordinaunces in
the Kinges Majesties Domynion and Principalitie of Wales, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 26 (1542-43),
provided that any freehold would qualify jurors in all actions other than attaint in Wales,
and a freehold of 40 shillings qualified them for actions of attaint, id. § 48. When Parliament increased the general freehold requirement in England to £20, the correlative figure
for Wales was eight pounds. See An Act for the returning of able and sufficient Jurors, 16 &
17 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 1 (1664-65). Parliament set the requirement for Wales of six pounds in the
statute of 4 W. & M., ch. 24, § 15 (1692).
In 1696 Parliament enacted one unusual requirement for Yorkshire. Jurors in Grand
Inquests were required to own freehold worth £80. An Act for the Ease of Jurors and better
regulating of Juries, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 32, § 8 (1695-96). The statute also required the sheriff
to return only one panel of 48 jurors for the Grand Inquest. Id. Apparently the statute
sought to restrain the sheriff from returning a large number of freeholders, some of whom
would, in all likelihood, buy their way off the panel. At the same time, the statute sought to
ensure that those freeholders returned by the sheriff were of a high caliber. For the quality
of grand jurors in general, see infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
37 Statute of 4 W. & M., ch. 24, § 8 (1692).
3' See Criminal Justice Act, 1972, ch. 71, § 25; 42 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
774 general note (3d ed. 1973).
39 For example, leasehold worth £20 was declared in 1730 to be the equivalent of a £10
freehold. See An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 18 (1730).
40 Although the point is disputed, legal authorities have asserted that even when statutes did not specifically mention freeholding as a qualification for jury duty, common law
required some freehold, however small. See 1 J. CHITry, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW 502 (London 1816); E. COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 155b-57a; 2 W. HAwKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 415 (London 1721); Remarks on the Lord
Russell's Trial, by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General in the Reign of William III, in 9
State Trials 793, 795. (In this article, all citation to State Trials refers to T. HOWELL, Con-

BERT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND
OTHER CRIMES

AND MISDEMEANORS

FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME

(London 1809-1826) (33 vols.). State Trials contains accounts of mostly criminal proceedings
from Norman times down through the Stuart and (in later editions) the Georgian periods.
The set of State Trials was first published in 1719, see T. SALMON, A COMPLEAT COLLECTION
OF STATE-TRYALS,

AND PROCEEDINGS UPON IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER

CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS (London 1719)

(4 vols.), but was published definitively in
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failure as a method to ensure honest and intelligent jurymen, of
very limited value. The statutes suffered from two familiar
problems-ineffective enforcement and obsolescence. Dr. J.H.
Baker contends that increasingly higher property qualifications
helped to foster underenforcement; the higher qualifications "made
it difficult for sheriffs in some parts of the country to find enough
men to return, a difficulty which was exacerbated by the habit of
selling exemptions, ' 41 leading in turn to a reduction in the property qualification.," The property requirement for non-urban areas,
however, was not decreased; it was doubled during Elizabeth's
reign. 3 Moreover, the sheriff's exemption of the richer freeholders
occasionally overloaded the jury panels with poorer freeholders
who then faced the choice of buying their way off the panel or, "by
delays and by adjournments[,] being kept for a week or a fortnight,
so that they lose their work and are wholly impoverished.'"4
In contrast, the jurors who were required to travel from outlying counties to Westminster cannot have been poor, given the time
and expense involved in the journey, for which they were not reimbursed.4 5 The trouble was that most country jurymen would risk a
Howell's edition of 1809-1826.) There are occasional indications that such a freeholding requirement was applied, for example, in city courts, which were exempted from the statutes
requiring jurors to be freeholders, and in noncapital criminal trials, but no consistent pattern appears.
41

2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN

SPELMAN,

supra note 31, at 107. Professor Cockburn

discusses the dearth of men of sufficient property in rural districts in his Calendar of Assize
Records, Home Circuit Indictments: Introduction (forthcoming 1985, HMSO), particularly
in a chapter dealing with trial by jury. Cockburn gives numerous later sixteenth- and early
seventeenth-century cases in which courts have difficulty in filling up assize juries, although
the problem seemed to stem as much from corrupt sheriffs as a shortage of freeholders. The
problem contributed to the practice of filling out juries "de circumstantibus,"that is, from
bystanders present in court. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; infra notes 410-13
and accompanying text. As the value of money declined, the property qualification became
less significant as a restriction on the number of available qualified jurors. See infra notes
51-61 and accompanying text.
" Dr. Baker cites as an example the statute Per le Juries infra Civitatem London, 4
Hen. 8, ch. 3 (1512), substituting personalty valued at 100 marks for freehold worth 40 shillings for the City of London, a development which Baker terms "a sensible adaptation to
the realities of urban life." 2 THE REPORTS

OF

SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 31, at 107.

" See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
"

SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL 1243-1482, at 10 (L Leadam & J. Baldwin

eds. 1918) (Citizens of London v. The Bishop of Bath (1295)) (footnote omitted). See also 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 631 (2d ed. 1898) ("The poorer
freeholders groaned under [jury] duty which consumed their time .... ."); 5 SELECT CASES
IN THE

COURT OF KING'S

BENCH

66-69 (G. Sayles ed. 1958) (plea no. 28, Mich. 1331).

' See, e.g., Rex v. Fitz-Patrick & Broadway, 3 State Trials 419, 419 (K.B. 1631), in
which the defendants were brought to the King's Bench at Westminster "where was a jury
of sufficient and able Wiltshire men, impannelled to go upon and try them." For a speculative analysis of the expense of a juror traveling from Northumberland to London in the
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fine for nonappearance rather than undertake the journey. The
fine, if assessed, probably would be less than the expense of the
trip. 48 As Dr. Sayles observed, "[tihe declaration that no jury came
is one of the most monotonous commonplaces of the records [of
the Westminster courts]. ' 47
Instead of locating and fining nonappearing jurors, another
way to enforce the property qualification was to amerce (fine) the
sheriff for returning panels of unqualified jurors. Few cases following this approach are reported.48 Perhaps one reason why there are
not more reported cases is the availability of a simpler enforcement mechanism. It was universally accepted that parties could
challenge prospective jurors for failure to meet the freehold requirement, thereby ensuring that only qualified men served. How
frequently the right was exercised is uncertain.49
Even if challenges of prospective jurors had effectively enforced the property qualification, the problem of obsolescence remained. A fixed property qualification was of limited utility in the
face of the constantly changing value of money. Writing in the
1560's,5" Sir Thomas Smith described "yeomen" as those "next

early 1300's, see 18 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, supra note 15, at xvi-xxi.
" 2 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH at ciii (G. Sayles ed. 1938).
"7 Id. (footnote omitted); accord 18 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, supra note 15, at xviixix.
". For allegations of jury-packing by sheriffs, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying
text; infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. For a rare reverse example, see 6 SELECT
CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH

54 (G. Sayles ed. 1965) (plea no. 30, Hil. 1347), where

a sheriff was amerced for declining to return a panel of jurors for a trial in which he was a
named plaintiff.
49 In his study of the Old Bailey Sessions Papers,Professor Langbein notes the infrequency of challenges, and asserts that "although the vast medieval law of challenge was
preserved in the law books of the time [mid-1670's to mid-1730's], this book learning was
virtually dead letter in the ordinary courts." Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 275-76 (1978) (footnote omitted). Compare the testimony of Sir
William Owen in 1817 that the frequent challenging of jurors "scarcely ever happens in
England; but in Wales, either from party prejudices or personal antipathies, the privilege of
challenge is exercised to a very considerable extent." H.C. SELECT COMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN WALES, REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE IN WALES 45 (H.C. Comm. Print 1817). See also cases cited infra note 100.

For early examples of the law writers who acknowledged the validity of a challenge for
want of freehold, see E. COKE, supranote 17, § 234, at 155b-57a; J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDMUS
LEGUM ANGLIA 59 (S. Chrimes ed. 1942) (1st ed. London 1545). Maitland surmised that
Fortescue was probably the earliest important writer on English law to praise the jury. See 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 631. As Professor Chrimes pointed out, however, Fortescue's statements on jury qualifications were influenced by statutes enacted during the reign of Henry VI; these statutes railed against the perjuries "'which horribly continueth and daily increaseth in the common jurors of the said realm.'" J. FoRTESCUE, supra,
at 173 (quoting statute of 15 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1436-37)).
80 Maitland, Preface to T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM at x (L. Alston ed. 1906)
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unto the nobilitie, knights and squires . . . [who] are more
travailed to serve in [the commonwealth] than all the rest."51 He
then added,
I call him a yeoman whom our lawes doe call Legalem
hominem, a worde familiar in writtes and enquestes, which is
a freeman borne English, and may dispend of his owne free
lande in yerely revenue to summe of xl. s. sterling: This
maketh (if the just value were taken now to the proportion of
52
monies) vi. 1. [£] of our currant mony at this present.
Using Smith's rate of inflation, the forty-shilling requirement of
the statute of 2 Hen. 5, Stat. 2, ch. 3 (1414), had been devalued
threefold by, for example, 1560.5 Yet it was not until twenty-five
years later that Parliament nominally increased the property requirement to four pounds. 4
In his seventeenth-century treatise, The Office and Authoritie
of Sherifes, Michael Dalton incorporated Smith's devaluation rate,
noting that the old forty-shilling requirement "doth make at this
present, at the least six pounds of our money. 5' 5 Dalton did not
speculate on the comparative value of seventeenth-century money,
but Edward Waterhous did in his commentary on Fortescue, published in 1663.56 Observing that, in Fortescue's time (around 1470),
forty shillings may have served as a measure of property "somewhat considerable, as a convenient support to life, and a delivery
of the Possessor from temptation to perjury," Waterhous argued
that the value of a juryman's fortune should be enhanced "according to the value of Rents, and Prizes now; (40 1. a year being as
little for a Free-holder now to have in Estate, as 40 s. then[ ]),,157 If
Waterhous's parenthetical comparison was accurate, 58 the four-

(lst ed. London 1583).
51 T. SMrrH, DE REPUBLICA
82 Id.

ANGLORUM

42 (L. Alston ed. 1906) (1st ed. London 1583).

'3 The 40-shilling requirement, of course, originated in the thirteenth century. See
Statutu de illis q' debent poni in Jura' & Assis' (The Statute of Persons to be put in Assises
and Juries), 21 Edw. (1293). I know of no treatment of the change in the value of 40 shillings from 1293 to 1414, although some fluctuation must have occurred.
" See An Act for the Returninge of sufficient Jurors and for the better Expedicion of
Trialls, 27 Eliz., ch. 6 (1584-85).
55 M. DALTON, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITIE OF SHERIFES 201b (London 1625). Later editors annotated the statement in the text with a citation to Smith's work. See, e.g., M. DALTON, supra note 22, at 318.
" E. WATERHOUS, supra note 17, at 342.
57

Id.

"Some evidence supports these figures. Waterhous buttressed his assertion with many
comparisons of wages, rents, commodity prices, and other fundamental components of the
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pound requirement of 158419 had become a trifle, and even the increase to ten pounds in 16920 would have been quite small. Working the comparison backward, the four- and ten-pound requirements would, in fifteenth-century money, be worth two and ten
shillings, respectively. Whatever the exact comparisons, it seems
fair to conclude that the property qualification declined in real
value from the sixteenth century onward. Parliament allowed the
1664 increase to twenty pounds to expire, and proposals for a major increase in the property qualification never succeeded.6 1
2.

General Quality Requirements.

And this Sheriffs shall do well to take notice of, that the
King's Courts of Justice are never (to my observation) better
pleased, then when they see Pannels and returns of Knights,
Esquires and Gentlemen, of rank and quality before them.2
If statutory property qualifications did not produce able jurymen, other methods were available. Apart from peremptory challenges 6s and the struck jury procedure, 64 there is a long history of
cost of living over the previous two centuries. Id. Writing in the early eighteenth century,
Sir James Astry observed that "in Hen. the Third's Time One Shilling was as much as Forty
Shillings now." J. ASTRY, supra note 20, at 7. See also R. BooTE, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF
AN ACTION OR SurT AT LAW 143 n.// (London 1766) ("But quaere, if 20 s. the 13 E. I was not
more than 10 1. now?"). Further corroboration can be found in Phelps, Brown & Hopkins,
Wage-rates and Prices: Evidence for Population Pressure in the Sixteenth Century, 24
ECONOMICA 289 (1957). The authors present in Table 4, id. at 306, a composite foodstuff
price index for southern England running from 1400 to 1700. Applying the authors' figures
to the Waterhous example would yield an increase in prices from 1470 to 1663 of approxi,mately 700%, translating 40 shillings at 1470 money into £14 of 1663 money. This is considerably below Waterhous's estimate, but it is a far greater change than the nominal increases
in statutory property qualifications for jurors.
'. An Act for the Returninge of sufficient Jurors and for the better Expedicion of Trialls, 27 Eliz., ch. 6 (1584-85).
:0 Statute of 4 W. & M., ch. 24, § 16 (1692).
61 As an example, a £50 freehold requirement was advanced in an early eighteenthcentury reform pamphlet that ran through numerous editions. See PROPOSALS HUMBLY OFFER'D TO THE PARLIAMENT, FOR REMEDYING THE GREAT CHARGE AND DELAY OF SUITS AT LAw,

AND IN EQUITY 34 (4th ed. n.p. 1724). One legislative curiosity, mentioned supra note 36, was
the enactment in 1696 of an £80 freehold requirement for grand jurors in Yorkshire. An Act
for the Ease of Jurors and better regulating of Juries, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 32, § 8 (1695-96).
According to the statutory recitations, Yorkshire enjoyed an abundance of property owners
who were potential jurymen. Id. § 7.
62 E. WATERHOUS, supra note 17, at 252.
62 Challenges to the qualifications of prospective jurors theoretically helped to produce
able jurors. See supra note 15; infra note 251. This approach, however, was imperfect; peremptory challenges applied only in crown cases, and, in any event, .the process was wholly
dependent upon the nature of the panel arrayed by the sheriff. The number and type of
challenges varied over time and according to the type of case. These specifics are outside the
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attempted control over jury quality by the king, the court, and the
parties.6 5
a. Juries of knights. Coke observed that in ancient times juries consisted entirely of knights.6 6 Jury service by knights on the
grand assize was standard medieval procedure, 67 but as C.T.
Flower noted, knights "also formed the backbone of juries in possessory assizes."6 On occasion they were put on a jury by royal
order6 and on occasion by judicial order. 70 Before the invention of

scope of this article; they can be found in numerous sources. See, e.g., 1 J. ARCHBOLD, supra
note 4, at 204-08; E. COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 155b-58b; THE COMPLETE JURYMAN,
supra note 4, at 99-145.
" It was established sometime before the end of the seventeenth century that either
party could request a struck jury, which was presumably drawn from an array of men of
better quality. See infra notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
There is at least a speculative possibility that certain of the Year Book cases are distant
procedural cousins to the struck jury. Discussion of the cases is deferred until procedural
aspects of the struck jury are explored. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
65 In addition, certain types of cases or inquests called for juries composed wholly or
partially of men of higher class than usual. See infra notes 109-37 and accompanying text.
66E. COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 155b. Citing "Glanvile lib. 2. c. 14." and "Bract[on]
fol. 116," Zachary Babington noted that "[i]n ancient time the Jury, as well in Common
Pleas as in Pleas of the Crown, were twelve knights." Z. BABINGTON, ADvIcE TO GRAND JURORS IN CASES OF BLOOD 13 n.(0) (London 1677) (emphasis omitted). See 2 BRACTON ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND

329 (S. Thorne ed. 1968) (1st ed. ca. 1240) (fol. 116; "oath

of the twelve knights chosen to speak the truth in a plea of the crown") (emphasis omitted).
In referring to "Common Pleas," Babington referred not to the Court of Common Pleas but
to disputes between private individuals. The discussion in Glanvill concerns knights' service
on one important type of private dispute-the grand assize. See THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 33 (G. Hall ed. 1965)
(1st ed. ca. 1188) [hereinafter cited as GLANVILL].
'7 See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
" INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., at 434 (C. Flower ed.
1944). The petit assizes, established by the latter part of the twelfth century, were novel
disseisin, mort d'ancestor, darrien presentment, and utrum. See generally R. VAN
CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 86-88 (1959) (discussing the various assizes).
0' 1 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES 1198-1202, at 93 n.3 (D. Stenton ed.
1953).
70 See INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 435.
Observe Flower's use there of the term "special jury" in describing these panels of knights.
Id. Lady Stenton used the term "special jury" in describing the offer by a prisoner of money
to the King "to have a verdict of a jury on the general question of guilt or innocence."
ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR LINCOLNSHIRE
1218-9 AND WORCESTERSHIRE 1221, at lxx (D. Stenton ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as LINCOLNSHIRE EYRE ROLLS]. In giving an illustration concerning a prisoner named Richard Estrech, Lady Stenton wrote: "He is clearly asking for a special jury, for the presenting jury
having recorded that his wife had been killed and that certain people have fled for the death
go on to state that they suspect Richard himself." Id. See also ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN
EYRE BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR GLOUCESTERSHIRE, WARWICKSHIRE AND
STAFFORDSHIRE, 1221, 1222, at lix (D. Stenton ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as GLOUCESTERSHIRE EYRE ROLLS], where Lady Stenton added:

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:137

techniques to force a recalcitrant prisoner to plead how he would
be tried, 7 1 courts on a number of occasions ordered "strong juries"
when a defendant either stood mute or expressly refused to put
himself upon the country.7 2 These "strong juries" ordinarily consisted of twenty-four knights, 73 but on at least one occasion "a specially strong jury of thirty-six" was impaneled.7 4
Trials were sometimes conducted with specially-formed juries
of knights chosen by consent of the parties.7 C.T. Flower's edition

The general principle on which the judges acted seems to have been that no one shall
be condemned to death on the sole verdict of the jury which has indicted him, even if
he has agreed to put himself on the verdict of the country. The representatives of the
villages were there and could be consulted, and if necessary a special jury of knights
could be empanelled.
Neither Flower nor Stenton used the term "special jury" in a technical sense. Nonetheless,
their usage was entirely apt in describing juries formed by a special procedure and composed of jurymen of higher quality than usual. See also infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
71 The most infamous technique was "peine forte et dure." Professor Radzinowicz describes this as follows:
A prisoner who upon arraignment "stood mute," which meant that he refused to plead
so as to evade conviction, might be laid naked on his back in a dark room, while
weights of stone or iron were put on his chest. If he continued to maintain silence, he
was pressed until he died.
1 L. RADzINowICz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750,
at 26 n.82 (1948) (citing A. ANDREWS, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 285-86 (London 1856)).
This form of torture was not abolished by statute in England until 1772, although it was
used infrequently during the eighteenth century. See An act for the more effectual proceeding against persons standing mute on their arraignment for felony, or piracy, 12 Geo. 3, ch.
20 (1772) (peine forte et dure eliminated, but willful refusal to plead became equivalent to
conviction). In 1827, Parliament adopted the "modem rule," which treated refusal to plead
as though it were a plea of not guilty. See An Act for further improving the Administration
of Justice in Criminal Cases in England, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 28, § 2 (1827). For an informative
discussion of peine forte et dure, see J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 74-77,
184 n.20 (1977).
7 The expression "put himself on the country" is a standard reference to trial by jury.
See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *349, *352; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supranote
44, at 623.
73 See GLOUCESTERSHIRE EYRE ROLLS, supra note 70, at lix; LINCOLNSHIRE EYRE ROLLS,
supra note 70, at lxix. Lady Stenton states that "[t]he empanelling of a jury of twenty-four
knights was an exceptional measure to secure convictions in what the bench clearly regarded
as particularly flagrant cases." GLOUCESTERSHIRE EYRE ROLLS, supra note 70, at Ix.
74 SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY ImI, at clxv (H. Richardson & G. Sayles eds. 1941). For a description of the case, see id. at 122-24 (entry no. 123).
Whether the jurymen were knights does not appear. This case and one other recorded by
Richardson and Sayles, id. at 121-22 (entry no. 122), are interesting because they were civil
in nature. As Richardson and Sayles note: "The treatment of a defendant who refused to
accept trial by jury is a question upon which a good deal of learning has been expended, but
we do not recall that it has been considered in relation to civil actions." Id. at clxv (footnote
omitted). The emphasis here is on juries of higher quality than usual, however, not on
procedure.
75 Many reports of Year Book cases note juries chosen by consent of the parties, with-
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of the Curia Regis Rolls includes a "perambulation"76 in 1203, consisting of knights to be chosen in equal number by each disputant.7 7 Flower notes, however, that the detailed instructions in this
case "suggest that at the time it was a novel experiment." 8 In ordinary cases, "[tihe justices did not expect too much of7 9jurymen,
and generally merely discharged an incompetent panel.)
Flower's last observation is interesting because of its implicit
assumption that the justices considered it their responsibility to
differentiate between competent and incompetent panels and to
insist upon the former, even before the charter of 1300,80 which
called for men who were "most sufficient, and least suspicious" to
be jurors.8 1 Thus, in an early thirteenth-century plea of novel disseisin, the poverty of the jury caused it to be respited "so that
knights and other free men may be appointed." 82 Similarly, in a
plea in Kent during the year 1202, after a jury was unable to resolve the disputed seisin, the court "ordered that other jurors be
elected, because [the first jurors] are paupers and unworthy.""3
And, according to Flower,
[d]ifficulties with regard to the selection of jurors did not
diminish as time went on. As late as 1230 the roll has two
consecutive entries relating to the inadequacy of the panels.
In a Lincolnshire case their certificate was not accepted because none of those who came were knights . . . . In the
neighbouring county of Cambridge every member of a jury
was poor and incompetent."
b. State trials. The medieval concern about the service of

out indicating the characteristics of the individuals chosen. For a discussion of these cases,
see infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
' A "perambulation" was "a technique to fix the exact dimensions of an estate ...
performed by a number of people who lived in the area, neighbours, who walked all along
the boundaries, so that they obtained a precise idea of what belonged to whom." R. VAN
CABMEGEM, supra note 68, at 77.
7 See INTRODUCTION TO THE CURA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 5758.
71 Id. at 58. Cf. id. at 441, where Flower mentions a case in 1230 decided by a "specially
constituted" panel of "eight knights of Cornwall and eight lawful men of Devonshire."
7" Id. at 451.
$0 Articuli super Cartas (Articles upon The Charters), 28 Edw., ch. 9 (1300); see infra
Appendix.
81Articuli super Cartas (Articles upon The Charters), 28 Edw., ch. 9 (1300).
sI GLOUCESTERSHIRE

EyRz ROLLS, supra note 70, at 30 (plea no. 90).

CIVIL PLEAS 50 (W. Baildon ed. 1890) (plea no. 126) (brackets in original).
ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 453
(footnote omitted).
"SELECT
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knights on juries occurred in unexceptional cases. Later, in exceptional cases of importance to the government, it became commonplace to impanel "special" trial juries of "men of quality and substance." A brief survey of the decisions reported in the State
Trials will illustrate this pattern. In scores of such cases, including
some of the most notorious trials in English history, juries consisted of knights, esquires, or gentlemen. s
" Although not necessarily an exhaustive list, a thoroughly representative selection of
cases follows. Cases of serious crime arising in the City of London and the County of Middlesex were tried at regular sessions held at Guildhall and at Justice Hall in the Old Bailey.
Criminal jurisdiction of these sessions was founded on the three commissions applicable to
all the judges on circuit-peace, gaol delivery, and oyer and terminer. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 3, at *58. References to trials held at these sessions are hereinafter cited as
"Guildhall" and "Old Bailey." The cases are: Rex v. de Berkele, 1 State Trials 55, 56 (Parliament 1331) (murder of King Edward II; jury of knights); Rex v. Fisher, 1 State Trials 395,
399 (0. & T. at Westminster 1535) (high treason; jury of knights and esquires); Regina v.
Abington, 1 State Trials 1141, 1143 (0. & T. at Westminster 1586) (high treason; jury of
esquires and gentlemen); Regina v. Blunt, 1 State Trials 1409, 1409 (0. & T. at Westminster
1600) (high treason; jury of Aldermen of London and gentlemen); Rex v. Raleigh, 2 State
Trials 1, 4 (0. & T. at Westminster 1603) (high treason; jury of knights and gentlemen); Rex
v. Drewrie, 2 State Trials 357, 360-61 (Old Bailey 1607) (high treason; a "verie sufficient
lurie"); Rex v. Turner, 2 State Trials 929, 931 (K.B. 1615) (aiding and assisting a murderer;
jury of knights, esquires, and freeholders); Rex v. Franklin, 2 State Trials 947, 947 (K.B.
1615) (murder; jury of esquires and gentlemen); Sindercome's Case, 5 State Trials 841, 844
(Upper Bench 1657) (high treason; jury of "gentlemen of worth and quality," separately
described as "a very substantial company of men, most of them being justices of the peace,"
id. at 843 n.*); Rex v. Coleman, 7 State Trials 1, 3 (K.B. 1678) (high treason; jury of one
baronet and esquires); Rex v. Ireland, 7 State Trials 79, 81 (Old Bailey 1678) (high treason;
jury of baronets, one knight, esquires, and one gentleman); Rex v. Green, 7 State Trials 159,
161 (K.B. 1679) (murder; jury of baronets, knights, and esquires); Rex v. Wakeman, 7 State
Trials 591, 595 (Old Bailey 1679) (high treason; jury of esquires and gentlemen); Rex v.
Gascoigne, 7 State Trials 959, 966 (K.B. 1680) (high treason; jury of one knight and 11
esquires); Rex v. Palmer, 7 State Trials 1067, 1067 (K.B. 1680) (high treason; jury of baronets, esquires, and one gentleman); Rex v. Thwing & Pressicks, 7 State Trials 1161, 1163
(York assizes 1680) (high treason; jury of one baronet and gentlemen); Rex v. Stapleton, 8
State Trials 501, 503 (York assizes 1681) (high treason; jury of knights and esquires); Rex v.
Bushby, 8 State Trials 525, 528 (Derby assizes 1681) (high treason; 10 of the 12 jurors gentlemen); Rex v. Borosky, 9 State Trials 1, 14 (Old Bailey 1682) (murder; jury of one baronet,
esquires, and gentlemen); Rex v. Grey, 9 State Trials 127, 127 (K.B. 1682) (debauchery, jury
of gentlemen); Rex. v. Sidney, 9 State Trials 817, 823 n.* (K.B. 1683) (high treason; entire
panel of 89 names enumerated, all baronets, knights, esquires, or gentlemen); Rex v.
Hampden, 9 State Trials 1053, 1061 (K.B. 1684) (high misdemeanor; jury of one baronet
and esquires); Rex v. Rosewell, 10 State Trials 147, 157 (K.B. 1684) (high treason; jury of
one baronet, knights, and esquires); Mossam v. Ivy, 10 State Trials 555, 555 (K.B. 1684)
(title to tenements; a "special jury of the county of Middlesex" made up of baronets,
knights, and esquires); Rex v. Johnson, 11 State Trials 1339, 1339-40 (K.B. 1686) (seditious
libel; jury of knights and gentlemen); Duke of Norfolk v. Germaine, 12 State Trials 927, 927
(K.B. 1692) (trespass on the case for adultef, jury of knights and esquires); Rex v.
Anderton, 12 State Trials 1245, 1245 (Old Bailey 1693) (high treason; jury of gentlemen);
Rex v. Charnock, 12 State Trials 1377, 1379 (Old Bailey 1696) (high treason; panel called by
sheriff of "above eight-score, and consisting of baronets, knights, esquires, and gentlemen");
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Occasionally the court took part overtly in jury selection. The
report of Lady Alice Lisle's trial in 1685 for high treason notes that
"it being a cause of great expectation and moment, the lord chief
justice e6 ' ordered the sheriff to take care, that a very substantial
' 87
jury should be returned, of the best quality in the county.

Regina v. Baynton, 14 State Trials 597, 597 (Q.B. 1702) (forcible taking; jury of gentlemen);
Regina v. Lindsay, 14 State Trials 987, 990 (Old Bailey 1704) (high treason; jury of esquires); Regina v. Dammaree, 15 State Trials 521, 548 (Old Bailey 1710) (high treason;
knight and five esquires among the 12 jurors); Rex v. Hendley, 15 State Trials 1407, 1411-12
(Rochester assizes 1719) (unlicensed preaching; one baronet and 10 esquires among the 12
jurors); Rex v. Francklin, 17 State Trials 625, 625 (K.B. 1731) (seditious libel; jury of esquires); Craig v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 State Trials 1139, 1139 n.* (Exchequer in Ireland 1743)
(ejectment; "the jury (most of them) gentlemen of the greatest property in Ireland, and
almost all members of parliament").
In all of the foregoing cases, the State Trials reports specifically indicate the juror characteristics. In other cases, the reports name jurors without any indication of social status,
but this fact alone does not prove that these jurors were not knights, esquires, or gentlemen.
For example, in Rex v. Tasborough & Price, 7 State Trials 881, 881 (K.B. 1680) (subornation of perjury), the jurors named without indication of social standing included Charles
Umphervile. In Rex v. Coleman, 7 State Trials 1, 3 (K.B. 1678) (high treason), "Charles
Umfrevile, esq." was a juror and in Rex v. Green, 7 State Trials 159, 161 (K.B. 1679) (murder), "Charles Humphrevile" was a juror and was designated an esquire. Very likely the
same man served as a juror in all three cases. The jurors in Rex v. Tasborough& Price also
included Thomas Earsby, Richard Pagett, and Edward Wilford. 7 State Trials at 881. All
three men are shown as "esquires" in the jury list for the 1679 treason trial against Nathaniel Reading. Rex v. Reading, 7 State Trials 259, 267 (0. & T. at Westminster 1679).
It does not necessarily follow, of course, that merely because jurors are designated
"knights, esquires, or gentlemen," they were in fact men of quality or of substantial property. There may have been considerable looseness in the use of the terms, especially "esquires" and "gentlemen." See, e.g., Rex v. Gascoigne, 7 State Trials 959, 966 (K.B. 1680)
(high treason), where the jury consisted of one knight and 11 esquires despite the fact that
"the best gentlemen stay at home." (This case is discussed infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.) Nonetheless most of the cases reported in the State Trials were sufficiently
consequential to allow weight to be given to the designations of juror quality.
" This was Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys, who never hesitated to speak his mind. He has
been described by one critic as "'this very worst judge that ever disgraced Westminster
Hall."' E. Foss, supra note 13, at 369 (quoting Mr. Justice Foster). Foss added:
His [Jeffreys'] brutality in the examination of the witnesses in Lady Lisle's case, the
blasphemy of his imprecations, his unjust insinuations against the unfortunate prisoner
in his summing up, the ferocious anxiety he evinced for her conviction, and the threats
to the jury by which he enforced it, are truly disgusting, and were equalled if not surpassed in what we hear of all the subsequent trials.
Id. at 372.
"' Rex v. Lisle, 11 State Trials 297, 311 (0. & T. at Winchester 1685). Apparently Jeffreys was not always successful in manipulating juries to his liking. Commenting on Rex v.
Hayes, 10 State Trials 307 (K.B. 1684), Bishop Burnet stated:
Jeffries pressed the Jury, in his impetuous way, to find Hajes guilty of high treason;
because, tho' there was not a witness against Hales, but only presumptions appeared
upon the proof, yet, Jeffries said, it was proved by two witnesses that the letter was
found in Armstrong's pocket; and that was sufficient, the rest appearing by circumstances. The little difference between the writing in the letter and his ordinary hand,
was said to be only a feint to hide it, which made him the more guilty. He required the
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Whether instructions of this type destroyed or protected the rights
of the defendant may have depended upon the character of the
judge delivering the instructions."
When defendants requested substantial juries, they had mixed
success. In his felony trial at the Croydon assizes in 1590, Puritan
minister John Udall stated, "I do desire to be tried by an inquest
of learned men; but seeing I shall not, I am contented to be tried
by the ordinary course, as these men before me are, that is, as you
use to say, by God and the country."8 9 But in the proceedings

Jury to bring him in guilty: And said, that the King's life and safety depended upon
this trial: So that if they did it not, they exposed the King to a new Rye-Plot; with
other extravagancies, with which his fury prompted him. But a Jury of merchants
could not be wrought up to this pitch. So he was acquitted, which mortified the Court a
little: For they had reckoned, that now Juries were to be only a point of form in a trial,
and that they were always to find bills as they were directed.
1 G. BURNET, BisHoP BURNr'S HISTORY OF HIS OWN TIME 599-600 (London 1724).
88 Consider, for example, the following reassurances given in 1683 by Lord Chief Justice
Pemberton to defendant Lord Russell about the absence of a freehold requirement for
London jurors:
I must tell you, you will have as good a jury, and better than you should have had in a
county, of 41. or 40s. a year freeholders. The reason of the law for freeholds is, [t]hat no
slight persons should be put upon a jury, where the life of a man, or his estate, comes
in question; but in the city, the persons that are impanelled are men of quality and
substance, men that have a great deal to lose.
Rex v. Russell, 9 State Trials 577, 594 (Old Bailey 1683). At the time, Pemberton was Lord
Chief Justice of Common Pleas. See id. at 580 n.*; E. Foss, supra note 13, at 508.
Pemberton was acknowledged to be an excellent judge, even if somewhat egocentric and
independent.
Compare with the Pemberton example the following report of the exchange between
Lord Chief Justice Scroggs and the Staffordshire sheriff at the beginning of the trial of
Andrew Brommich for high treason for "being a Romish Priest":
The Lord Chief Justice having the night before charged the sheriff to return a good
jury, and the court being sat, he enquired of him if he had observed his directions; the
sheriff acquainted his lordship, that since he had impannelled the said jury, he had
heard that one [ ] [sic] Allen, of [ ] [sic] in the said county, being then returned to
serve on the said jury, had said in discourse with some of his fellows, that nothing was
done against the popish priests above, and therefore he would do nothing against them
here, nor find them guilty;, whereupon his lordship called for the said Allen and one
Randal Calclough, one of his fellow jurymen, and another witness upon oath, who proving the words against him, his lordship discharged him of the jury, and committed him
to prison till he found sureties for his good behaviour; and likewise three more of the
jury were discharged upon suspicion of being popishly affected, his lordship commanding the sheriff to return good men in their places; which was accordingly done ....
Rex v. Brommich, 7 State Trials 715, 715-19 (Stafford assizes 1679). According to Foss,
"[tihe obloquy which is attached to the name of Scroggs may serve as a warning to every
man to avoid obsequiousness to those from whom favour flows." E. Foss, supra note 13, at
597. Ultimately Scroggs was undone by his own "gross partiality and brutal conduct." Id. at
599.
89 Regina v. Udall, 1 State Trials 1271, 1277 (Croydon assizes 1590). See also the 1303
Year Book case discussed by Sir James Stephen, in which a defendant unsuccessfully protested "that he was a knight, and his jurors were not his equals, not being knights." 1 J.
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against William Acton for murder in 1729,90 the crown solicitor unsuccessfully sought to avoid drawing a second jury from the same
panel that had produced a jury that acquitted Acton in his first
trial.9 1 Defense counsel's response to the crown solicitor's attempt
was that "[t]he other panne[ 21 cannot write; these are men of ability and experience."9s
Further, in the trial of the elderly Sir Thomas Gascoigne, baronet, for high treason, Gascoigne requested "a jury of gentlemen,
of persons of my own quality, and of my own country, that may be
able to know something how I have lived hitherto, 9 4 to which
Lord Chief Justice Scroggs replied: "Tell him he shall have a good
jury of gentlemen of his own country."95 The jury sworn consisted
of one knight and eleven esquires, 98 despite the following colloquy
during the impaneling process:

Att. Gen.[97 I perceive the best gentlemen stay at home.
Serj. Maynard. Yes, it is so small a business.9 8
Occasionally the responsibility for the quality of a jury was
laid at the feet of a defendant who exercised too many challenges.
Judge Francis Bacon, in conducting the trial of Connor, Lord Macguire, for high treason, observed: "He [the defendant] hath spent
three days this term already, this is the fourth: we would have proceeded now, but for his peremptory challenge; but if we stay till tomorrow, he must be content to be tried by a meaner jury."99
The cases in the State Trials demonstrate that, in cases of
national importance, jury panels of well-bred men were returned
almost as a matter of course. Although the precise dynamics remain obscure except in those few instances of overt directions from
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND

261 (1883).
Rex v. Acton, 17 State Trials 511 (Surrey assizes 1729).
Id. at 511. Acton was the deputy keeper of the Marshalsea Prison. The crown prosecuted Acton for the alleged murders of four prisoners. Acton was found not guilty in each
case. Rex v. Acton, 17 State Trials 545, 562 (Surrey assizes 1729); Rex v. Acton, 17 State
Trials 525, 544 (Surrey assizes 1729); Rex v. Acton, 17 State Trials 511, 524 (Surrey assizes
1729); Rex v. Acton, 17 State Trials 461, 510 (Surrey assizes 1729).
2 Presumably, the different panel sought by the solicitor for the crown.
IsActon, 17 State Trials at 511.
" Rex v. Gascoigne, 7 State Trials 959, 963 (K.B. 1680).
95 Id.

"Id. at 966.
17 Sir Creswell Levinz. He later became a judge of the Court of Common Pleas where he
was "respected for his legal knowledge and upright conduct." E. Foss, supra note 13, at 406.
" 7 State Trials at 966.
'
Rex v. Macguire, 4 State Trials 653, 668 (K.B. 1645). Judge Bacon was distantly
related to the much more famous Francis Bacon of a generation previous.
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the crown or court, it is clear that the sheriff was the key to the
impaneling process. Customarily he decided how large a panel
should be returned in crown cases100 and who should be on the
panel. 01 Jury composition could be influenced in this manner
much more effectively than by statutory property qualifications.
The practice did not necessarily produce juries predisposed toward
guilty verdicts, 102 but it may have tended in that direction. The
commoner was not convinced that a jury of men of quality "chosen" by the impaneling officer secured a fair trial, despite the
availability of challenges; he was more apt to suspect that such jurymen were partial toward the crown.103 This was true of both
petit 04 and grand juries, 10 5 in-trials at Westminster Hall'0 6 and on
100 In civil cases the regular jury panel consisted of 24 names. See M.

DALTON, supra

note 22, at 316. But because of the large number of potential challenges, much larger panels
were returned in criminal cases. See, e.g., Rex v. Charnock, 12 State Trials 1377, 1390 (Old
Bailey 1696) (defendants exercised 33 challenges before jury impaneled); Rex v. Sidney, 9
State Trials 817, 823 n.* (K.B. 1683) (89-man panel).
101 The admonitions to sheriffs by Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys in Lady Alice Lisle's case,
see supra text accompanying notes 86-87, and by Lord Chief Justice Scroggs in the trial of
Andrew Brommich, see supra note 88, illustrate the court's reliance on the sheriff to return
the right kind of jurors. It is also clear that sheriffs exercised wide discretion in returning
jurors for unexceptional trials. For example, in Ashfield v. Dawling, Gray's Inn MS 34, fol.
396 (Upper Bench 1658), a verdict was set aside because
after the Sheriff had returned a Jury, the party for whom the verdict was given came to
the Sheriff and told him that Booth[,] one whom he had returned[,] was resolved not to
find for him and would starve first[,] as Booth had declared, and [he] desired him to
put him out, which accordingly the Sheriff (taking it for good Cause) put him out, and
put in of his own Head one Cole, which Cole did not serve because 12 besides
appeared.
Id. The influential role of the sheriff continued well into the nineteenth century. See H.C.
SELECT COMM. ON SPECIAL AND COMMON JURIES, supra note 13, at 3, 31.
102

See, e.g., supra note 87.
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attitude finds support across several centuries. Defending himself against a li-

bel charge, John Home cast many aspersions on special jury practice, including:
The best men and the worst men are sure to attend upon a special jury where the
crown is concerned; the best men, from a nice sense of their duty; the worst men, from
a sense of their interest. The best men are known by the Solicitor of the Treasury: such
an one cannot be in above one or two verdicts; he tries no more causes for the crown.
There is a good sort of a man, who is indeed the most proper to try all this kind of
causes; an impartial, moderate, prudent man, who meddles with no opinions. That man
will not attend; for why should he get into a scrape? He need not attend; he is sure not
to be censured; why should he attend? The consequence follows, that frequently only
four or five men attend, and those such as particularly ought not to attend in a crown
cause.
Rex v. Home, 20 State Trials 651, 691-92 (K.B. 1777).
104 As Cockburn notes: "If Chamberlain is to be believed, Edmund Peacham's conviction at the Somerset assizes in 1615 was ensured by drafting seven knights, all apparently
local magistrates, to serve on the petty jury." J. COCKBURN, supra note 23, at 115 (footnote
omitted). John Chamberlain, an Englishman, was "an accomplished scholar and an admirable letter-writer," who lived from 1553 to 1627. 4 THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 2
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assize.10 7 'Indeed, accusations of jury-packing invariably accompanied trial by jury, of whatever kind. 10 8
3. Specific Traditions Requiring Jurors of High Social
Standing. Parliamentary legislation and efforts by the court, the
crown, and the parties show a long history of concern for ensuring
able jurors. In addition, it was well established that specific types
of cases or inquests required juries consisting wholly or partially of
"men of quality."' 09

(L. Stephen & S. Lee eds. 1921-1922) (entry by T. Cooper).
105 See infra note 107.
1" For example, in Rex v. James, 6 State Trials 67 (K.B. 1661), a report of the trial
written by James's friends states:
[B]etwixt the commitment and trial. . .John James received a letter from a person of
note, to advertise him that there was such a jury of life and death impannelled to
proceed upon him, as had not been for many years before, being all picked men, and
most of them knights and gentlemen; and that if he did not except against them, or
most of the chief of them, he was a dead man.
Id. at 75-76.
107 Cockburn asserts that "[firom the 1640s onwards assizes increasingly came to resemble a political forum in which judges and local factions lobbied for support and competed openly for control of the grand jury," and that "[iln this environment jury packing
became a standard political tool." J. COCKBURN, supra note 23, at 116 (footnote omitted).
108 For representative examples, see Regina v. Tutchin, 14 State Trials 1095, 1099
(Guildhall 1704); Rex. v. Lewis, 7 State Trials 249, 249-50 (Monmouth assizes 1679); The
Trials of Twenty-Nine Regicides, 5 State Trials 947, 985 n.* (Old Bailey 1660); Penruddock's Case, 5 State Trials 767, 773 (0. & T. at Exeter 1655); Regina v. Throckmorton, 1
State Trials 869, 871 (Guildhall 1554); J. AsTRY,supra note 20, at 27; [A. BOOTH], supra
note 19, at 77; SELECT CAsEs iN CHANCERY 21 (W. Baildon ed. 1896) (entry no. 19); L.
SPOONER, supra note 22, at 148-49; 20 YAR BooKs OF EDWARD H, at 152 (M. Legge & W.
Holdsworth eds. 1934) (entry no. 56, Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. 2 (1316)); Remarks on
Fitzharris's Trial, by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General to King William the Third, 8
State Trials 425, 435-36 (1681).
101 The best known category hardly requires mention-trials of peers. Magna Carta secured to every free man the right not to be deprived of liberty or property "but by the
lawful Judgment of his Peers." 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225). This principle was already in place
under Henry I, see F. PALMER, PEERAGE LAW IN ENGLAND 146 (1907); 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MArrLAND, supra note 44, at 409, but it did not necessarily guarantee to earls and barons
trial by a jury of earls and barons since the king's judges also could be viewed as peers, id. at
409-10. Bracton, however, pointed out that in cases of high treason and felony, the king was
the prosecutor, and a baron or earl should not be judged by the king's own representatives,
his justices. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 66, at 337. In
this way, trial by other barons and earls came to be established for these cases. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 44, at 410.
Indeed the principle became so firm that the judges on the Wiltshire assizes in 1631
ruled that a peer could not waive his trial by peers and be tried "by ... the country"; any
such attempt would be construed as a refusal to plead. Rex v. Audley, 3 State Trials 401,
402 (Wiltshire assizes 1631); see 2 W. HAwINS, supra note 40, at 425. The principle extended to misprision of treason or felony, id., but did not apply to appeals of felony, that is,
to private civil actions involving accusations of felonious behaviour, id.; 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 3, at *308-12.
In civil actions and misdemeanors, peers have been tried by the country. For a long
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a. The grand assize. A defendant in possession of 'disputed
land could invoke the grand assize 10 as an alternative to trial by
battle."' The grand assize was distinguished by its special composition and method of selection. As stated by C.T. Flower, "[t]he
mere fact that the jurors had to be knights gave the grand assise a
pre-eminence, since freedom was a sufficient qualification for ju-

rors under the possessory assises. '1112 Pollock and Maitland make
clear that the jury in the grand assize was, originally at least, only
the twelve knights impaneled-the four knights who selected them
did not participate in the verdict.1 3
Assembling four knights as selectors and twelve knights as jurymen was no simple task,'14 but the requirements were flexible.
Even in the formative years of the grand assize, it is noted in
Glanvill that
with the consent of the parties, the court may award that, although all four knights have not come, one of them may elect
the twelve by joining with two or three other knights of the

while, peers had the right to insist that there be at least one knight on the panel of jurors
returned, whether the peer be plaintiff or defendant. See, e.g., R. BROWNLOW, DECLARATIONS
AND PLEADINGS IN ENGLISH 64 (3d ed. London 1659) (1st ed. London 1653-1654); T. POWELL,
THE ATTouRNEY's ACADEMY 72-73 (London 1647). Parliament eliminated this privilege by
statute in the eighteenth century. An act for the better regulation of trials by jury, 24 Geo.
2, ch. 18, § 4 (1751) (citing "great delays. . . in trials, where a peer or lord of parliament is
party, by reason of challenges to the arrays of panels of jurors, for want of a knight's being
returned") (emphasis omitted).
110 "A grand assize is composed of twelve lawful knights of the district in which the
disputed tenement lies, who have been chosen in the presence of the justices by four
knights, who have been chosen by the sheriff." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 44,
at 621 (footnote omitted). For additional descriptions of the grand assize, see 1 W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 327-29 (7th ed. 1956); 1 REEES' HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 394-401 (W. Finlason ed. 1880).
" Henry II created the grand assize and made it available to a tenant-defendant sued
under a writ of right. See W. DUGDALE, ORIGINES JURIDICALES 73 (London 1666); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supranote 44, at 147. See generally Russell, I Trial by Battle and the
Writ of Right, 1 J. LEGAL HIST. 111 (1980) (discussing the writ of right as a form of trial by
battle).
INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 130.
Flower was speaking of the early part of the thirteenth century; thus, the property qualification of the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw., ch. 38 (1285), had not yet become a requirement for common jurors in the possessory assizes.
1132 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,supra note 44, at 621 n.1. See supra note 110.
114 Flower describes a case from 1200 to illustrate this problem, which was exacerbated
by the normal defaults and delays attending the litigation of the era. INTRODUCTION TO THE
CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 130-32. See also 1 RE~vEs' HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH LAW, supra note 110, at 398-99 (describing delays inherent in assize
procedures).
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same county if any such can be found in court, even if they
were not summoned for that purpose.1 1 5
Much later, in his Commentaries Upon Original Writs, William
Hughes described a case in which the sheriff returned two knights
and two serjeants as selectors, because "there were not more
Knights within the County who were not of affinity to the one
[party] or to the other."1 1 Acknowledged to be an insufficient re1 17
turn, the court allowed it to stand ex assensu partium,
with
Hughes adding "and yet it was conceived, that if the Sheriff had
returned Gentlemen, and called them Knights, it was sufficient,
11 8
and not traversable whether they were Knights or not."
Over time, the grand assize atrophied, but it was not formally
abolished until the nineteenth century. " Both in terms of the unusual quality of the jurors and the special selection procedure, the
grand assize can be viewed as an antecedent to the later development of the special jury.
b. Attaint. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries,
the writ of attaint hovered over common jurors in civil actions, admonishing them to behave honestly. The attaint "consisted in
summoning a jury of twenty-four, and the proceedings were not
merely a reconsideration of the facts in dispute, but also a criminal
trial of the first jury for perjury."1 20 If found guilty, the original
jury faced severe punishment: "They were imprisoned for a year,
forfeited their goods, became infamous, their wives and children
were turned out, and their lands laid waste." 2 1
15 GLANVILL, supra note 66, at 32. In Glanvill, it is urged that six or more knights be
summoned for safety, and in general it is urged that "it is far better to rely on the discretion
of the court than to insist on the settled law and custom of the court." Id. Later writers
adopted this passage from Glanvill. See, e.g., W. DUGDALE, supra note 111, at 73.
I W. HuGHEs, TIE COMMENTARIES UPON ORIGINAL WRITS 67 (London 1655).
117 Id. That is, by or with the consent of the parties.
118Id.; see also J. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 121 (noting a case in which the requirement that the sheriff return four knights was not strictly followed). Alternatively, an accepted practice allowed knights to be summoned from a neighboring shire or county if there
were an insufficient number available locally. Such knights, however, could serve only if they
owned land in the shire or county to which they were summoned. See M. DALTON, supra
note 22, at 313; W.J., THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAW OF ENGLAND CONCERNING TRIALS IN
HIGH-TREASON, M1ISPRISION OF TREASON, AND IN ALL OTHER CRIMES AND OFFENCES RELATING

TO THE CROWN 234 (London 1710).
11l 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note

110, at 329. The statute abolishing real actions eliminated the grand assize. An Act for the Limitation of Actions and Suits relating to Real
Property, and for simplifying the Remedies for trying the Rights thereto, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch.
27, § 36 (1833).
12 T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 131 (5th ed. 1956).
"I1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 341.
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The relevance of the attaint to this study lies again in the special quality of the attaint jurors. 122 Fortescue observed that the jurors of attaint were to be persons "having much greater patrimony
than the first jurors,' 123 and the statutory property qualifications
support his statement. In 1436 Parliament passed a requirement
that attaint jurors each possess a twenty-pound freehold in cases
involving pleas of land worth more than fifteen shillings or pleas of
personalty worth more than forty pounds. 2 City and borough
courts were excepted,12 5 but near the end of the fifteenth century,
Parliament required attaint jurors in London to have £100 real or
personal property. 126 During the first half of the sixteenth century,
the'various property-holding requirements for attaint jurors were
reduced somewhat, but they reniained substantially higher than
1 27
the requirements for common jurors.
c. The grandjury. The accepted wisdom of the law writers of
the seventeenth century held that members of the grand jury were
"I It is not necessary for my purposes to trace the history of the writ or its scope.
Suffice it to say that the writ was largely obsolete by the late sixteenth century, and by the
mid-eighteenth century Lord Mansfield described it as "a mere sound." Bright v. Eynon, 1
Burr. 391, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366 (K.B. 1757). The writ was formally abolished in 1825.
See An Act for consolidating and amending the Laws relative to Jurors and Juries, 6 Geo. 4,
ch. 50, § 60 (1825). See generally 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 337-42 (discussing
attaint procedure). The writ was never applicable to criminal actions, and authorities differ
about the types of civil actions to which the writ attached. See GLANVILL, supra note 66, at
36 n.1; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 337-40; SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT
WRIT UNDER HENRY III, supra note 74, at lxxxvii-lxxxix.
J.FORTESCUE, supra note 49, at 61. In early cases, attaint jurors were knights. For an
example of a distringas of 24 knights in an attaint, see R. BROWNLOW, WRITS JUDICIALL 30
(London 1653). William Sheppard, however, described the attaint jurors merely as "twenty
four sufficient Gentlemen of the Countrey." W. SHEPPARD, AN EPITOME OF ALL THE COMMON
& STATUTE LAWS OF THIS NATION, Now IN FORCE 121 (London 1656). This is corroborated by
Hughes's statement that "the Writ of Attaint is 24 Milites [knights], and yet if the Return
be Generosos [gentlemen], it is good." W. HUGHES, supra note 116, at 67.
I2 Statute of 15 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1436-37). Three years later, Parliament enacted a special
rule for Kent, allowing a £20 leasehold or nonfreehold to qualify. Statute of 18 Hen. 6, ch. 2
(1439).
Statute of 15 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1436-37).
126 An Act agaynst Perjurye, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 21, § 1 (1495).
127 As of 1531, an attaint juror was qualified by a freehold worth 20 marks per year for
cases involving neither a capital offense nor less than £40 in dispute. See An Acte concernynge pjurie & punysshement of untreue verdictes, 23 Hen. 8, ch. 3, § 1(o) (1531-32). For
disputes concerning amounts in controversy less than £40, the qualification was freehold
worth five marks per year or personalty worth 100 marks. Id. § 3. The old (higher) standard
remained in effect for capital offenses.
In 1545, 400 marks personalty were made equivalent to 20 marks freehold for jurors
serving in the royal courts while sitting in London. An Acte that such as have goods to
CCCC marks maye passe in Attaints, 37 Hen. 8,ch. 5 (1545).
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generally men of "Great Worth,"12 8 who were "ingenious and
learned."1 9 Zachary Babington observed that grand jurors might
be "called Grand in respect of the quality of their Persons, and
greatness of their Estates, ability of their Judgments (being of
good Education).' ' I -0
Doubtless these characteristics were present on occasion, such
as in cases reported in State Trials. For example, in Rex v. Messenger,' the defendants were indicted after "having been several
times examined, upon confession of some, and pregnant proof
against others, by a special jury of several knights, esquires and
gentlemen, of very great worth and esteem, of the county of Middlesex." 13 2 Similarly, Bishop Burnet describes the grand jury that
shocked the court by returning an ignoramus bill""3 against Lord
Shaftesbury 4 as having been "composed of many of the chief citizens of London."' 5
Nevertheless, after extensive research on sixteenth- to early
eighteenth-century assize calendars, Cockburn concludes that
Blackstone's contention that grand juries in his day usually
consisted of "gentlemen of the best figure in the county" is
not true of earlier centuries. Respected local freeholders-those "sufficient inhabitants" on whom community service as tithingmen, constables, and coroners rested so heavily-with a leavening of junior magistrates and lesser
118A GuIDE TO ENGLISH JURIES 143 (London 1682).
120THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE ASSIZE 30 (London 1682 ed.) (1st ed. London

1660).
130

Z.

BABINGTON,

supra note 66, at 5 (emphasis in original). See also J. AsTRY, supra

note 20, at 5 (echoing Babington's observation); [J. HAWLES], THE GRAND-JURY-MAN'S OATH

AND OFFICE EXPLAINED 2 (London 1680) (describing grand jurors as men who "ought to be
Persons of more than ordinary Account, Estates, Understanding"); [J. SoMsRS], THE SEcuRITY OF ENGLISH-MENs LIvEs 14 (London 1681) (describing grand jurors as "of the most hon-

est, and most sufficient for Knowledge, and Ability of Mind and Estate").
131 6 State Trials 879 (Old Bailey 1668).
132 Id. at 879.
133 If the grand jury found the evidence insufficient to indict, the accepted practice of
the time was to return the bill of indictment marked "ignoramus," meaning "we know nothing of it." 1 J. CHITTY, supra note 40, at 324.
,34Rex v. Shaftesbury, 8 State Trials 759 (Old Bailey 1681).
135 1 G. BURNET, supra note 87, at 508 (emphasis in original). Upon the return of the
bill, pandemonium broke out among the spectators, causing the Attorney General to remark: "[L]et it be recorded this hollowing and hooping in a court of justice." 8 State Trials
at 821. In the view of Sir John Hawles, the jury "did like honest understanding gentlemen."
Remarks on the Earl of Shaftesbury's Grand Jury, By Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General
in the Reign of William III, 8 State Trials 835, 842. Hawles observed further that the serious business of the grand jury is "composed of more substantial and understanding men
than a petit jury." Id. at 839.
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gentlemen would perhaps describe more adequately the composition of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century grand juries.""6
Other recent work on the grand jury confirms Cockburn's conclusion.13 7 If these assessments of grand juror quality are accepted,
the panels would appear to represent a stratum of society roughly
comparable to that drawn upon in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries for special juries.
C.

Juror Qualifications: Special Knowledge or Expertise

Jurors with qualifications other than minimum property holdings traditionally were impaneled in certain types of cases. Jurors
in these cases have been "special," even if not so called, because
they were selected for their particular knowledge or expertise. During the late eighteenth century, for example, special juries of
merchants well-versed in mercantile customs helped Lord Mansfield articulate and order principles of commercial law.1 38 Mansfield's use of the jury as a resource of particular knowledge was not
new. As Thayer states, "[w]hat we call the 'special jury' seems always to have been used. It was a natural result of the principle
that those were to be summoned who could best tell the fact, the
veritatem rei."13 These earlier juries included not only jurors supposedly knowledgeable of the facts in dispute, but also jurors supposedly having special expertise or understanding. Both types of
cases are illustrated below.
1. Hundredors. Originally, jurors were presumed to know the
facts in dispute because they were residents of the vicinity where
the dispute arose. The early statutes called for jurors who were
"next Neighbours,"' 4 0 those who "have best Knowledge of the
14 1
Truth, and be nearest.
16 J. COCKBURN, supra note 23, at 112-13 (footnotes omitted).

'31 See J. MORRILL, supra note 26, at 18-19; C. Herrup, Weeders of the Commonwealth:
Grand Juries in Seventeenth-Century East Sussex 4 (unpublished manuscript, presented at
the annual meeting of the American Society for Legal History, Washington, D.C., October
23-24, 1981) (cited with permission) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
"
See supra note 13.
1.

j.THAYER, supra note 4, at 94.

110 Articuli super Cartas (Articles upon the Charters), 28 Edw., ch. 9 (1300).
141 Statute of 42 Edw. 3, ch. 11 (1368). Occasionally the vicinage requirement inspired
arguments resembling motions for a change of venue. In 25 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at
119-20 (J. Collas ed. 1964) (Paues v. Fraunceys, Y.B. Trin. 12 Edw. 2 (1319)), a wardship
case is reported involving the tender of marriage at a fixed time in Somerset, allegedly to
one John Fraunceys during his minority. Fraunceys asserted that he was then of age. Plaintiffs attorney argued that the writ alleged a tender of marriage in Somerset and "therefore
we ought to have a jury of the country in the county of Somerset." Id. at 120. But, agreeing
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In time, the concept that all jurors be "next Neighbours"
proved unworkable. The diluted variation that arose required that
1' 42
each common jury contain a certain number of "hundredors.'

The term "hundred" escapes uniform definition, but historically it
refers to a subdivision of a county, measured either by a number of
villages or by population. 43 According to Dalton, "hundredors be
men impannelled, or fit to be impannelled upon a Jury for any
Controversie, and dwelling within the Hundred where the Land
lieth, which is in question, &c. whereby they (by intendment of
Law) may have Notice de rei veritate, or better knowledge of the
44
Cause."

Coke reported that common law required four hundredors to
be on a jury "in a plea reall, mixt, and personal.' ' 45 The statute of
35 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1543-44)46 altered this rule by requiring that six
hundredors be returned on nisi prius panels, if available "within
the saide hundred where the Venewe lieth.' ' 147 During Elizabeth's

reign, Parliament decreed that the appearance of two hundredors
would suffice in trials of personal actions.14 8 In 1705 Parliament
eliminated
altogether the requirement of hundredors for civil
9
cases.

14

with the defendant Fraunceys, the court held that "none can have such good knowledge of
whether he was of full age at that time as those who have knowledge of his birth; and so you
shall have a jury of the county where he was born etc." Id.
142 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *360; E. COKE,supra note 17, § 234, at 157a.
143 According to Sir Thomas Smith:
An hundred, or lath, rape, or wapentake be called of the divisions or partes of shires in
divers countries diversly named after the manner and language of each countrey. For
the shires be divided some into x. xii. xiii. xvi. xx. or xxx. hundreds, more or lesse,
either that they were at the first C. townes and villages in eche hundred: and although
now they be but xvi. xx. xxx. xl. 1.Ix. more or lesse, yet it is still called an hundred, or
else there were but so many at the first as be nowe, or a fewe more or lesse, and they
did finde the king to his warres an hundred able men.
T. SmrrH, supra note 51, at 81.
"I M. DALTON, supra note 22, at 315.
x E. COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 157a.
1,6 An Acte concerninge thapparaunce of Jurors in the Nisi Prius, 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6
(1543-44).
147 Id. § 1.
148 An Act for the Returninge of sufficient Jurors and for the better Expedicion of Trialls, 27 Eliz., ch. 6, § 5 (1584-85).
149 An Act for the Amendment of the Law and the better Advancement of Justice, 4 &
5 Anne, ch. 3, § 6 (1705) (citing "great Delays... by reason of Challenges to the Arrays of
Pannels of Jurors and to the Polls for Default of Hundredors").
Before the 1705 enactment, there were some limitations on challenges for default of
hundredors. Juries in treason and felony trials were to be drawn from the shire where the
acts were laid, but no challenge was "to be had for the Hundred." F. PuLTON, DE PACE
REGIS ET REGm 242a (London 1610). Coke noted that in attaints, "although the Jury is
double, yet the Hundredors are not double." E. CoKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 157a. Shep-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:137

Of special interest to this study are the cases in which one
party challenged the jury for want of hundredors after both parties
had formed the jury through the struck jury procedure. Some
judges were naturally irked to receive such a challenge when hundredors on the panel had been struck off the panel by one of the
parties. During the seventeenth century, the King's Bench allowed
two such challenges, 150 but the Court of Exchequer ruled otherwise. Chief Baron Hale stated that "[ilt is against the common
course to take a challenge for want of hundredors. . where there
are but twenty-four left by the parties themselves."1 51 Later, in the
1 52
1724 decision of Rex v. Burridge,
the King's Bench held that
when the parties consented to the rule for a special jury, they im15
pliedly waived their rights to challenge for want of hundredors. 3
pard stated that 12 of the 24 attaint jurors must be of the hundred, W. SHEPPARD, supra
note 123, at 121, but according to Finch, four hundredors would suffice even in an attaint
jury, H. FINCH, LAw: OR, A DISCOURSE THEREOF, IN FOURE BOOKS 410 (London 1636).
Even the watered-down requirement for ordinary civil cases in Elizabeth's time annoyed some judges. For example, at the Norfolk summer assizes in 1658, Atkins, J. denied a
challenge for want of hundredors, apparently on the seemingly inapplicable ground that the
challenge should have been to the polls and not to the panel. Gray's Inn MS 34, fol. 406; see
infra note 251 for an explanation of the distinction between challenges to the polls and
those to the panel. In Benson v. Dawson, at the York assizes in the mid-seventeenth century, a panel was challenged because two hundredors did not appear at trial, though they
were returned in the panel; "and it was now allowed a good challenge, but the Judg [sic]
said he will not do it again, for this will overthrow most of the tryalls." [J. CLAYTON], REPORTS AND PLEAS OF Assizs AT YORKE 130 (London 1651).
150 Rex v. Kiffin, 3 Keble 740, 84 Eng. Rep. 984 (K.B. 1677); Mich. 1649 Banc. sup.,
Style 233, 82 Eng. Rep. 672 (Upper Bench 1650).
2 Attorney General v. Pickering, Hardes 228, 228, 145 Eng. Rep. 465, 466 (Exchequer
1662).
152 2 Ld. Raym. 1364, 92 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1724), also reported in 8 Mod. 245, 88
Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B. 1724); 1 Str. 593, 93 Eng. Rep. 720 (K.B. 1724). For discussions of the
reputations of these reports for accuracy, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 557, 560;
J. WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 355-56, 401-02 (4th ed. 1882) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1844).
15 Burridge, 2 Ld. Raym. at 1366, 92 Eng. Rep. at 390. Thus the court was able to
distinguish its seventeenth-century decisions, supra note 150 and accompanying text, because in those cases the court had ordered struck juries without the consent of the parties,
see 2 Ld. Raym. at 1366, 92 Eng. Rep. at 390. For a discussion of the circumstances in which
consent was required, see infra notes 365-81 and accompanying text.
Counsel for Burridge cited the practice in Common Pleas to issue a rule for a special
jury only after the parties had agreed not to challenge for want of hundredors, arguing that,
by negative inference, the Common Pleas admitted a right in the parties to challenge whenever that right had not been expressly waived. 2 Ld. Raym. at 1365, 92 Eng. Rep. at 389.
The King's Bench rejected this theory, expressing annoyance at the defendant's challenge as
"a concerted contrivance, only to put off the trial." Id. at 1366, 92 Eng. Rep. at 390. One
report recited that the defendant had advanced this challenge "with an air of insolence." 8
Mod. at 246-47, 88 Eng. Rep. at 176. Strange reported the court's blunt response to the
defendant's challenge as: "This is a plain contempt." 1 Str. at 593, 93 Eng. Rep. at 720.
Another report noted that the court "was of the opinion, that the defendant was guilty of a
premeditated contempt." 8 Mod. at 247, 88 Eng. Rep. at 176.
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Reports of Rex v. Burridge give no indication that either the
court or the parties sought a special jury of experts."" Assuming
the struck jury request was genuine and not a delaying tactic by
counsel,15 5 the parties probably sought a jury of gentlemen. Clearly
the parties had not sought special expertise through hundredors.
By the mid-sixteenth century, it was fanciful to view the hundredor requirement as likely to produce jurymen who were "experts" in the sense of being especially knowledgeable about the
facts in dispute. Arguably the requirement never had this effect,
but was merely a transitional device preserving the appearance of
the old jury of witnesses while the jury assumed its new role of
deciding the facts based on evidence presented in court. 6
2. Jurors in Trials of Aliens, Clerics, and Others. Another
specially constituted jury long present in the law pertained to trials of aliens or foreigners. An alien had the right in most cases to
request a trial de medietate linguae.157 Thayer states that "[t]he
jury of the 'half-tongue,' de medietate linguae, was founded on
considerations of policy and fair dealing, rather than a wish to provide a well-informed jury."58 Undoubtedly the concept was akin to
the sentiment expressed by Sir Thomas Gascoigne in his request
for "a jury . . . of my own country, that may be able to know
something how I have lived hitherto."' 5 9
The tradition was old and varied and was not limited to the
royal courts. Parliament provided an early articulation of the principle in the following 1354 enactment:
And that in all Manner of Inquests and Proofs which be to be
taken or made amongst Aliens and Denizens, be they
Merchants or other, as well before the Mayor of the Staple as
before any other Justices or Ministers, although the King be

I" The case involved only a misdemeanor charge against the former Mayor of Tiverton

for his alleged failure to appear on the day appointed for the election of his successor. 2 Ld.
Raym. at 1364, 92 Eng. Rep. at 389.
See supra note 153.
'a' The idea that by being neighbors to the event jurors would know the facts was tenacious, finding repeated expression well into the eighteenth century. See, e.g., J. AsTRY, supra
note 20, at 31.
117 Trials "de medietate linguae" were trials "of the half tongue," or trials in which one
party was an alien whose native language was not English. The statutory property qualifications for jurors were not applicable to alien jurors who served in such cases, see infra notes
160-79 and accompanying text, because aliens would not be freeholders. See statute of 8
Hen. 6, ch. 29 (1429); THE CoY.PamE JURYMAN, supra note 4, at 146-47.
I" J. THAYER, supra note 4, at 94 n.4.
Is# Rex v. Gascoigne, 7 State Trials 959, 963 (K.B. 1680); see supra text accompanying
notes 94-98.
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Party, the one half of the Inquest or Proof shall be Denizens,
and the other half of Aliens, if so many Aliens [and Foreigners] be in the Town or Place where such Inquest or Proof is to
be taken . . .."
The statutory reference to the Mayor of the Staple reveals antecedents from the law merchant."' 1 An inquest before the staple
courts "was to consist wholly of aliens when both parties to the
suit were aliens; wholly of denizens when both parties were
denizens; and half of aliens and half of denizens when one party
was an alien and the other a denizen."16 2 And, as Hubert Hall observed, "[tihese juries of 'the half tongue' were no new expedient,
for even Jews had long ago received this right."'8 3 The right to
which Hall referred is documented by J.M. Rigg in his study of the
thirteenth-century rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews. 6 4 The Exchequer of the Jews was essentially a branch of the royal Court of
Exchequer, with similar procedures, the most important modification being "the right of a Jew to trial by a panel 'de medietate'
when impleaded by a Christian upon a cause of action arising
within the Je vry.''165
There were other variants. Mary Bateson identified fourteenth-century borough customs calling for a jury of which half of
110

Statute of 28 Edw. 3, ch. 13 (1354) (brackets contained in 1

STATUTES OF THE REALM

348 (1816); compilers direct readers to omit bracketed words, id. at n.10). For representative
early cases of such trials, see 7 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 90-91 (G.
Sayles ed. 1971) (plea no. 46, Hil. 1397); 2 SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER
BEFORE ALL THE JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 96, 100 (M. Hemmant ed. 1948) (entry no. 29,
Lombards v. Taillour, Pasch. 1485). The form of the venire facias in use during the early
seventeenth century is shown in R. BROWNLOW, supra note 109, at 455-56; R. BROWNLOW,
supra note 123, at 155.
1I One year previous, Parliament had enacted a series of provisions applying aspects of
the law merchant to staple towns, including the "medietate linguae" principle. See
Ordinacio Stapularum (The Ordinance of the Staples), 27 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, ch. 8 (1353). Forsyth points out that the commonly held view that the origin of trial de medietate dates to
the reign of Edward I1 is mistaken-evidence of the concept exists in a charter of Edward
I. W. FORSYTH, supra note 4, at 228. Forsyth was referring to the Carta Mercatoria of Edward I, discussed in 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 624 n.3; see infra note
198 and accompanying text. Charles Gross indicates that trial de medietate was followed as
well in the temporary piepowder courts associated with trade fairs. Gross, The Court of
Piepowder, 20 Q.J. ECON. 231, 243 (1906).
162 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT A.D. 1270-1638, at xxvii (C. Gross
ed. 1908); see J. THAYER, supra note 4, at 94 n.4.
143 2 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT A.D. 1239-1633, at xx (H. Hall ed.
1930).
1" S.LECT PLEAS, STARRS, AND OTHER RECORDS FROM THE ROLLS OF THE EXCHEQUER OF
THE JEWS A.D. 1220-1284 (J. Rigg ed. 1902).
165Id. at xxiii. For examples of this procedural right, see Articles Touching the Jewry,
id. app. V, at lxi, and various cases, id. at 63, 64, 78, 79, 83, 84, 103, 104, 116.
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its members were burgesses in the trial of any burgess outside the
borough.""6 In general, the "half-tongue" principle applied to
Welsh defendants, though not to Scots. 67 Further applications occurred in the university and ecclesiastical courts. Blackstone observed that when a university scholar was indicted at the assizes or
elsewhere for treason, felony, or mayhem, the vice-chancellor of
the university could claim jurisdiction, and the resulting trial was
before the high steward and a jury formed "de medietate"-half
from a panel of eighteen freeholders returned by the sheriff and
half from a panel of eighteen matriculated laymen returned by the
beadles of the university. 68 And under a writ of jure patronatus
concerning church patronage, the dispute could be tried by the
bishop or by a specially appointed commission, before "a Jury of
six Clergymen and six Laymen of the Neighbourhood, or of as
many more as the Bishop pleases; the Proportion being observed of
Clergy and
Laity, that there be as many of one Sort, as the
9
16

other."

It is therefore clear that the de medietate concept, known also
in the literature as a "party jury," 170 had wide application. Thayer
is undoubtedly correct in suggesting that the concept grew out of
notions of fair dealing, 71 spurred primarily by the idea that some
members of the jury should speak the defendant's language.172 The
practice books give examples of venires calling for the aliens to be
natives of the defendant's country, sometimes even of the defendant's city of residence. 7 s Yet this practice did not persist. Pulton
1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 10-11 (M. Bateson ed. 1904).
Id. at 10 n.3; W. DUGDALE, supra note 111, at 64. Even before An Act for an Union
of the Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 6 Anne, ch. 11 (1706), Scotsmen were not
146

17

considered aliens. See THE COMPLETE JURYMAN, supra note 4, at 145-46; 2 W. HAWKINS,

supra note 40, at 420. The reason was simple-they "speaketh our language." W. LAMBARD,
EIRENARCHA 555 (London 1614).
148 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *275.
J..
J.
MALLORY, QUARE IMPEDIT 169 (London 1737).
170 See, e.g., 3 R. BURN, THE JUSTIcE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 104 (J. King
ed. 22d ed. 1814); J. HERNE, PLEADER 462 (London 1657).
"'
172

See supra text accompanying note 158.

Hall, in describing a mercantile case involving a Lombard plaintiff relying on ledger
accounts, states that "it was clearly essential (if justice was not to become a farce) that not
only half the jurors, but also some at least of the auditors ... and of the arbitrators...
should speak the language that was before them in a written form." 2 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT A.D. 1239-1633, supra note 163, at xx. See W. LAMBARD, supra
note 167, at 554-55.
17 See, e.g., J. HERNE, supra note 170, at 462, where the plaintiff alleged that he was an
alien born at Antwerp and requested a party jury, half to be aliens born at Antwerp. Five
such alien jurors were returned. A sixth foreigner, who was also from Antwerp according to
the pleadings, was added as a talesman from the bystanders in court.
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observed that the trial "per medietatem linguae" 174 was available
at the king's grant even before the statutes of 27 Edw. 3, Stat. 2
(1353) 17 and 28 Edw. 3, ch. 13 (1354), but because the statute
of
176
27 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, applied only to civil actions in staple towns, it
"did not remedy the mischief, where the king was party. ' 177 Thus

"the before rehearsed statute of 28. E. 3. was provided, which
maketh mention generally of aliens: therefore it is not materiall of
what nation those aliens are.

' 178

Eventually, it would suffice for

each of the six alien jurors to be from a different nation. 79 This
ludicrous image of jury members wholly unable to communicate
with each other, much less with the defendant, obviously contradicts the original justification for this type of trial.
There was additional erosion of the concept. By statute, trial
de medietate was unavailable to "Egyptians," that is, to rogues
and vagabonds commonly known as gypsies.180 Likewise, this privilege was unavailable in treason trials, 81 in actions or suits concerning statutes regulating imports and exports,8 2 and in inquests to
assess damages by a writ of inquiry upon a default judgment taken
against an alien.183 The privilege was also inapplicable to grand juries, 184 and, iifa defendant in a criminal action pleaded not guilty
and allowed a common jury to be returned, he waived his right to a
party jury.185
By the late eighteenth century, therefore, the party jury had
become more form than substance, even though it was still available. Perhaps never viewed as a jury of experts, the party jury
emerged to ensure a jury able to understand the point of view of
174

F. PULTON, supra note 149, at 193a.

Ordinacio Stapularum (The Ordinance of Staples), 27 Edw. 3, Stat. 2 (1353).
Id.
177 F. PULTON, supra note 149, at 193a.
178 Id. See also G. DUNCo mBE, TRIALS PR PAis 195 (5th ed. London 1718) (1st ed.
London 1665); 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 420.
1792 J. LILLY, THE PRAcTicAL REGISTER 125 (London 1719).
180 An Acte concernyng Egypsyans, 22 Hen. 8, ch. 10, § 1 (1530-31); An Acte for the
Punishement of Vagabondes callyng themselfes Egiptians, 5 Eliz., ch. 20, § 2 (1562-63). For
discussion of these statutes, see 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 420; F. PULTON, supra note
149, at 193a.
181 See An Acte wherby certayne Offences bee made Tresons; and also for the Governement of the Kinges and Quenes Majesties Issue, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 10, § 6 (1554 & 155455); THE COMPLETE JURYMAN, supra note 4, at 145.
182 See, e.g., An Act for preventing Frauds and regulating Abuses in His Majesties Customes, 14 Car. 2, ch. 11, § 13 (1662).
183 THE COMPLETE JURYMAN, supra note 4, at 146.
184 Id.; 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 419.
185 J. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 87.
178

176
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the alien party. In this sense, its animating spirit was similar to
that of the special jury of the eighteenth century.
3. Matrons. In Lambard's colorful words, a female defendant
in a criminal case could "have (for once onely) the benefit of her
belly, if it be found by women thereto appointed that she is with
child."186 Lambard meant that, although pregnancy in a female
criminal defendant would not delay her trial, the court could stay
her execution if she were found guilty of a capital crime in order to
permit the child to be born.18 7 For the limited purpose of ascertaining whether her claimed pregnancy was genuine, the court
would impanel an all-female jury under the writ de ventre inspiciendo (to inspect the belly). Upon the appearance of the
women in court, the clerk of assize would administer the following
oath to the jurors: "You as [matrons] of this Jury shall swear that
you shall search and try the Prisoner at the Bar, whether she be
quick with Child of a quick Child, and thereof a true Verdict shall
return according to the best of your judgment; so help you God."'
A bailiff would then escort the jury and the prisoner to a chamber
where the jury would search and inspect the prisoner, returning a
verdict declaring whether or not she was quick with child. If she
was found to be pregnant, the court would stay her execution until
the next assizes. If she should then be pregnant again, she gained
no further reprieve, and "the Sheriff or Gaoler which had the custody of her, shall be fined for keeping her so slackly, that she had
the company of a man."1 11
Who the jurors were and how they were summoned are not
known. 90 Naturally courts used the all-female jury for reasons of
18e W. LAMBARD,

supra note 167, at 563.

87 Apparently the procedure was unavailable outside the royal courts. According to one

authority, "Justices of Peace cannot award a Venire facias tot matronas,to know whether a

Felon be with child or no." R. CHAMBERLAIN, THE COMPLETE JUSTICE 430 (London 1681)."
:so THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF ASSIZE, supra note 129, at 61 (emphasis omitted).
1 Id.
at 63.
110 There is some evidence that "pleading her belly" was a common phenomenon

among female criminal defendants, so that the impaneling of a female jury would have been
familiar to the public at large. In Moll Flanders,Daniel Defoe frequently refers to the practice in describing Newgate prisoners. Moll describes her own emergence into the world after
her mother received a respite of her sentence of transportation, having "[p]leaded her belly,
and being found quick with child." D. DEFOE, THE FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE FAMOUS MOLL FLANDERS 2 (Modern Library ed. 1950) (1st ed. London 1722). Much later when
Moll was herself imprisoned in Newgate, a fellow prisoner explained that she was not under
immediate threat of execution because "I pleaded my belly, but I am no more quick with
child than the judge that tried me, and I expect to be called down next session." Id. at 262.
Defoe explained that "[t]his 'calling down' is calling down to their former judgment, when a
woman has been respited for her belly, but proves not to be quick with child, or if she has
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delicacy, but they primarily viewed the women as experts on the
subject of their inquiry. "Matrons" were impaneled-married
women or widows who had experience with childbirth. 91
The writ de ventre inspiciendo was also used on occasion in
civil cases, but for a different purpose. Blackstone describes the
writ as appropriate "when a widow feigns herself with child, in order to exclude the next heir, and a suppositious birth is suspected
to be intended. '192 Richardson and Sayles trace the civil use of the
writ back to 1220 in the records of Bracton, where they found
knights and matrons jointly conducting the examination. 19 3 One
year later, a case is reported in which a jury of fourteen women
from London was impaneled,19 4 and by 1223, the use of the writ
was shown by its appearance on the plea roll. 195

been with child, and has been brought to bed." Id. Passages such as these help to explain
the degree of suspicion that existed among the judges that defendants were not in fact with
child. See infra note 192.
"I1One definition for "matron" is "[a] married woman considered as having expert
knowledge in matters of childbirth, pregnancy, etc.; now only in jury of matrons." 6 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 239 (rev. ed. 1933). Blackstone states that the jury can be of
matrons "or discreet women," 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *388, but the cases invariably refer to matrons, see, e.g., Regina v. Baynton, 14 State Trials 598, 634 (Q.B. 1702)
(names of 12 matrons contained in report of case).
192 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *362. The courts were extremely suspicious of
trickery in these situations, as is shown by the following cases. In Willoughby's Case, Cro.
Eliz. 566, 78 Eng. Rep. 811 (C.P. 1597), a writ de ventre inspiciendo issued out of Chancery
directing the Sheriff of London to have Dorothy Willoughby viewed by 12 knights and
searched by 12 women in the presence of the knights, and to report the results to Common
Pleas. This was done and Dorothy was reported to be 20 weeks pregnant. Then a second
writ issued

commanding the sheriff safely to keep her in such an house, and that the doors should
be well guarded; and that every day he should cause her to be viewed by some of the
women named in the writ (wherein ten were named); and when she should be delivered, that some of them should be with her to view her birth, whether it be male or
female, to the intent there should not be any falsity.
Id. at 566, 78 Eng. Rep. at 811. A similar writ was issued in Theaker's Case, Cro. Jac. 686,
687, 79 Eng. Rep. 595, 595 (C.P. 1625), except that because the widow had remarried within
a week after the death of her first husband, she was allowed to cohabit with her new husband, with daily inspections to take place at their house. See also Ex parte Aiscough, 2
Peere Wins. 591, 594, 24 Eng. Rep. 873, 874 (Ch. 1730), where the Lord Chancellor allowed
that the second writ need not be executed in quite so strict a manner, "provided people of
skill had from time to time free access to her, and might be present at the birth."
193 SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY III, supra note 74, at cliii.
194 Id. at cliii-cliv. This case may be found in 3 BRACTON's NoTE BOOK 417-18 (F.
Maitland ed. 1887) (plea no. 1503).
195 See SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY III, supra note 74, at
cliv. This case can be found in 3 BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK, supra note 194, at 473-74 (plea no.
1605). For another example in the King's Bench from the late fourteenth century, see 7
SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, supra note 160, at 56 (plea no. 30, Pasch.
1388).
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4. Merchants and Other Experts. Matrons were a rare species of expert jurors. Less rare were merchant juries, which existed
long before Lord Mansfield. In some instances merchant status ensured quality rather than expertise,1 9 but usually it was otherwise.
The distant heritage, of course, was the law merchant. Thus "[i]n a
Court of Pipowders the triall is by the Merchants." 197 And the
Carta Mercatoria of Edward I (1303) provided that a foreign
merchant may have six foreign merchants on the jury.19 8 Many examples of juries of merchants, or "merchants and next neighbors,"
can be found in the thirteenth-century records of the Fair Court of
St. Ives.1 99
Given this background, the regular use of merchant juries
would be expected in the royal courts during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, a period when legal questions of mercantile
importance appeared with increasing frequency. Writing in the
mid-seventeenth century, Matthew Hale observed that when a
question of lex mercatoria arose in the common law courts, "if it
be a question touching the custom of merchants[,] merchants are
usually jurors at the request of either party."2 0 0
Nevertheless, few reports of such cases exist.201 In his Reges'" See, e.g., Rex v. Borosky, 9 State Trials 1 (Old Bailey 1682). Count Conigsmark, one
of the defendants on trial for murder, was an alien. Speaking through an interpreter, he
requested a trial de medietate, a jury comprised of "half foreigners and half English...
[who were] persons of some quality, as they use to treat persons of his quality, and strangers." Id. at 9. Lord Chief Justice Pemberton responded: "There shall be such strangers, tell
him." He then addressed the undersheriff: "You have merchants of good account, I suppose,
upon this pannel?" The undersheriff replied: "Yes, my Lord, they are all such." Id. See
supra note 87 (Bishop Burnet's comments on Rex v. Hayes, 10 State Trials 307 (K.B.
1684)).
'*
H. FINCH, supra note 149, at 412. In the staple towns, merchants joined judges to
form lay tribunals. See W. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
72-73 (1904).
19&See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 624 n.3 (discussing the Carta
Mercatoria).
1'9 See, e.g., 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT A.D. 1270-1638, supra
note 162, at 17. The role of the merchants was not limited to the customary medieval jury
function of being witnesses to the facts; often the merchants "declared the law." W. MITCHELL, supra note 197, at 73. In other contexts the merchant jury was closer to common law
traditions. Mitchell refers, for example, to a case in the maritime court in Padstow in which
the mayor and burgesses were assisted by "a jury of mariners and merchants." Id. (footnote
omitted).
200 M. Hale, Treatise of the Admiralty Jurisdiction (unpublished manuscript), quoted
in Baker, Ascertainment of Foreign Law: Certification to and by English Courts Prior to
1861, 28 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 141, 144 (1979).
201 It should be emphasized again that most of the analysis in this article is derived
from printed sources, which would not necessarily contain data about jury composition or
characteristics. As the passage from Hale's manuscript suggests, see supra text accompanying note 200, absence of evidence in such sources about seventeenth-century merchant juries
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0 2 William Style mentions a 1646 King's Bench
turn Practicale,
decision in which the court granted a motion for "a Jury of
Merchants . . . to try an issue between two Merchants, touching
Merchants affairs," because "they might have better knowledge of
matters in difference which was to be tryed, then [sic] others
could who were not of that profession."0 3 In the 1649 case of
Pickering v. Barkley, °4 the court held that a contract was to be
interpreted according to the custom of merchants and summoned
merchants to decide the issue.2 0 5
Assorted cases can be identified indicating the courts' readiness to impanel other juries of experts on an ad hoc basis. Thayer
stated that jurors were occasionally "men of particular trades," citing a 1394 jury of "cooks and fishmongers, where one was accused
of selling bad food."2 6 A further example arose in the 1663 libel
trial of John Twyn.20 1 One of the defendants stated: "We desire we
may have a jury of booksellers and printers, they being the men
that only understand our business."20 8 Lord Chief Justice Hyde replied: "There are those already that understand it as well as booksellers or printers; besides, half the jury are such, and they are able
to make the rest understand it .... 209
Later, in 1700, Holt reported an anonymous case involving a
dispute between an earl and one of his farmers over the value of
improvements on the land. 210 Holt indicated that the first jury of
farmers gave £ 200 damages, which the court considered excessive.
But on the second trial, "a Jury of Gentlemen [was] order'd, who
only gave 40 l.''211 The court considered this insufficient and
granted the farmer's motion for a third trial. 1 2
Sayles reports early King's Bench cases in which juries of

does not prove that they did not exist. Original source work from the plea rolls and elsewhere might tell a different or more complete story, but even this is uncertain. For example,
in Filks v. Newman, Harvard MS 4055(4), fol. 4 (K.B. 1734), Chief Justice Hardwicke noted
that "on Trials at Bar the names of the Jury are never entered on [the] Record and [it] is in
no case necessary but where [there] is a Tales, and there tis to show how many are of the
original pannel and how many [are] of the Tales."
202 W. STYLE, REGESTUM PRACTICALE (London 1657).
203 Id.
at 161 (emphasis in original).
204 Style 132, 82 Eng. Rep. 587 (Upper Bench 1649).
205 Id. at 132, 82 Eng. Rep. at 588.
200 J. THAYER, supra note 4, at 94 & n.4.
207Rex v. Twyn, 6 State Trials 513 (Old Bailey 1663).
208

209
230
212
212

Id. at 519.
Id.
Anonymous, Holt 703, 90 Eng. Rep. 1288 (K.B. 1700).
Id. at 703, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1288.
Id.
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clerks and attorneys were impaneled to deal with alleged falsification of writs by attorneys,2 13 extortion by court officials, 1 4 and
similar behavior. 15 The problem of corrupt behavior by officers of
the court persisted over the centuries, and expert juries of inquiry
became a regular part of the administration of the Court of Common Pleas in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries.
From an examination of fifteenth-century plea rolls, Dr. J.H.
Baker has ascertained that official inquiries into alleged misconduct by an attorney or officer occurred "[v]ery occasionally." 216 In
1566 Lord Chief Justice Dyer ordered a sixteen-member jury of attorneys,2 1 7 and in 1654 Common Pleas issued a rule calling for a
jury of clerks and attorneys to be impaneled once every three years
"to enquire of Abuses, Extortions, &c. of Attornies."218 Undoubtedly these juries of inquiry functioned as investigative committees
or special commissions more than as traditional juries addressing
specific factual disputes. Yet in their role of applying expertise to
the identification and evaluation of behavior differing from the
norm, they resemble the later merchant juries that applied expertise on mercantile customs to the commercial behavior of the
litigants.
D.

Summary

Three meanings of the term "special jury" were presented at
the beginning of this article. The first type of "special jury," a jury
of men of high social or economic status, served by informal practice in cases of national importance.21 9 Such juries served as well
under formal legal rules or traditions in grand assizes,2 0° at11135 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH,

supra note 44, at 47 (plea no. 18,

Pasch. 1330).
114Id. at xx.
215 Id. at 83-84 (plea no. 38, 1336). See also 6 SELECT CASES INTHE COURT OF KING'S
BENCH 30-31 (G. Sayles ed. 1965) (plea no. 15, Pasch. 1344), reporting the lively case of a
man arrested for insisting on walking about Westminster Hall in a full suit of armor. A jury
of attorneys and ministers of the court confirmed that the defendant had been spoken to in
"coarse and wicked language" by unknown men and that he was genuinely in fear of his life.
Id. at 31.
214 Baker, The Attorneys and Officers of the Common Law in 1480, 1 J. LEGAL HisT.
182, 184 (1980).
17 PRAxis UTRiUSQUE BANci 40-41 (London 1674).

118[W. BOHUN], THz PRACTISING ATroRNEY

39 (London 1724).

A Proclamation for Jurors, by James I, supra note 18, urged "that there be a discretion used, as well in returning the most principall persons upon the greatest causes, as in
sorting men of quality with their equals, as neere as may be." See supra notes 85-108 and
accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
11I
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taints,221 and grand juries.222 These formal rules and traditions
were followed with varying degrees of fidelity.223 The second type
224
of "special jury," a jury of experts, included the jury of matrons,
the jury de medietate linguae,225 and other juries whose members
possessed special knowledge or expertise.226 The third type of "special jury," the struck jury, is the subject of the remainder of this
article.
II.

EMERGENCE OF THE STRUCK JURY

By the early eighteenth century, the term "special jury" became synonymous with "struck jury." The statute of 3 Geo. 2, ch.
25 (1730),227 treats the struck jury as an established concept, using

the terms special and struck jury interchangeably without elaboration. 228 Struck juries did not always require men of above-average

property holdings, high social standing, or particular knowledge or
expertise. Rather, the formation procedure, allowing each party to
strike twelve prospective jurors from a panel of forty-eight names,
was the consistent distinctive characteristic.
One of the early articulations of the formation procedure was
in Duncombe's 1665 treatise on trial by jury. After mentioning the
statutory four-pound freehold requirement, Duncombe wrote:
And the Court may in matters of great consequence, direct a
Venire facias, for a Jury of above 4 1. per annum, a piece, but
not under Cro. 2. part. 672. But in such Cases (every one
knowes) the Court most commonly orders the Prothonotary to
chuse 48. out of the Sheriffs Book of Freeholders, of the most
substantial men in the County, and the parties strike out 12. a
piece, then the Sheriff returns the rest. 2 9
221 See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
22 Grand assizes, for example, were indeed tried by knights, see supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text, but contrary to the contentions of law writers, grand juries have not
always been composed of leading citizens, see supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
1'

See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.

225

See supra notes 157-85 and accompanying text.

226

See supra notes 196-218 and accompanying text.

227 An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730).
228 Id. § 15.
2I G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73. The chief clerk of King's Bench on

the plea side was the Prothonotary. His deputy was the secondary who was also called "the
Master." W. BOHUN, INSTITUTIO LEGALIS 16 (3d ed. London 1724) (1st ed. London 1708)
(emphasis in original). On the crown side, the principal officer was the Clerk of the Crown
Side, who in turn was attended by a secondary. See generally 1 THE CLERK'S ENGLISH TuTOR 42, 47-48 (London 1733) (descriptions of court officers).
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This passage raises most of the remaining questions addressed in
this study of the origins of the special jury: whether there is evidence before or during Duncombe's period indicating that the
struck jury procedure was accepted and widely known; whether the
order for a jury "of above 4 1. per annum, a piece"23 0 was accompanied always by the struck jury procedure; whether such juries were
ordered only for trials at bar (the usual mode of trial for matters of
great consequence); on whose motion such a jury would be impaneled; whether a showing of good cause was required; whether the
court's granting of such a jury was a discretionary decision; and
whether the court would order it over the parties' objections.
A.

Earliest Appearances

Citing a King's Bench rule from Michaelmas term 1645, William Style in his 1657 Regestum Practicale3 1 referred to the special jury as follows: "In all cases where there is to be a special Jury,
there the Venire Facias must be special. Mich. 22 Car. B.r. For
'23 2
ordinary forms are not applicable to extraordinary cases.
Then, on the authority of a King's Bench rule from Trinity term
1646, Style gave the following example of cases meriting special
juries: "Upon a motion and an Affidavit made in Court, that the
Cause to be tryed at the barr, is a Cause of very great consequence,
the Court will make a Rule for theS Sheriff to retorne 48. Jurors
2
upon the Jury. Trin. 23 Car. B.r. I
In his second edition (1670), Style added the following explanatory sentence to the preceding example: "That each party may
have liberty of challenge and yet a sufficient Jury remain.2 3 4 But
in the 1694 edition (published long after Style's death in 1679235),
Lilly significantly revised the text to read:
Upon a motion and an Affidavit made in Court, that the
Cause to be tryed at the Bar, is a Cause of very great consequence, the Court will if they see Cause, make a Rule for the
Secundary to name 48 Free-holders, and each party to strike
out 12 by one at a time, the Plaintiff or his Attorny to begin

"'

G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73.
W. STYLE, supra note 202.
W31
Id. at 329 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 163.

134

W. STYLE, THE PRACTicAL REGISTER 239 (2d ed. London 1670) (1st ed. London 1657)

"'

(emphasis in original).
M See 19 THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 104, at 140 (entry by
J.M. Rigg).
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first, and the remaining 24 shall be the Jury to be returned for
the Tryal of the Cause, Trin. 23 Car. B.R.2 86
The preceding passages suggest that Style was unaware of the
struck jury procedure, despite Duncombe's 1665 assertion that the
procedure was something "every one knowes. ' 2 s 7 Certainly Style's
1670 explanatory sentence was peculiar.23 8 Large panels were often
returned in criminal cases in anticipation of numerous challenges,
but this was done at the sheriff's discretion without need for motion, affidavit, and rule of court."' e Style's text was not limited to
criminal cases in any event, and the suggestion that an especially
large panel was necessary in civil cases (where there were no peremptory challenges 24 )-even civil cases of great consequence-appears unsupportable.
In his original edition, Style also dealt with situations "where
it is conceived an indifferent Jury will not be retorned. . . by the
Sheriff of the County where the venue lyes. ' '2 41 He noted that in
such cases, "the Court, upon motion, will order the Sheriff to attend the Secondary of the Office with his book of the Freehoulders
of the County where he is Sheriff, that he may see an indifferent
Jury retorned. '' 242 As authority, Style cited a rule of Trinity term
231W. STYLE, PRAccAL REGISTER 288-89 (3d ed. London 1694) (1st ed London 1657).
Lilly published in 1710 a two-volume work entitled A Continuation of the PracticalRegister. In the preface, Lilly states:
There having come to my Hands a little Book, entituled, Style's PracticalRegister,
wherein I thought were many Things well worth Observation, and some others which
wanted some Correction and Amendment ... I did in the year 1694, make such Alterations, Corrections and Additions thereunto ... as I though necessary and fit for my
own Private Use, without any Intention of making it Publick ....
J. LILLY, A CONTINUATION OF THE PRAcICAL REGISTER at iii-iv (London 1710). He added
that the bookseller holding an interest in Style persuaded him to allow one impression of
the 1694 revised version as a trial run, after which Lilly would do a more complete job if the
trial succeeded. But the bookseller died and his executors published several impressions of
the 1694 edition "with such Additions as they could get; and what they are, let the World
judge." Id. at v. The two-volume "continuation" in 1710 was largely a compilation of new
and revised material, but in 1719 Lilly incorporated this material into the 1694 edition of
Style and published the PracticalRegister under his own name. J. LILLY, supra note 179.
The revised passage from the 1694 edition quoted in the text was repeated unchanged in the
1719 edition, 2 id. at 123, and therefore seems properly attributable to Lilly as of 1694.
237 G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73; see supra text accompanying note
229.
238 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
240 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *346.
241 W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 163.
242 Id. In the 1670 edition, an additional sentence appears: "But there may be probable
matter shewed to the Court why an indifferent Jury may not be had, else the Court will
make no such Rule." W. STYLe,supra note 234, at 239 (emphasis in original). In 1694, the
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1646,243 but in the section about sheriffs he cited a rule of Michaelmas term 1645 for the following statement: "In some cases the
Court will order the Sheriff to attend the Secondary of the Office,
with his Book of Free-holders of the County where the Land in
question doth lye, that an indifferent Jury may be returned for a
tryal at the Bar. Mich. 22. Car. B.r."' 244 To this was added in 1670
the phrase: "That is in such cases where the Court conceives the
Sheriff will not return an indifferent Jury.' ' 245 This additional
phrase harmonized the two passages. The only apparent difference
between them was that the court, in trials at bar, on its own motion could order the sheriff to attend the secondary; in other cases,
the court required a motion by one of the parties and a showing of
good cause.
Neither the 1657 nor the 1670 edition clarifies the procedure
for these "unindifferent sheriff' '246 cases, but Style implies that the
secondary selected the jury ("that he [the secondary] may see an
indifferent Jury retorned"). 4 7 In the 1694 edition, however, Lilly
explicitly states that in trials at bar the court "usually" orders the
sheriff to attend the secondary with his book of freeholders, in order "that an indifferent Jury may be struck by the Secundary in
the presence of the Attornies, on both sides, and afterwards re2 48
turned by the Sheriff.
None of the three editions of Style refers to a panel of fortyeight names or to a procedure by which each party strikes twelve
names in the "unindifferent sheriff" cases. Yet during the eighteenth century, this type of case became a standard example of an
occasion for the struck jury procedure, a procedure which was by

word "may" was changed by Lilly to "must." W. STYLE, supra note 236, at 288. See also 2 J.
LILLY,

supra note 179, at 510 ("In Trials at the Bar the Court doth usually order the Sheriff

to attend the Secondary.

.

. that an indifferent Jury mag be struck by the Secondary in the

Presence of the Attorneys on both sides .

.

243 W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 163.
244 Id. at 304.
245 W. STYLE, supra note 234, at 503 (emphasis in original).
24 The expression is awkward, but it was standard usage in the legal literature of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
14 W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 163; see supra text accompanying note 242.
241 W. STYLE, supra note 236, at 505 (emphasis added). The earlier passage in the 1694
edition dealing with ordinary trials (not at bar) states that "the Secundary in the presence
of the Attornies on both sides [is] to strike a Jury." Id. at 288. That the secondary was on

occasion the impaneling officer in cases of alleged bias receives further support in Style's
report of Pooly v. Markham, Style 477, 82 Eng. Rep. 876 (Upper Bench 1655). The defendant alleged that some of the jurors were the same jurors who had been "feasted" by the
plaintiff in a former trial. Chief Justice Glyn ruled: "Let the Freeholders book be brought to
the Secondary, and let him retorn a Jury." Id. at 477, 82 Eng. Rep. at 876.
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then invariably known by the term "special jury." The most likely
catalyst for this eighteenth-century viewpoint was Blackstone, who
wrote the following oft-cited passage:
Special juries were originally introduced in trials at bar, when
the causes were of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders; or where the sheriff was suspected of partiality, though not upon such apparent cause, as to warrant an
exception to him. He is in such cases, upon motion in court
and a rule granted thereupon, to attend the prothonotary or
other proper officer with his freeholder's book; and the officer
is to take indifferently forty eight of the principal freeholders
in the presence of the attornies on both sides; who are each of
them to strike off twelve, and the remaining twenty four are
returned upon the panel.24
There is no known evidence that the struck jury procedure applied before the eighteenth century to the "unindifferent sheriff"
situation. This situation presented a completely different problem
from that of striking the jury in a trial of great consequence. In the
latter instance, parties sought a highly capable jury of qualified individuals who would apprehend the importance of the case and
would behave responsibly. This goal was accomplished by requiring a large panel of exceptional individuals. The panel could have
been reduced from forty-eight to twenty-four by the secondary,
but, perhaps to avoid overt appearances of jury-packing, the parties were given that task. In the unindifferent sheriff situation,
there was neither a need for a larger panel than usual nor a need
for jurors of exceptional ability; the problem was simply to avoid
the alleged bias. This had been a recognized problem for centuries.
The standard illustration in the legal literature from the fifteenth
to the eighteenth centuries was a sheriff who was "cozen," or kindred, to one of the parties.250 In such cases, it was uniformly stated
2"

3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *357-58. Blackstone perceived the inconsistency

between the struck jury practice and the standard practice of having the coroner return the
jury when the sheriff was biased, discussed infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
Blackstone stated that the struck jury procedure applies only where the suspected partiality
of the sheriff is "not upon such apparent cause, as to warrant exception to him." 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *358.
250 See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *359 ("challenges to the array..
. may
be made upon account of partiality... in the sheriff"); E. COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at
156a ("there is a principall cause of challenge ... if the sherife ...
be of ...
kindred or

affinitie to the plaintife or defendant"); G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 29 (if
the plaintiff "surmise. . . that the Sheriff is his Cozen," he may pray that the "Venire be
directed to the Coroners"); H. FINCH, supra note 149, at 401 ("Cosinage in the Sherife is a
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that the plaintiff could have the venire directed to the coroner, not
the secondary.2 5 1

good principall challenge to the array"); W. GREENWOOD, A PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION OF
COUNTY-JUDICATURES 21 (5th ed. London 1675) (1st ed. London 1654) ("Challenge is said to
be, where... [t]he Sheriff or Bayliff which make the Pannel, is of the Plaintiffs kindred");
J. HERNE, supra note 170, at 256-57 ("Challenge for that Sheriff is father to the Wife of the
Plaintiff"); J. KrrCHIN, JURISDICTIONS 180 (London 1651) ("the Plaintif may quash the array
though the Sherif is of consanguinity or affinity of the Defendant"), 587 (if the sheriff is
"cozen to the Plaintif," the defendant "may have his challenge and quash the Jury"); T.
POWELL, THE ATTORNEYS ACADEMY 118 (London 1623) (if either party believes "the Jury to

bee favourable, and not indifferently returned by the Sheriffe," he may challenge); T. Powsupra note 109, at 17-18 ("if the defendant be of kin to the Sheriffe either by bloud or
marriage, the plaintiffe may pray the venire fac' may bee directed to the Coroners"); THE
PRACTICK PART OF THE LAW 30 (London 1654) ("where the Defendant is of kindred to the
Sheriffe ... the Plaintiffe may pray the Venire Facias directed to the Coroners"); 2 THE
REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 31, at 104 (a party may challenge a jury impaneled by a sheriff who is a party or related to a party); R. VAUGHN, PRACTICA WALLIAE 38
(London 1672) (the plaintiff may challenge the array if "there be any kindred, affinity, or
alliance between [the defendant] or his Wife; and the Sheriff or his Wife"); J. WILKINSON, A
ELL,

TREATISE CONCERNING THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITIES OF CORONERS AND SHERIFES

377 (London

1657) (plaintiff may challenge the array if the "Sherife is Cousin" to the defendant).
If the coroner was also suspected of bias, process issued to two electors or elizors, "two
whom the Court shall chuse and deeme fit to retorn the Jury; And to the retorn of these
[Electores] . . .no challenge will be admitted." G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30,
at 28. See also J. HERNE, supra note 170, at 257 ("coroners challenged for the cause of
consanguinity"); R. VAUGHN, supra, at 39 (the defendant may "put in a challenge to both
coroners, if there be cause, and pray process to Elizors").
251 Specific procedures and limitations circumscribed this privilege. If, upon examination, the defendant persuasively denied the alleged "cozenage," the court issued the venire
to the sheriff "because the... Sheriff's Authority and profit shall not be taken away, without cause apparent to the Court." G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 29-30. A
defendant, moreover, was not allowed to request that the coroner return the jury. Such a
privilege would enable the defendant needlessly to delay his trial and was unnecessary because he was protected against biased jurors by his unlimited challenges for cause. See Lord
Brooke's Case, Gray's Inn MS 34, fol. 323 (Upper Bench 1657); E. CoKE, supra note 17, §
234, at 157b; G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 29-30.
This scheme can be illustrated as follows. If the plaintiff was cousin to the sheriff, the
plaintiff could anticipate challenge by the defendant to the array of jurors and move to have
the venire returned by the coroner. The coroner would do so if the defendant "confesse[d]
it," that is consented. E. CoKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 157b. If the defendant refused to
consent, the plaintiff would have the venire issued by the sheriff, and the defendant would
be estopped from challenging the array for cause. If the plaintiff did not move to have process issued to the coroner, the defendant could not do so, because he had the alternative of
the challenge to the array. See, e.g., id. (If, however, the court ultimately upheld the defendant's challenge to the array, process would then issue to the coroner. 1 J. CHITrY, supra
note 40, at 548.)
If the relationship between the plaintiff and the sheriff were more tenuous, the defendant could still challenge "to the favour." See, e.g., E. COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 156a.
In such cases, two "triers," chosen from among the jury panel, the attorneys, or the coroners, would hear the challenge and recommend whether the court, in its discretion, should
allow it. See 1 J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 4, at 208; 1 J. CHITTY, supra note 40, at 549; E.
COKE, supra note 17, § 234, at 157b-58a.
If the challenge to the array due to alleged bias in the impaneling officer failed, a defen-
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Style's work contains the only seventeenth-century reference
to the secondary as the impaneling officer when the sheriff's impartiality was questioned, although, as mentioned, Style supports his
reference with a 1646 King's Bench rule.2 52 Possibly the rule was
made to avoid the accepted limitations on the privilege of referring
the venire to the coroner, particularly the unavailability of the
privilege to a defendant.2 53
Style may well have been one of Blackstone's sources. 254 Style

dant could still exercise his challenges "to the polls," challenges to individual jurors in
whom bias could be shown. See generally 1 J. CHITTY, supra note 40, at 536-51 (discussing
the grounds for challenges for cause). Thus, the defendant still had recourse when the relationship between the plaintiff and the sheriff was insufficient "to warrant an exception to
him." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *358. It is surprising, therefore, that the struck
jury would be used in these cases, see id., for by using the struck jury, process was moved
from the sheriff to the secondary. In practical terms, this would not only provide the defendant a new principal challenge (analogous to the "cozenage" case), but also it would allow
him to exercise the challenge before the initial return of the panel-something he could not
do even when the "cozenage" in the sheriff was clear. Moreover, there was no guarantee that
the matter would be at rest by sending process to the secondary. In Rex v. Johnson, 2 Str.
1000, 93 Eng. Rep. 995 (K.B. 1734), local Chester judges allowed a challenge to the array,
based on an unindifferent sheriff, after the sheriff had received from the secondary the
panel of 24 names to be called. For an explanation of the case, see infra note 373.
Interestingly, in his 1718 edition, Duncombe notes without explanation that the defendant could pray for elizors in a trial at bar. G. DUNCOMBE, supra note 178, at 124. Elizors
were appointed by the court when coroners were biased. Id. at 151; see supra note 250. If by
1718 struck juries were used automatically in trials at bar, process would issue to the
secondary, not the coroner. Perhaps, therefore, Duncombe's statement was a recognition of a
practical problem. At assizes or nisi prius, the defendant could exercise his principal challenges normally, and a new panel of jurors could be obtained locally. In a trial at bar, however, the original panel of jurors would have been called to London for naught if the defendant there challenged the array because of the alleged bias in the impaneling officer. This
problem could be avoided by allowing the defendant to pray for elizors before the trial
began.
252 See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. I have been unable to locate independent corroboration of such a rule. Style is the source of unpublished decisions of King's
Bench Judges Henry Role and Sir John Glynne. See W. STYLE, NARRATIONES MODERNAE, OR
MODERN REPORTS BEGUN IN THE NOW UPPER BENCH COURT AT WESTMINSTER

(London 1658).

Style's Regestum Practicalestates that it is applicable to proceedings in the Upper Bench
"[tiaken for the most part, during the time that the late Lord Chief Justice Rolle did sit and
give the Rule there." W. STYLE, supra note 202, at title page.
Some published court rules are available, see, e.g., RULES AND ORDERS FOR THE COURT OF
THE UPPER BENCH AT WESTMINSTER, MADE AND PUBLISHED BY THE JUDGES OF THE -SAID COURT,
IN THE TERME OF ST. MICHAEL, IN THE YEAR

1654 (London 1655), but I have found none for

the years in question, the mid- and late-1640's.
.253
See supra note 251. See also Pooly v. Markham, Style 477, 82 Eng. Rep. 876 (Upper
Bench 1655) (indicating that the defendant could only challenge the jury after it was impaneled, despite the fact that the plaintiff was known to have "feasted" the jurors in a former
trial between the parties), discussed supra note 248.
254 Courts often turned to Style as an authoritative source. For example, in Dodson v.
Taylor, Harvard MS 2050, vol. 1, at 169, 181 (K.B. 1736), Chief Justice Hardwicke, in upholding a rule of practice, stated, "I have looked into some of the Books concerning the
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states that both in cases of unindifferent sheriffs and in matters of
great consequence, the sheriff must attend the prothonotary or secondary with the book of freeholders in the presence of the attorneys for the parties. 55 Perhaps these statements caused Blackstone to lump the two situations together as illustrations of the
256
special (struck) jury.
It is also unclear how widely known the availability of a special jury was before the eighteenth century in cases involving matters of great importance (Style's original example).25 7 An examination of the reports from King's Bench, Common Pleas, and
Exchequer throughout the 1600's yields only a handful of such
cases.2 58 The earliest example is Style's report of the anonymous
King's Bench case in 1649 involving a challenge to the array for
want of hundredors. 59 The court ruled that although the "Jury
was returned by the Secondary by rule of Court, and the Hundreders were put out by the consent of the parties," the challenge
was good.2 60 This report corroborates Style's reference in his original edition of Regestum Practicale to a King's Bench rule of

Practice of Cts. In Style's Practical Reg. 344 there is mention of such a Rule, and it is
transcribed in the very same Words into Lilly's Abr. 84, 87."
See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
'"See supra note 249 and accompanying text. Another source of Blackstone's application of the special jury to the case of the unindifferent sheriff could be the 1724 King's
Bench decision in Rex v. Burridge. Several reports of the case were published, see supra
note 152, one of which describes the court as stating that a special jury could be struck by
the master if a lawful objection to the sheriff were established by affidavit. 8 Mod. at 248, 88
Eng. Rep. at 177. The point under discussion, however, was whether a special jury could be
ordered without the consent of the parties, not who should be the impaneling officer. Id. at
245, 88 Eng. Rep. at 175. Indeed, in a later case, Rex v. Johnson, 2 Str. 1000, 93 Eng. Rep.
995 (K.B. 1734), the court not only belittled Rex v. Burridge but also acknowledged that
"though the sheriff is mentioned in the rule, yet that is only as he is the usual officer; but it
did not preclude the prosecutor from taking the venire to the coroner," id. at 1001, 93 Eng.
Rep. at 995. The last statement was followed by this sentence: "And the court remembered
in what manner the motion was made by Strange, viz. that where-ever the prosecutor thinks
fit to take his venire, there may be a special jury." Id. Perhaps Strange was suggesting that
when the sheriff was biased the venire could be directed to the coroner, and the coroner
would attend the secondary with the freeholders book to strike the special jury.
157 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
" As excerpts from Style, see supra note 244 and accompanying text, and Duncombe,
see supra note 229 and accompanying text, suggest, struck juries were used frequently in
trials at bar. See also infra notes 316-19, 351-61 and accompanying text. In Charles
Cremer's Reports, containing cases heard by the Upper Bench and King's Bench from 1650
to 1676, 36 cases are identified as having been trials at bar. Gray's Inn MSS 33-35. There
were probably many more such cases. If all or most of the trials at bar used struck juries,
the concept ought to have become reasonably familiar, at least to the judges and leading
practitioners in London. But see infra notes 264-74, 294-309, 359-60 and accompanying text.
'51 Mich. 1649. Banc. sup., Style 233, 82 Eng. Rep. 672 (Upper Bench 1650).
20 Id. at 233, 82 Eng. Rep. at 672.
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1646 11 and suggests that the parties had reduced the panel from
forty-eight to twenty-four.26 2 The one other "hundredor" case
found from the period is clearer; there, the court expressly noted
that each party had, by rule, struck out twelve of the forty-eight
jurors returned. 6
Other references to the struck jury procedure in the cases
prior to 1700 are sporadic and incomplete. 6 4 If, however, the procedure is divided into two parts-(1) the impaneling of a jury specially chosen by consent of the parties, and (2) the particular use
of a panel of forty-eight and an impaneling officer other than the
sheriff-earlier roots of, or analogies to, the procedure are discernible. Style's passages contain the earliest known references to the
second part, 6 5 but the first part was not new. In scores of Year
' '266
Book cases, jurors were "chosen with the consent of the parties.

261
262

See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
But see supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text for evidence that Style himself

was unaware of the struck jury procedure.
263 Rex v. Kiffin, 3 Keble 740, 84 Eng. Rep. 984 (K.B. 1677).
264 Mr. Farrington's Case, Jones T. 220, 84 Eng. Rep. 1227 (K.B. 1682) (struck jury not
allowed in capital cases); Rex v. Kiffin, 3 Keble 740, 84 Eng. Rep. 984 (K.B. 1677) (defendant may challenge for lack of hundredors despite a struck jury); In Enquest, Br. 30, 1
Keble 864, 83 Eng. Rep. 1288 (K.B. 1665) (sheriff not allowed to bring the book of freeholders to the secondary when court orders a new trial).
266 See supra notes 233-34, 252, 257 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY m, supra note
74, at 44 (plea no. 30, Hil. 1266), 46 (plea no. 31, Mich. 1267), 83 (plea no. 68, Pasch. 1257),
98 (plea no. 85, 1259), 99 (plea no. 87, Hil. 1260), 100 (plea no. 88, Hil. 1260), 112 (plea no.
106, Hil. 1260). For additional examples see GLOUCESTERSHIRE EYE ROLLS, supra note 70,
at 496 (entry no. 1129); ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE FOR YORKSHIRE 398 (D. Stenton ed.
1937) (entry no. 1117); 7 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, supra note 160, at
43 (plea no. 21. Hil. 1385); 9 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 66 (G. Turner ed. 1926) (entry
no. 18, Northmimmes v. Castel, Y.B. Trin. 4 Edw. 2 (1311)), 90 (entry no. 25, Carpenter v.
Carpenter, Y.B. Trin. 4 Edw. 2 (1311)), 138 (entry no. 33, Boydyn v. Brun, Y.B. Trin. 4
Edw. 2 (1311)), 147 (entry no. 35, Bishop of Exeter v. Taillur, Y.B. Trin. 4 Edw. 2 (1311));
10 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 123 (G. Turner ed. 1947) (entry no. 30, Butiller v. Le
Wronge, Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 2 (1311)); 12 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 106 (W. Bolland ed.
1916) (entry no. 45, Tony v. Cheshut, Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw. 2 (1312)); 14 YEAR BOOKS OF
EDWARD II (pt. 2), at 31 (W. Bolland ed. 1927) (entry no. 18, Heyvil v Le Suur, Y.B. Hil. 6
Edw. 2 (1313)), 63 (entry no. 27, Cooper v. Shirley, Y.B. Hil. 6 Edw. 2 (1313)); 15 YEAR
BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 17 (W. Bolland ed. 1918) (entry no. 4, Prior of St. Bartholomew v.
Prioress of Clerkenwell, Y.B. Trin. 6 Edw. 2 (1313)); 16 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 25
(W. Bolland ed. 1922) (entry no. 1, Abbot of Valmont v. Parson of Stratfieldsaye, Y.B. Hil. 7
Edw. 2 (1313)); 17 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 79 (W. Bolland ed. 1925) (entry no. 33, Rex
v. Prior of the Hospital of St. John, Y.B. Hil. 8 Edw. 2 (1315)), 199 (entry no. 7, Rex. v.
Bray, Y.B. Trin. 8 Edw. 2 (1315)); 18 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD IH,supra note 15, at 120
(entry no. 20, De Lisle v. Say, Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 2 (1314)), 196 (entry no. 30, Hereford v.
Prior of Newnham, Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 2 (1314)), 208 (entry no. 36, Bures v. Abbot of Fcamp, Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 2 (1314)); 19 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, at 15 (G. Turner ed.
1929) (entry no. 6, Wanerville v. Stainford, Y.B. Mich. 9 Edw. 2 (1315)), 51 (entry no. 17,
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R.C. Van Caenegem, in his study of royal writs in. England from
the conquest to Glanvill, identifies as a "remarkable feature" of
the popular jury "the frequent election of the jurors by the
litigants."' 6 7
The customary reference in the early cases to "jurors chosen
with the consent of the parties" is frustratingly terse, yet it appears with sufficient frequency to suggest an accepted and wellknown practice. Perhaps the practice was connected to what has
been termed "oblations," that is, applications for juries accompanied by the payment of fees. 26 8 Van Caenegem states: "We find, for
example, someone paying 1 mark of silver 'for the jurors whom he
elected', which meant the privilege of choosing for himself the jurors rather than having them selected by the sheriff."2 6 9 Similarly,
Lady Stenton remarks that "[i]t seems probable that when the accused were ready to purchase an inquest they expected to have the
benefit of a jury specially empanelled. 2 70 In the Curia Regis Rolls
circa 1200, C.T. Flower finds many examples of oblations in both
civil and criminal cases where parties sought "to have an enquiry
2 71
by a jury on a specified issue, or to have a jury of a special type.
These early examples of oblations strongly resemble the later
practice of impaneling a special jury at the request of one of the

Segrave v. Godyn, Y.B. Mich. 9 Edw. 2 (1315)), 90 (entry no. 2, Westbach v. Abbot of Cluny,
Y.B. Hil. 9 Edw. 2 (1316)), 91 (entry no. 3, Dorre v. Le Fevre, Y.B. Hil. 9 Edw. 2 (1316)); 20
YEAR BooKs OF EDWARD II, supra note 108, at 58 (entry no. 15, Gynes v. Vescy, Y.B. Mich.
10 Edw. 2 (1316)), 120 (entry no. 38, Abbot of St. Osyth's v. Pateshulle, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw.
2 (1316)); 22 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD H1, at 129 (J. Collas & W. Holdsworth eds. 1942) (entry
no. 37, Atte Grene v. Sharp, Y.B. Mich. 11 Edw. 2 (1317)), 192 (entry no. 6, Le Poter v.
London, Y.B. Hil. 11 Edw. 2 (1317)), 227 (entry no. 22, La Rivere v. Abbot of Abingdon,
Y.B. Hil. 11 Edw. 2 (1317)), 283 (entry no. 7, Le Norreys v. Le Norreys, Y.B. Pasch. 11 Edw.
2 (1318)); 25 YEAR BooKS OF EDWARD II, supra note 141, at 18 (entry no. 31, Cerzians v.
Dynham, Y.B. Pasch. 12 Edw. 2 (1319)), 110 (entry no. 23, Kynardeseye v. Parent, Y.B.
Trin. 12 Edw. 2 (1319)).
267 R. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 68, at 77.
"a INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 77.
269 R. VAN CARNEGEM, supra note 68, at 95 (footnote omitted).
270 GLOUCESTERSHIRE EYRx ROLLS, supra note 70, at lxii. See also LINCOLNSHIRE EYRE
ROLLS, supra note 70, at lxx (discussing cases in which an accused person offers money to
have a jury decide his guilt or innocence).
271 INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., supra note 68, at 482.
Thus, "Guy de Cesteinle gave two marks to have a jury from a single hundred," and Bernard de Scrouteby paid half a mark for an enquiry "by twelve lawful men of the soke of
Hemsby who should be acceptable to both parties." Id. at 483 (footnotes omitted). Further
[i]n an assise of mort d'ancestor, when the sheriff had been ordered to put other lawful
men in the place of four who had been removed, the defendant gave a mark to have
knights chosen to fill the vacant places, although the jurors in possessory assises were
not necessarily knights; and the sheriff was ordered to do this.
Id. at 484 (footnotes omitted). For another example, see id. at 436.
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parties, who would then be responsible for additional fees. 27 2 To

the extent that the juries purchased by oblation were also chosen
by the parties, the resemblance is stronger still. Apparently, however, an oblation did not automatically generate the right to choose
the jurors; neither were jurors "chosen with the consent of the parties ' 273 invariably purchased by oblation.274
How these practices continued or changed through the later
Year Book period and the dark era of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is not known. A similarly obscure but possibly
related concept emerged toward the end of this period. The term
"substantial jury" appears in several case reports. The expression
was not a widely accepted term of art,27 ' but, from the cases, seems

to have referred to a jury composed of men with property holdings
at a specific level above the statutory minimum. Conceivably the
term was an early description of a struck jury.
The first of these cases was Morris v. Thomas,27 6 decided in
the Queen's Bench in 1591. There the court agreed with counsel
that a jury owning freeholds worth more than that required by
statute "is no fault at common law; for it is for the benefit of the
parties to have the better trial; and if it be, it is helped by the
statute of jeofails.I''
The same point arose in the 1623 King's
Bench decision of Philpot v. Feeler."' Responding to a motion in
See infra notes 395-406 and accompanying text.
"" See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
171

24 Compare THE ROLL AND WRIT FILE OF Tm BERKSHIRE EYRE OF 1248, at 159, 186 (M.

Clanchy ed. 1973) (pleas nos. 379, 437) (oblations for juries chosen by consent of parties)
[hereinafter cited as BERKSHIRE E-m ROLLS] with id. at 263 (plea no. 617) (jurors chosen by
consent of the parties without reference to oblation) and id. at 322, 346, 380 (plea nos. 804,
873, 990) (oblations for juries without reference to consent of parties in choosing jurors) and

id. at 229, 246 (plea nos. 535, 580) (juries impaneled by sheriff without reference either to
oblation or to consent of the parties in choosing jurors).
276 Although juries of higher stature than ordinary were often summoned in important
trials, see supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text, no consistent use of the term "substantial jury" occurred in those cases.
276 Cro. Eliz. 256, 78 Eng. Rep. 512 (Q.B. 1591).
277 Id. at 257, 78 Eng. Rep. at 512 (emphasis in original). A statute of jeofails allows a
party to amend harmless errors of form after the fact. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3,
at *406.
27' Cro. Jac. 672, 79 Eng. Rep. 582 (K.B. 1623), also reported sub nom. Philpot &

Feilder's Case, Godb. 334, 78 Eng. Rep. 196 (K.B. 1623). The suit originated in Chancery,
which issued a venire facias. Returnable in King's Bench, the venire called for jurors having

at least four pounds annual freehold income. Defendant's attorney argued that the fourpound requirement of "the statute of 27 Eliz. c.6 [An Act for the Returninge of sufficient
Jurors and for the better Expedicion of Trialls, 27 Eliz., ch. 6, § 1 (1584-85)]" applied only
to writs issued by "the King's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Justices of Assize,"
Cro. Jac. at 672, 79 Eng. Rep. at 582. Writs issued by Chancery, he argued, were outside the
statute. Id. Godbolt's report provides another strand of defense counsel's reasoning. He ar-
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arrest of judgment on the ground that the venire facias specified
jurors holding property worth more than the statutory minimum,
plaintiff's counsel argued: "[B]y the common law, Judges may direct a venire facias tales quorum quilibet habeat tantum de terris,
in cases where the matter is of great consequence; but they may
not appoint of lesser value than the statute limits. ' 27 9 The court
denied the motion, although not upon the strength of plaintiff's
argument. Justice Chamberlain was equivocal, stating that the
Statute of Jeofails 280 cured any problem with the venire at common law. 281 Godbolt's report of the case describes two of the justices as having thought it "a plain case, for the venire facias ought
to be according to 35 H. 8 cap. 6, ''281 which only requires jurors to
have forty shillings income.28s These views explain why Duncombe,
after stating that "the Court may in matters of great consequence,
direct a Venire facias, for a Jury of above 4 1. per annum, a piece,"
' 284
added "but not under Cro. 2. part. 672 [Philpot].9
Whatever doubt the King's Bench may have had on the issue
disappeared before Attorney General v. Blood 285 was decided in
1680. There the writ of venire facias specified a twenty-pound
freehold requirement for jurors called to try the defendants for a
conspiracy to indict the Duke of Buckingham for buggery. 2 86 Citing
both Philpot28 7 and Morris,28 8 Henry Pollexfen 2 9 argued for the

gued that venires issued by Chancery were still held to the 40-shilling requirement of the
"statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. [An Acte concerninge thapparaunce of Jurors in the Nisi Prius,

35 Hen. 8, ch. 6, § 1 (1543-44)]." Godb. at 334, 78 Eng. Rep. at 197. The statute of 1543-44
related back to the statutes of 2 Hen. 5, Stat. 2, ch. 3 (1414); Statutu de illis q' debent poni
in Jur' & Assis' (The Statute of Persons to be put in Assises and Juries), 21 Edw. (1293);
Les Premers Estatuz de Westminster (The Statutes of Westminster I), 3 Edw., ch. 11
(1275).
Philpot v. Feeler, Cro. Jac. at 672, 79 Eng. Rep. at 582.
Statute of 32 Hen. 8, ch. 30 (1540) (Mispleading Jeofailes, & c.).

'o
11

2

Cro. Jac. at 672-73, 79 Eng. Rep. at 582.
Godb. at 334, 78 Eng. Rep. at 197. The two justices reasoned that "27 Eliz. cap. 6

speaks nothing of the Chancery." Id.
183

See supra note 278.

" G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73; see supra text accompanying note

229.
1"

Raym. Sir. T. 417, 83 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1680).

$6 Id.
187 Philpot v. Feeler, Cro. Jac. 672, 79 Eng. Rep. 582 (K.B. 1623); see supra notes 27883 and accompanying text.
'" Morris v. Thomas, Cro. Eliz. 256, 78 Eng. Rep. 512 (Q.B. 1591); see supranotes 27677 and accompanying text.
215 This was the same Henry Pollexfen who appeared as defendants' counsel in the
Trial of the Seven Bishops, see infra notes 299-309 and accompanying text, and who later
became Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas under William I, see E. Foss, supra
note 13, at 523.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:137

Attorney General that "['t]is for the advantage of the defendant to
have a substantial jury. "290 A unanimous court agreed with Pollexfen's declaration that "before the statutes it was, and now is in
the power of the court to award a yen. fac. of what larger sum they
please." 91
The term "substantial jury" appears in reports of other seventeenth-century cases: a trial in King's Bench in 1638 for a breach
of the peace was before a "substantial jury,

'292

and one year later,

a report of a murder case described the trial as having been before
a "substantial jury of Surry [sic]." 29 3 In neither of these cases did

the reporter use the term in a technical sense, but the jurors may
well have owned property worth more than the statutory
minimum.
Whether these "substantial juries" were in fact early examples
of struck juries cannot be established. The possibility is logical, especially by the time of Attorney General v. Blood, 94 and is
squarely supported by Duncombe's assertion that these
cases-Philpot a5 excepted-were the very ones which by common
knowledge involved the struck jury procedure. 26 Nevertheless,
what came to be described in the eighteenth century as the struck
jury appears not to have emerged as a distinct procedural concept
before the King's Bench rule of 1646 noted by Style. Even during the second half of the seventeenth century, there is reason to
question Duncombe's assertion that the procedure had become one
that "every one knowes."298
290
291

Attorney General v. Blood, Raym. Sir T. at 417, 83 Eng. Rep. at 218 (Mr. Pollexfen).
Id. (Mr. Pollexfen). Shower reported the case under a different name and viewed the

issue as one of statutory construction: "[T]he statute says four pounds a year at the least; so
that it may be more, and it is the substance which is regarded by that statute." Rex v.
Curtis, 2 Show. K.B. 144, 144, 89 Eng. Rep. 848, 848 (K.B. 1680). Although the court agreed
with Polexfen, Raymond in his report of the case expressed doubts about giving the court
so much discretion in setting the worth of jurors: "[F]or if it shall be in the power of the
Court to put what sum they please in the venire fac. the defendant being in prison may be
there detained for want of jurors of that value.
"Attorney General v. Blood, Raym. Sir.
T. at 418, 83 Eng. Rep. at 218.
21 Rex v. Heyward, Cro. Car. 498, 499, 79 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1030 (K.B. 1638).
293 Cooper's Case, Cro. Car. 544, 544, 79 Eng. Rep. 1069, 1069 (K.B. 1639).
" Raym. Sir T. 417, 83 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1680).
Philpot v. Feeler, Cro. Jac. 672, 79 Eng. Rep. 582 (K.B. 1623).
G, DUNcOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73- see supra text accompanying note

"'

229.
2. See W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 163; supra note 233 and accompanying text.
291 G. DuNcoms, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73; see supra note 229 and accompanying text. The only case recognition of the concept before the turn of the century has been
mentioned supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text. Among the seventeenth-century law
writers, only Duncombe, see supra note 229 and accompanying text, and possibly Style, see
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Consider, for example, the well-known Trial of the Seven
Bishops299 in King's Bench in 1688. The report contains extended
colloquies between Lord Chief Justice Wright and Sir Samuel Astry, Master of the Crown Office, on a variety of procedural points.
Astry had been the chief clerk on the crown side for a dozen years
and had been a civil practitioner for the twenty years previous. 00
By the tone of the exchanges, it is clear that Lord Chief Justice
Wright deferred to Astry's experience on court procedures, despite
the dour comment from defendants' counsel that "Sir Samuel Astry has not been here so very long, as to make the practice of his
time the course of the court."3 0 1 One of the procedural points that
arose concerned a request by defendant's counsel "that in the return of the jury there may be forty-eight returned."3 02 The Attorney General s responded: "I tell you what we will do; sir Samuel
Astry shall have the Freeholders Book, if you please, and shall return twenty-four. 30 4 Counsel for the defendant rejoined that
"[e]ight and forty has been always the course, when the jury is

supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text, address the subject. Most of the prominent
works of the era do not mention the struck jury procedure, and occasional works suggest a
positive unfamiliarity with the concept. For example, a report of an anonymous case
brought under the Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3 (1328), indicates that "forty six Jurors
were returned, which was more then by law ought to be returned, but the tryall for all that
did proceed." [J. CLAYTON], supra note 149, at 122. See also An Act for the Ease of Jurors
and better regulating of Juries, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 32, § 8 (1695-96) (at the York assizes no
more than 10 panels of 24 jurors "shall be returned to serve upon Tryals in Civil Causes").
Cf. W. NELSON, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORr OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 433 (10th ed. London
1729) (1st ed. London 1704) ("at the Assizes there shall be ten Panels, and no more, of Petty
Jurors; consisting of twenty-four Jurors in each Panel, except where Special Jurors are
directed").
21' 12 State Trials 183 (K.B. 1688). The charge was publishing a libel. Id. at 183.
3oo Id. at 247.
SO Id. at 242 (Mr. Finch). Heneage Finch was Lord Nottingham's son and a former
Solicitor General. See E. Foss, supra note 13, at 254. Pollexfen, also counsel for the defendants (and later Chief Justice of Common Pleas, see supra note 289), acknowledged that it
was "customary for the court to ask what is the course of the court in doubtful cases, and to
receive the information from the officers of the court on both sides," 12 State Trials at 243.
Pollexfen argued, however, that what they reported was not to be taken as "final and conclusive." Id. The main point of debate was whether the defendants were entitled to an imparlance and a copy of the information before they were required to plead. Astry stated
that, although these could be granted at the court's discretion, it was not the normal course
of the court to do so. Id. at 252 (Sir S. Astry). Lord Chief Justice Wright stated that the
certificate of court practice from Sir Samuel Astry "truly weighs a great deal with me." Id.
at 255 (Wright, L.C.J.). (According to Holdsworth, Jeifreys had engineered Wright's elevation to the bench, and before that time, Wright had been "a notoriously incompetent lawyer." 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 507.)
:02 Trial of the Seven Bishops, 12 State Trials at 276 (Sir. R. Sawyer).
SOSThe Attorney General was Sir Thomas Powys. Id. at 191.
"

Id. at 276 (Att'y Gen. Powys).
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returned by sir Samuel Astry." °5 Counsel then agreed to follow
whatever the usual practice was, and Lord Chief Justice Wright
asked: "What is the usual course, sir Samuel Astry? Do you use to
return twenty-four, or forty-eight, and then strike out twelve apiece, which I perceive they desire for the defendants?" 308 Astry
responded: "My lord, the course is both ways, and then it may be
as your lordship and the court will please to order it. 30s7 Lord
Chief Justice Wright ordered forty-eight because "that is the fairest," 308s with which counsel for both sides were content.3 09
By 1700 the struck jury procedure had become a much more
regular feature of court practice. The first express statutory reference to the special jury had occurred in 1696,310 and during that
same year two King's Bench rules dealt specifically with procedural aspects of striking the jury.3 11 Sketchy reports exist of further encounters with the struck jury in the case law,3 12 and during
the first three decades of the eighteenth century the concept crept
by degrees into a number of the practice books.3 13 By the 1730 enactment," 4 the procedure was established.3 11
B.

Relation to Trials at Bar

Blackstone's view was that special juries were "originally introduced in trials at bar, when the causes were of too great nicety
Id.
Id.
307 Id.
305
3-

(Sir. R. Sawyer).
(Wright, L.C.J.).
(Sir S. Astry).

309 Id. (Wright, L.C.J.).

Id.
3" An Act for the Ease of Jurors and better regulating of Juries, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 32, §
309

8 (1695-96), specified the size and number of the jury panels for civil cases at the York
assizes "except onely where Special Juries are directed to be returned by Rule of Court."
31 Anonymous, 1 Salk. 405, 91 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B. 1696); Anonymous, 1 Salk. 405, 91
Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B. 1696). These rules are discussed infra notes 363-64 and accompanying
text;

31. See supra note 264; infra notes 365-73 and accompanying text. See also supra note
258 and accompanying text (speculation that the use of struck juries in trials at bar should
have made the concept familiar to judges and practitioners); infra note 363 and accompanying text (discussing a 1696 case in which the defendant's attorney failed to attend the striking of a jury for a trial at bar).
313 See [W. BOHUN], supra note 218, at 37; LAw QUmBLES 76-77 (2d ed. London 1726)
(1st ed. London 1724); T. WooD, AN INSTrTUTE OF TmE LAWS OF ENGLAND 591 (4th ed.
London 1728) (1st ed. London 1720). Continued attention to the concept was, of course,
reflected in updated editions of Tryals per Pals. See, e.g., G. DuNcoMBE, supra note 178, at
84, 90; see also supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text (discussing later editions of
Style's Regestum Practicale).
3'4 An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730).
148 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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for the discussion of ordinary freeholders." ' s This is probably correct, but Robert Richardson's flat statement in 1739 in his widelyused King's Bench practice book that "[a]ll Issues to be tried at
the Bar are to be tried by a Special Jury struck by the Secondary"317 is surely incorrect. Older authorities contain some illumination of the relation of the special jury to the trial at bar. 18 Although there clearly is an historical connection between the two,

9

its exact nature is not well defined. Style again provides a suitable
starting point.
According to Style, trials at bar were granted in two situations-where the trial presented difficult questions or involved
great value.320 In either case, "it is fit the Tryal should be at the
Bar, where Tryals are more solemn, and where more time may be
spent in the Tryal than can be at the Assizes." 2 ' Citing a 1648
rule of King's Bench, Style noted that "the old use of practice"
allowed only ten such trials per year because "Tryals at the Bar
are a great hindrance to other businesses which are more proper
for the Court. 32

2

Nevertheless, on May 1, 1650, the King's Bench

increased the maximum number of trials at bar to twenty per year,

text.

1 3 W. BLACKSTONE,supra note 3, at *357-58; see supra note 249 and accompanying

[R. RICHARDSON], supra note 4, at 123. Although Richardson's generalization was too
broad when written, the close correspondence between trials at bar and special juries continued into the nineteenth century. Thus Archbold states: "The jury is almost invariably special; and the rule for the special jury, forms a part of the rule for the trial at bar." 1 J.
17

ARCHBOLD, supra note

4, at 188.

See 3 J. MORGAN, ESSAYS 369-98 (Dublin 1789) (collecting many of the cases).
An Act for the better regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 15 (1730), ratifies the
power of the court to strike juries "in such Manner as special Juries have been, and are
usually struck... upon Trials at Bar."
310 W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 310. Practice books trace this basic formula to the
Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. (1285). The chapter concerning the authority of the
justices at nisi prius provides that "Inquisitions of many and great Articles, the which require great Examination, shall be taken before the Justices of the [Bench,] except that both
Parties desire that the Inquisition may be taken afore some of the Associates when they do
come into those Parts." Id. ch. 30 (brackets contained in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 86
(1810); compilers substituted this word for "Benches," id. at n.2); see 1 P. BURTON, PRACTICE OF THE OFFICE OF PLEAS, IN THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER 245 (London 1791); 2 W. TroD,
supra note 4, at 747. Before the Statute of Westminster II, all civil trials were at th* bar
except those decided in eyre, the procedure for itinerant justices that existed before the
circuits of assize. Id.
W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 310 (emphasis in original). In the 1670 edition, Style
added the caution that "otherwise this Court is not to be troubled with Tryal Causes, because the Court is thereby hindered in their proceedings in matters of Law, and not matters of fact." W. STYLE, supra note 234, at 510 (emphasis in original). Neither the 1694
edition, W. STYLE, supra note 236, at 513, nor Lilly's 1719 continuation, see 2 J. LILLY,
supra note 179, at 604, changes this passage.
W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 314 (emphasis in original).
318

3,,

311

322
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all to be conducted, as had been true earlier, during Easter term.2
At some point after 1670, the year of Style's second edition, the
limitations on the number of trials at bar and their confinement to
Easter term disappeared; Lilly's revision of Style in 1694 noted
that trials at bar "are now more desired than anciently they
were," and that "the Court doth not think fit to limit them to any
number.

'324

Apart from the early numerical limitations, additional rules
and cases circumscribed the court's discretion in granting trials at
bar. For example, "[i]f the Venire chance to arise out of three
Counties, the Trial must be at Bar, unless it be upon two Issues. ' 325 Style states that a trial at bar could not be had without
leave of the court,3 26 yet other authorities indicate that the Attorney General could always obtain a trial at bar for criminal cases32 if7
desired, at least where the Attorney General was the prosecutor.

Similarly, the courts granted a trial at bar if one of the justices of
the bench or a master in Chancery was involved in the litigation,
"soit le value quel voet [be the value what it will]."3'28 And in an
unsuccessful action brought against Sir Samuel Astry

29

to capture

his place as Clerk of the Crown for the Court of King's Bench, the
court granted Sir Samuel's motion for a trial at bar over the Attorney General's protest, because "a trial at bar was never denied to
any officer of the Court, nor hardly to any gentleman at the
3 30
bar.,
323

Id.

at 315. Specifically, all civil trials at bar were to be conducted during the fort-

night before the end of the term. Id. The "old course" allowed some criminal trials at bar
during Michaelmas term and, eventually, "special cases" in Hilary and Trinity terms as

well. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original). By the early 1700's, the court could take up "extraordinary Cases" in any term if necessary to avoid prejudicial delay. 2 J. LILLY, supranote
179, at 615.
32" W. STYLE, supra note 236, at 517 (emphasis in original). Rules limiting the number

of trials at bar pertained to King's Bench; I have located no comparable rules for Common
Pleas.
THE PRAcTICK PART OF THE LAW, supra note 29, at 45.
W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 317.
327 See, e.g., Rex v. Robertum Hales, 2 Str. 816, 93 Eng. Rep. 868 (K.B. 1728); Lord
Bellamont's Case, 2 Salk. 625, 91 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1700). In Robertum Hales, the Attorney General's motion for a trial at bar "was granted as of right to the King in his own
321

311

cause." 2 Str. at 816, 93 Eng. Rep. at 868. Note that An Acte to redresse Disorders in Common Infourmers upon Penall Lawes, 18 Eliz., ch. 5, § 3 (1575-76), required the Attorney
General to show reasonable cause for a trial at bar of any alleged criminal offense taking

place more than 30 miles from Westminster. It seems doubtful that this statute was enforced during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
328 Morton v. Hopkins & Spencer, 1 Sid. 407, 407, 82 Eng. Rep. 1185, 1185 (K.B. 1669).
319

330

See supra text accompanying note 300.
Sir Samuel Astrey's Case, 2 Salk. 651, 651, 91 Eng. Rep. 554, 554 (Q.B. 1704).
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In Lord Sandwich's Case,3 3 1 the King's Bench in 1699 ac-

knowledged that "[w]here there is value or difficulty, we are bound
of common right to grant trials at the bar," but the court denied a
motion for a new trial at bar. 3 2 The court reasoned that, even
though the value of the property in question was large, only the
execution of a conveyance remained in dispute.33 3 Two unreported
cases support the intimation in Lord Sandwich's Case that Chief
Justice Holt was not pleased by the proliferation of trials at bar. In
Drake v. Nicholle 3 4 Lord Raymond moved for such a trial, alleging that £150 was in dispute; Chief Justice Holt denied the motion,
33 5
stating "the value is not all but the difficulty must be regarded.

Similarly in Duke of Richmond v. Costelo,33 6 the court denied a
trial at bar in an action for scandalum magnatum3

37

on the

strength of an affidavit that less than 200 was in dispute.
In Fuller v. Mountjoy,33 8 Chief Justice Parker observed that
"the real purchase money as 2000£ may be said to buy an 100£
annuity," thus a general rule of £100 income per annum real estate
or £2000 personalty was established.3 9 Despite Chief Justice
Holt's reservations, the "value or difficulty" formula 4 ° persevered34' until a swing of the pendulum back to a more sparing allowance of trials at bar can be observed, beginning in the late
1720's and becoming established in the 1730's. In 1725 the court
had, on the strength of precedent, granted a trial at bar where the
disputed matter was of trifling value but required lengthy testimony.34 2 In 1728 the new attitude of King's Bench was expressed
3 43
in Goodright v. Wood:

331

2 Salk. 648, 91 Eng. Rep. 550 (K.B. 1699).

"

Id. at 648, 91 Eng. Rep. at 550 (footnote omitted).

3 Id.
4

3" Harvard NB 163 (unpaginated).
:35

Id.

36

Id.

Scandula magnata are "[w]ords spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other
great office of the realm." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *123.
Reports of Cases adjudged Between Trinity Term 13 Ann: & Trinity Term 1 Georgii
inclus' in the King's Bench, Harvard MS 1019 [hereinafter cited as King's Bench Reports,
1714-1715, Harvard MS 1019], at 14 (K.B. 1714).
"I Id. This general rule was reiterated as an accepted principle in Wynn v. Middleton,
Harvard MS 4055(7), fol. 32 (K.B. 1743).
340 See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text.
541 See Wynn v. Middleton, Harvard MS 4055(7), fol. 32 (K.B. 1743); Haycroft v. Ross,
Harvard MS 1110, at 3 (K.B. 1730); Mead v. Constable, King's Bench Reports, 1714-1715,
Harvard MS 1019, at 102 (K.B. 1715).
'"' Rex v. Johnson, 1 Str. 644, 93 Eng. Rep. 754 (K.B. 1725).
us 1 Barnard. K.B. 141, 94 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1728).
37

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:137

On a Motion For a Trial at Bar, the Court laid down two
Rules, that they never grant these Trials merely for the Consequence of the Cause, though it be of ever so great a Value;
nor ever for the Length of Examination, where 'tis of a very
small Value; and in Ejectments the Rule has been not to allow
them but where the Yearly Value of the Land in Question is
1001. The Court said likewise that a general Swearing of the
Length of a Cause, though there is Value too, will not be sufficient, unless there is a probable Foundation laid for them to
4
5
believe it. "

Further, in the 1741 Common Pleas case of Frost v.
Whadcock,34 5 plaintiff supported his motion for a trial at bar by
citing the need for a close examination of title, involving many witnesses, to which the court responded: "As to strict Examination, it
is necessary in all Cases, and is nothing with Respect to a Trial at
Bar." 46 There being "no Nicety in this Point, or Difficulty, so as to
require the Attention of the whole Court," the court denied the
request in favor of "a Day extraordinary at the Assizes, where an
examination of a3' 4great
Number of Witnesses is most proper, and
7
least expensive.

A further limitation on the trial at bar was its unavailability in
London. By the city's charter, London jurors could not be required
to journey outside city limits.3 4s Moreover, "[lt was said by Rolle
"4
Id. at 141, 94 Eng. Rep. at 98. In 1762, the King's Bench belatedly noted that the
phrase "'value or difficulty"' in Lord Sandwich's Case, 2 Salk. 648, 648 (K.B. 1699), should
be changed to value "and" difficulty. 91 Eng. Rep. 550, 550 & n.t (K.B. 1762) (per curiam)
(emphasis in original).
34 Barnes 447, 94 Eng. Rep. 997 (C.P. 1741).
"6 Id. at 447, 94 Eng. Rep. at 997.

347 Id. To have the plaintiff's witnesses appear before a judge on assize was a practical
solution, but it contrasted directly with the result in Rex v. Johnson, 1 Str. 644, 93 Eng.

Rep. 754 (K.B. 1725). In that case, the court ordered a trial at bar partly because the prosecutor planned to call "above thirty witnesses." Id. at 644, 93 Eng. Rep. at 754. According to

the manuscript report of Wynn v. Middleton, the Johnson court had "order'd a trial at
Bar" "where on affidavits that a great number of Witnesses was to be examin'd the Court
thought it not fitt for Trial at the Assizes." Wynn v. Middleton, Harvard MS 4055(7), at 15
(K.B. 1743). In a 1738 case, however, the court granted a trial at bar with the understanding
that elderly witnesses distant from London could testify by deposition. Martyn v.
Tregonville, Notebook on William Chapple (puisne judge of King's Bench), Harvard NB
136, fol. 50 (K.B. 1738). For a further treatment of this theme, see 1 J. ARCHBOLD, supra
note 4, at 186-87. William Tidd remarked in the 1820's that "the courts are extremely unwilling to grant a trial at bar, except in cases where it appears to be absolutely necessary." 2
W. TIDD, supra note 4, at 749.
"I See Castell v. Bambridge, 2 Str. 854, 856, 93 Eng. Rep. 894, 895 (K.B. 1730); Anonymous, 2 Salk. 644, 644, 91 Eng. Rep. 543, 543 (K.B. 1693). Style's version of the limitation

referred to disputes over houses within the City of London, based on a 1648 King's Bench
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Chief Justice, that the City of Bristol will not bring a matter to 34be9
tryed here at the Bar, no more then the City of London will.
The same rule existed generally regarding the counties palatine, as
Coke's report of a Common Pleas case in 1568 indicates. 5
With these general rules on the availability of a trial at bar as
background, some features of the connections between the special
jury and the trial at bar can be identified. First, not every trial at
bar used a special jury. Mr. Farington's Case,3 51 a 1682 murder
trial, clearly illustrates this fact. There, the court ordered a trial at
bar upon good cause shown, after which a request was made that a
special jury be struck "as is usual by the Secondary in Civil Causes
upon Trials at Bar." '52 The court denied the request as "contrary
to the Course of the Court in capital Causes."3 53 Otherwise the defendant would be deprived of his right of thirty-five peremptory
challenges.3 54
Conversely, not every special jury case was a trial at bar during the formative years under discussion. A majority of the reports
of seventeenth-century special jury cases state that the trial was at
bar, but many of them are silent on the subject, and the trials may
not have been at bar.155 Moreover, by the second half of the cen-

rule. W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 313. The general limitation in the London charter was
added to the 1694 edition. See W. STYLE, supra note 236, at 517.
1" W. STYLE, supra note 202, at 317 (emphasis in original). Later, the various geographic limitations were said to be waivable by the parties in a case otherwise appropriate
for trial at bar. 1 J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 4, at 187 (relying upon Lockyer v. East India Co.,
2 Wils. K.B. 136, 95 Eng. Rep. 728 (K.B. 1761) (trial at bar by a special jury of citizens of
London)).
350 E. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COUmTS 212 (London 1644). See Rex v. Amery, 1 T.R. 363, 99 Eng.
Rep. 1141 (K.B. 1786).
351 Jones T. 222, 84 Eng. Rep. 1227 (K.B. 1682).
35 Id. at 222, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1227-28.
35 Id., 84 Eng. Rep. at 1228.
'14 This rationale is articulated in Rex v. Duncomb, 12 Mod. 224, 224, 88 Eng. Rep.
1278, 1278 (K.B. 1698). See 21 C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW

AND

EQUITY 301

(2d ed. London 1793) (1st ed. London 1741-1751) (descripiion of a manuscript report of Rex
v. Makartney (K.B. 1716)). For a description of the criminal defendant's peremptory challenges, see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *347.
355 For cases shown as trials at bar, see Philips v. Crab, 12 Mod. 94, 94, 88 Eng. Rep.
1187, 1187 (K.B. 1696); Mr. Farington's Case, Jones T. 222, 222, 84 Eng. Rep. 1227, 1227
(K.B. 1682); Rex v. Kifin, 3 Keble 740, 740, 84 Eng. Rep. 984, 984 (K.B. 1677); Mich. 1649.
Bane. sup., Style 233, 233, 82 Eng. Rep. 672, 672 (Upper Bench 1650). For cases silent about
whether the trial was at bar, see Rex v. Duncomb, 12 Mod. 224, 88 Eng. Rep. 1278 (K.B.
1698); Anonymous, 1 Salk. 405, 91 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B. 1696) (does not state that trial was
at bar, but case appears to be identical with Philips v. Crab, 12 Mod. 94, 88 Eng. Rep. 1187
(K.B. 1696), which was at bar); In Enquest, Br. 30., 1 Keble 864, 83 Eng. Rep. 1288 (K.B.
1665).
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tury, courts on assize could order special juries. Lilly reports a ruling by Chief Justice Glyn stating that a struck jury could be
awarded at nisi prius, 56 and, in the 1724 decision of Rex v. Burridge,5 7 Chief Justice Pratt observed that "above thirty years ago
there were several [such] precedents" in which struck juries were
ordered, even without the consent of the parties.3 58
Although the special jury may have deep roots, it was not well
recognized until the latter half of the seventeenth century. Even
then, judges and leading practitioners were uncertain about the
procedure. " Trials at bar, in contrast, were both familiar and
common. It is unreasonable, therefore, to assume that struck juries
invariably accompanied trials at bar for important or difficult
cases. The sheriff may well have produced a "special," nonstruck
jury as a matter of course for trials of sufficient moment to command the full court's attention; in this sense the special jury and
the trial at bar seem to have been linked at least through the
1600's. During the late 1600's, however, the number of trials at bar
increased significantly, reaching cases of trifling consequence that
promised complicated or extended testimony. When this happened, even the "special," nonstruck jury, probably was not returned on a consistent basis.3 60 Additionally, the increasing use of
the special jury at nisi prius by the end of the century and the
unavailability of the special jury in capital cases further distanced
the two concepts. By the statute of 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730),61 the
special jury had become synonymous with the struck jury and had
acquired a life of its own.
85 W. STYLE, supra note 236, at 286. See infra notes 374-77 and accompanying text for

a discussion of this passage in Style and Lilly.
8 Mod. 245, 88 Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B. 1724).
Id. at 247, 88 Eng. Rep. at 177. See also Regina v. Banks, 2 Ld. Raym. 1082, 92 Eng.
Rep. 217 (Q.B. 1704) (special jury granted for trial on assize after complex procedural dis357
358

pute between prosecutor requesting a trial at bar and defendant seeking to have the case
heard at nisi prius); infra notes 381, 398.
3" See supra notes 299-309 and accompanying text (discussing The Trial of the Seven
Bishops).
380 During the first half of the eighteenth century, trials at bar again may have generated special juries automatically. Trials at bar were no longer freely granted, and after the
passage of An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730), practitioners

had become increasingly familiar with struck jury procedures. That this in fact occurred is
suggested by Pyle v. Grant, 1 Barnard. K.B. 260, 94 Eng. Rep. 177 (K.B. 1729), where the
court stated that "in these Trials at Bar... the Rule is always drawn up with a Clause,

that the jury shall be struck by the Master, without any special Direction." Id. at 260, 94
Eng. Rep. at 178. See 1 J. ARcioLD, supra note 4, at 188; infra notes 382-85 and accompanying text (discussing Regina v. Harcourt).

3" An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730).
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C. Procedural Questions
Some procedural features of the special jury were settled
before the statute of 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730).32 In 1696, the King's
Bench ruled that if attorneys for both parties received proper notice and only one side appeared, "he that appears shall, according
to the ancient course, strike out twelve; and the Master shall strike
out the other twelve for him that is absent."3 2 Also, by a separate
rule in the same year, the court ordered that the rule for a struck
jury must specify that the Master is to "strike forty-eight, and
each of the parties shall strike out twelve," or else "the Master is
to strike twenty-four, and the parties have no liberty to strike out
any.,

36 4

Whether the consent of both parties was always required for a
special jury is unclear. In Rex v. Chipping-Norton,6 5 Chief Justice

:62

Id.

t Anonymous, 1 Salk. 405, 405, 91 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (K.B. 1696). The events leading
's
to the issuance of the rule are described in 2 J. LILLY, supra note 236, at 25-26. The case was
to be tried at bar, but the defendant's attorney did not appear to participate in striking the
jury. The court was irked, stating that if the rule for a trial at bar had been obtained by
consent of counsel for both sides, then defendant's attorney was in contempt for not attending the striking of the jury, or at least "it was the Defendant's Attorney's Fault, and a Trick
in him." Id. at 25. The court, however, grudgingly accepted defendant's attorney's excuse of
having been too busy to attend and allowed the striking of a new jury, issuing at the same
time the general rule to govern future cases. Id. at 25-26.
Lilly does not identify the case, but manuscript sources show that the case was Earl of
Bath v. Earl of Montague (K.B. 1696). See James Wright, A Collection of Certain Cases and
Proceedings at Law, From the Death of King Charles 2, to the End of the Reign of King
William 3 [hereinafter cited as James Wright's Reports], Harvard MS 1071, fol. 50. The case
was tried in Trinity term, 8 Will. 111 (1696). Ward, plaintiff's attorney, gave Sherwood, defendant's attorney, notice to attend the secondary on a particular evening. Sherwood said he
already had an appointment that night to appear before the Prothonotary of Common Pleas
to strike a jury for a case pending in that court and then "offered to attend ... the next
day." Id. Ward nevertheless prevailed upon the secondary to strike a jury ex parte. Ultimately, Sherwood successfully moved to set the jury aside. Id. Although Lilly's version of
the case depicts Sherwood as the culprit, Wright seems to have perceived Ward as the manipulative attorney. Interestingly, Wright notes elsewhere that an earlier phase of the dispute between the parties was "so very long and tedious" that it kept the court and jury
sitting for an uninterrupted 24 hours, during which "refreshments were brought into Court
to the Jury, once or twice." Earl of Montague v. Earl of Bath, James Wright's Reports,
Harvard MS 1071, fol. 39.
I" Anonymous, 1 Salk. 405, 405, 91 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (K.B. 1696). Several years later
the court ruled that a new trial was not justified where the sheriff had erroneously returned
a common jury despite a rule for a special jury, because the defendant had participated in
the trial without protest. Anonymous, 12 Mod. 567, 88 Eng. Rep. 1525 (K.B. 1701). Cf.
supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing rule that an alien in a criminal action lost
his right to request a jury de medietate if he allowed an ordinary jury to be impaneled
without objection).
, 1 Barnard. K.B. 41, 94 Eng. Rep. 29 (K.B. 1727).
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Raymond stated that the defendant could not have a special jury
without the consent of the Attorney General. 6 Yet Sir Samuel Astry was allowed a trial at bar over the Attorney General's protest, 67 and the trial at bar w.s then commonly tried before a spe69
cial jury. 8 And in the 1710 decision in Regina v. Harcourt,3
Justice Powell stated: "I have known the Court to overrule the Attorney General where he has prayed and claimed to have a thing
tryed at nisi prius, and the Court when they thought '370
the issue deserved a Tryall at Barre have directed it to be had.

In Rex v. Burridge371 the court asked the Master of the Crown
Office whether a special jury could be granted without the consent
of the parties. After a search of the precedents, he reported "that
above thirty years ago there were several precedents for special juries upon trials for nisi prius, without the consent of the parties;
but that in the last thirty years there were several motions made
for that purpose, but always denied.

3

72

Chief Justice Pratt took

this to mean that the court 'still had discretionary power to grant a
special jury without the consent of the parties, but his three fellow
justices disagreed. They believed "that a special jury might be
granted to try a cause at BAR without the consent of the parties,
but never at the nisi prius, unless very good cause
was shewed, and
'373
that the cause now shewed was not sufficient.

3" Id. at 41, 94 Eng. Rep. at 29. See infra notes 416-17 and accompanying text.
"' Sir Samuel Astrey's Case, 2 Salk. 651, 651, 91 Eng. Rep. 554, 554 (Q.B. 1704). For a
discussion of the case, see supra notes 329-30 and accompanying text.
3" See infra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
363

Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 150 (Q.B. 1710).

370Id.

-1 8 Mod. 245, 247, 88 Eng. Rep. 175, 177 (K.B. 1724); see supra note 152 for additional reports of the case.
172 8 Mod. at 247-48, 88 Eng. Rep. at 177.
373Id. at 248, 88 Eng. Rep. at 177 (emphasis in original). By "very good cause," the
judges meant a "lawful objection" against the sheriff, proved by affidavit, because "the sheriff is the proper officer to return juries; and if there is no legal exception against him, the
Court cannot slip him, and order another to strike a special jury, without the consent of the
parties, to try an issue at the assizes." Id. Presumably this would require a showing of affinity or of sufficient bias to justify a challenge to the favor. See supra note 251. No such
showing was made in Burridge.

The point of contention in Burridge seems therefore to have been the policy question of
when the sheriff was to be deprived of his fees for returning a jury if one party objected to a

motion by the other party for a special jury. The court's answer was that the sheriff should
never be deprived at nisi prius, absent a valid challenge to the array. 8 Mod. at 248, 88 Eng.
Rep. at 177. But in a trial at bar, the significance of the case might justify impaneling a
special jury without the parties' consent, a policy overriding the ordinary right of the sheriff

to his fees. Apparently the court in Burridge did not perceive that, if a lawful challenge to
the array existed, process could go to the coroner, and there would be no need to impanel a
special jury over one party's objection. See supra note 256.
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Style further confuses the point. In his second edition, Style
includes the following decision by Chief Justice Glyn:
This Court will not order the Secndary [sic] to return a Jury
to try a Cause at the Assizes, except both parties consent; for
this were to thwart the ordinary course of proceedings. But in
Causes that are to be tryed at the Barr, the Court will upon
good cause shewed by either party why it should be so, will
order the Secondary to do it. 8 74
The third edition of Style (revised by Lilly), however, dropped the
italicized sentence, and the report of the decision was altered to
read "[t]his Court will order the Secundary [sic] to return a Jury
to try a Cause at the Assizes, if they see reason for it, without both
Parties consent, or else this were to thwart the ordinary course of
proceedings, and obstruct Justice."87 5 Lilly's 1719 edition retained
the altered version of Chief Justice Glyn's decision.3 7
The cause of the alteration is uncertain. Interestingly the
master's report in Burridge that motions for special juries at nisi
prius without the parties' consent had been denied for the past
thirty years 77 referred to a period beginning in 1694. Earlier prece-

Later, Strange reported that "the court did not seem to relish" Burridge, and that the
court stated that the case "might be an authority in one exactly circumstanced as that was,
but in no other." Rex v. Johnson, 2 Str. 1000, 1001, 93 Eng. Rep. 995, 995 (K.B. 1734). In
Johnson, the defendants initially had obtained a rule for a special jury. The defendants
later challenged the array because of the sheriff's alleged interest. This challenge, however,
came after the sheriff had received the venire instructing him to attend the master with the
freeholder's book and after the parties had reduced to 24 the panel of 48 struck by the
master. The judges of Chester allowed the challenge, despite the plaintiff's vigorous argument that "since the late act [An Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25
(1730)] the sheriff had no influence, he being only to return the list brought him as struck."
2 Str. at 1001, 93 Eng. Rep. at 995. The prosecutor then moved in King's Bench for an
attachment against the defendants for a contempt in having challenged improperly, citing
Burridge. Id.
Although Strange's report of the case is inconclusive, a manuscript report of the case
clearly shows that the court rejected the plaintiff's motion. Rex v. Johnson, Harvard MS
4055(4), foL 22 (K.B. 1734). The manuscript report also makes the case more understandable. The sheriff, a citizen of Chester, had contributed £50 toward the prosecution of Johnson. Chief Justice Hardwicke acknowledged that this was "good reason for Jealousie," creating a fear that "the Sheriff might alter the array." Id. As a result, there was no basis for a
contempt, and by a suggestion on the Roll, the court directed process to the coroner. Chief
Justice Hardwicke distinguished Rex v. Burridge as a case in which the challenge had been
a "Fraud on the Rule of Court." Id.
"4
375

W. ST=Lz, supra note 234, at 237 (emphasis in original).
W. STYLx, supra note 236, at 286 (emphasis added).

2 J. LuLy, supra note 179, at 122.
Rex v. Burridge, 8 Mod. 245, 247-48, 88 Eng. Rep. 175, 177 (K.B. 1724); see supra
text accompanying note 372.
379
37
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dents allowing such special juries were said to exist, and perhaps
those cases led to the change in the 1694 edition.
In any event, the early eighteenth-century practice seems to
have been as follows. When a party requested a special jury, the
opposing party was given notice and time to respond.3 7 8 A special
jury would be ordered where good cause existed, even over the objection of one or both parties. 37 9 The court might find good cause
in the innate importance of the case, and the court could order a
special jury on its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties. A unique and interesting variation on this pattern is an unreported anonymous case in 1710 in which the King's Bench accepted the prospect of jury-packing as good cause not to allow a
special jury. The court granted the defendant's motion to discharge a rule for a special jury after he argued: "The suit is between the Lord of a Mannor and his Tenants. They will get all
Lords of Mannors returned. I pray it may be tryed by a Common
38 0
Jury."
If the sheriff was unindifferent, the plaintiff could request that
process issue to the coroner and forego a special jury. The defendant, however, always retained his challenges in cases of alleged
sheriff bias. But the defendant may have had the alternative of
requesting a special jury, at least according to the dicta in the ver3 81
sion of Rex v. Burridge contained in Modern Reports.
82
In the unreported case of Regina v. Harcourt an information had been brought against the Master of the Crown Office. His
counsel s moved for a trial at bar; crown counsel challenged the
378

"It.

.

. has always been the course of the court, that when either party will suggest

any special matter about awarding the venire out of the common course, a copy must be
given to the opposite party, and they must have a reasonable time to consider it ...
Brocas v. Civit' London, 1 Str. 235, 235, 93 Eng. Rep. 493, 493 (K.B. 1719).
379

This was not likely to be done in a crown case if the Attorney General withheld his

consent. See Rex v. Chipping-Norton, 1 Barnard. K.B. 41, 94 Eng. Rep. 29 (K.B. 1727);
infra text accompanying notes 416-17. But in Pyle v. Grant, 1 Barnard. K.B. 260, 260, 94
Eng. Rep. 177, 177 (K.B. 1729), the court ordered a special jury as an automatic part of a
trial at bar, despite the appellant's protest that he was too poor to bear the expense of a
trial at bar. See also Wilks v. Eames, Andr. 51, 52, 95 Eng. Rep. 293, 294 (K.B. 1737), where
the court stated that "though it was not usual, before the said act [An Act for the better
Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730)], to grant special juries without consent, yet in
some instances, and for special causes, it was and might be done."
3"
81

Anonymous, Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 190 (Q.B. 1710).
Rex v. Burridge, 8 Mod. 245, 248, 88 Eng. Rep. 175, 177 (K.B. 1724).

Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 150 (Q.B. 1710).
One of the defendant's counsel was his father, Simon Harcourt, a leading member of
the bar who had already served briefly as Attorney General, later returned to that office,
and eventually became Lord Chancellor. See 8 THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY,
supra note 104, at 1206-09 (entry by G.F. Barker).
"3
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motion on unusual procedural grounds. The notice originally given
by the defendant's counsel stated that the defendant would move
for both a trial at bar and a special jury. A venire was filed accordingly. Later, the formal motion for a trial at bar made no reference
to a special jury. The question thus became whether the venire was
fatally irregular, or whether it could be taken off the record. On
this question the court was evenly divided, two to two, and the
motion for a trial at bar did not carry.38 4
The unusual problem was that the special jury could not be
struck because the defendant was the secondary. According to
Chief Justice Parker:
Here was notice given for a Tryall at Barre and for a Special
Jury, but the motion for the Tryall at barre was only made,
here the thing can't be done according to the Course of the
Court that is for the Master to strike the Jury, because he is a
party, the question is whether it can be taken off the file. 85
In the case of a biased sheriff, the venire was traditionally directed
to the coroner, and if the coroner was tainted as well, electors were
appointed.3 86 Apparently no similar contingent procedure had yet
evolved for the special jury; when the secondary was biased, the
court would deny the motion for a struck jury. This defect ultimately was cured. In South-Sea Company v. Crimes,3 7 a special
jury was moved in London, but because the sheriff, one of
London's two coroners, and the master all were South-Sea Company stockholders, the court directed the venire to the other coroHarcourt,Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 186-89.
Id. at 187. Chief Justice Parker and Justice Eyre were of the view that the venire
should not be taken off the record-an extraordinary measure-because the error was harmless. Had the notice contained no reference to the special jury, the venire would have been
regular, and the omission by counsel should therefore not have made any difference. Id. at
186-87. Observations about the court's recent practice strengthened this view. Previously
the venire was "awarded" formally by being recorded on the Plea Roll, and no discrepancy
could exist between the venire as awarded and as previously entered on the record. But the
process of award by recordation on the Plea Roll had been abandoned, and as Solicitor
General Raymond argued: "If proceedings are to be set aside for want of an Award of a
384
3s5

Venire upon the Roll, no Tryall has been regular these 40 years. .

. ."

Id. at 188.

Justice Powell stated that "it is commonly part of the Rule for a tryall at Barre to have
a Speciall Jury," but "when a Venire is filed irregularly there is no room to move for a tryall
at Barre and a good Jury till it is taken off the File." Id. at 187. Justice Powys agreed. Id.
Because neither Parker nor Eyre would agree to taking the venire off the record, id., the
court was stalemated, id. at 189. Interestingly, both Justices Powell and Eyre used the terms
"special jury" and "good jury" interchangeably. Id. at 187 (Powell, J.), 188 (Eyre, J.). For a
discussion of the "good jury," see infra notes 414-46 and accompanying text.
3
See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
'1
1 Barnard. K.B. 421, 94 Eng. Rep. 283 (K.B. 1730).
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ner and ordered that the freeholder's book be delivered to the
Clerk of the Papers to strike a jury."'8
Other remarks of the judges and counsel in Regina v. Harcourt provide clues to early eighteenth-century perceptions of the
struck jury. sse Chief Justice Parker noted that before the Statute
of Nisi Prius,390 the sheriff returned all juries to London, so that
"the Jury are at the same Expense at a Tryall at Bar as to come to
another Tryall in Middlesex." ' Exactly what other trials Justice
Parker had in mind is unclear; Solicitor General Raymond pointed
out that "[b]efore the Stat[ute] of nisi prius all tryalls for Middlesex were at the Barre," adding that "then the39Sheriff
was not
2
obliged to return gentlemen of the better Rank."
The Statute of Nisi Prius did not create any obligation "to
return gentlemen of the better Rank," but this tradition emerged
as a part of reserving protracted, difficult cases for trials at bar. 93
By the time of Regina v. Harcourt,however, there was some question about whether "gentlemen of the better Rank" were invariably jurors for trials at bar. Justice Eyre commented that "[iun a
Tryall at Barre the Jury is returned by the Master. The Jury is
special only because it is returned in a special
manner, it is no Ob3' 9 4

jection that a man is a Common Juror.

With regard to the expense of a special jury, the applicable
statute required the applying party to pay the costs of striking the
'3
Id. at 421, 94 Eng. Rep. at 283. Part of the information about the resolution of this
case is taken from the manuscript report in Harvard MS 4055(1), at 88.
' The case also vividly illustrates how strong personalities among the bar could intimidate the bench. When Simon Harcourt moved to put off the case until the next day, the
Attorney General (Sir James Montague) protested indignantly:
Will you stay proceedings on the bare suggestion of a son in the case of his Father[,] who is Secondary to his Father? At that rate proceedings may be stayed without
anything more than a motion. In the case of Chapman and Sedgewick to be tryed
before my Ld. C.J. [Lord Chief Justice] this afternoone I pray proceedings may be
stayed. There are irregularities in it.
Regina v. Harcourt, Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 187 (Q.B. 1710). Justice
Powell responded, petulantly: "I have not known such Usage as that offered to the Court. I
would have you know that tho' Mr. Attorney be a great man this Court is greater than he."
Id.
39 The Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw., ch. 30 (1285).
31 Regina v. Harcourt, Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 187 (Parker, C.J.).

392

Id. at 188.

See supra notes 229, 249 and accompanying text.
Regina v. Harcourt, Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 187 (Eyre, J.).
Eyre's comment supported his view that the venire issued pursuant to a notice for a special
jury could be used for a common jury after the request for a special jury was abandoned. Id.
at 187, 188 (Eyre, J.).
3S
31
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jury.39 5 Previously, perhaps because courts almost always impaneled special juries with the consent of both parties,39 6 the practice
had been for the parties to share equally the costs of striking the
jury.s 7 The loser, however, bore the expense of paying the special
jurymen. S9 The amounts of the fees were not fixed by rule of court
or by statute. In a 1694 table of customary fees, the fees due Mr.
Richard Aston, Secondary of the Court of King's Bench, included:
"For Returning Juries to Try Causes at the Bar, each Party give
what he pleases."3 9 According to Richardson, "[t]he Secondary
and Under-Sheriff had formerly40 01 each a Guinea a Side from
Plaintiff and Defendant. 4 01 And in 1730, a tabulation of the fees
of Mr. Samuel Clarke, Secondary of King's Bench, showed one
pound, one shilling due from each party "[flor the nominating and
'402
striking all special Juries for Trials at the Bar and otherwise.

:95 An

Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Gceo. 2, ch. 25, § 16 (1730).
96See the language of King's Bench in Wilks v. Eames, Andr. 51, 95 Eng. Rep. 293

(K.B. 1737), quoted supra note 379.
397 See LISTS OF THE OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPUTIES, BELONGING TO THE SEVERAL COURTS

IN WESTMINSTER-HALL, AND ELSEWHERE 66 (London 1731) (presented to the House of Com-

mons pursuant to an order of March 4, 1730), where an entry for a proceeding in the Exchequer indicated that "[flor striking a special Jury. . .half was paid by the Plaintiff, and
half by the Defendant, before the Act of Parliament [An Act for the better Regulation of
Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730)], to the Master."
398 Wilks v. Eames, Andr. at 52, 95 Eng. Rep. at 294. The court added that the practice
of the loser bearing the expense of paying the special jurymen applied "whether with or
without [the loser's] consent [to the special jury]." Id. In the manuscript report, Chief Justice Lee clarified this point:
It would be too much to take the Consent, which was objected at the Bar, as the Redson why the Party against whom the Verdict was given should pay the Costs of the
Special Jury, for the Costs are always paid by him against whom the Verdict is given
and that is the reason for paying costs.
Wilks v. Eves [sic], Harvard MS 2050, vol. 1, at 85.
39 AN ExAcT TABLE OF FEES, OF ALL THE COURTS AT WESTMINSTER 53 (London 1694).
See also THE PRACTICK PART OF THE LAW, supra note 29, at 38 app. (noting that no authentic tables of ancient fees on the plea side of King's Bench were known to exist, such tables
reputedly having been burned in the great fire of London). The fees given, id. at 39 app.,
appear to be identical to those in the 1694 table; they were compiled from responses received from inquiries sent to the "several Offices and Clerks" of King's Bench, id. at 38 app.
For trials at bar, special fees were due to other officers-for example, the Clerk of the Papers, the Deputy Marshall, the Crier-but these were not incidents of the special jury.
400 The practice, that is, before the enactment of An Act for the better Regulation of
Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730).
401 R. RICHARDSON, THE ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 217 (2d
ed. London 1743) (1st ed. London 1739).
402 LISTS OF THE OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPUTIES, BELONGING TO THE SEVERAL COURTS IN
WESTMINSTER-HALL, AND ELSEWHERE, supra note 397, at 22. Apparently each clerk prepared
his own list of fees. The secondary on the crown side merely showed one pound, one shilling
"[flor attending every Trial at Bar." Id. at 36. He added a fee of 10 shillings six pence per
side "[u]pon striking of every special Jury, for the fair copies, which are made and delivered
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In addition to the costs of striking, fees were paid to special
jurymen. Chief Justice Lee observed in 1737 that "there has not
been any Rule settled about the Sum that it is reasonable to give
the Jury upon a Trial at Bar,"40 3 but the Master of the King's
Bench Office certified that "he never allowed less than a guinea to
each special juror in London."4' 04 One case of a trial at bar was
cited in which each juryman received five guineas,40 5 and one justice questioned why a special juror should receive more than a
common juror, because the former was better able to bear the cost
of jury service than the latter.40 6
A final point of procedure pertains to the use of talesmen.
Originally, talesmen were summoned by a specific rule for a fixed
number of additional prospective jurors when the initial panel did
not yield a full jury.40 7 As the Appendix shows, statutory property

out by the Secondary." Id. at 37. The Prothonotary of Common Pleas showed one pound,
one shilling "[flor the striking of every special Jury each Side." Id. at 45. In the Exchequer
two pounds, two shillings were indicated "[flor striking a special Jury, whereof half was paid
by the Plaintiff, and half by the Defendant, before the Act of Parliament [An Act for the
better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730)], to the Master." Id. at 66.
403 Wilks v. Eves [sic], Harvard MS 2050, vol. 1, at 60 (K.B. 1737).
4' Wilks v. Eames, Andr. 51, 52, 95 Eng. Rep. 293, 293-94 (K.B. 1737) (emphasis in
original). Andrews's report shows that the London jurors in Wilks received two guineas each
(the two talesmen each received one-half guinea). Andr. at 52. In a companion case, the
special jurors apparently received at least that much. Hamilton v. Style, Andr. 53, 53, 95
Eng. Rep. 294, 294 (K.B. 1737) ("311. 10s. charged for costs of the jury"). Manuscript reports, however, show that the jurors in Wilks each received one guinea, Wilks v. Earns [sic],
,,Harvard MS 4055(6), fol. 10; Harvard NB 151, fols. 109, 114; the jurors in Hamilton received more, evidently sharing 31 guineas. Hamilton, Harvard NB 151, fol. 114. It should be
noted that the author of this notebook erroneously wrote "Hamilton and Stiles was a Cause
tryed at Guildhall and 12 Guineas allowed[.] Wilks v. Eames tryed at Chester and 31 Guineas allowed." Id. He had transposed the two cases.
405 Wilks v. Eames, Andr. 51, 52, 95 Eng. Rep. 293, 294 (K.B. 1737). Indeed Duncombe,
in his fifth edition, published in 1718, asserted that Middlesex juries "court the Bailiffs to
return them, especially to Trials at Bar, where five Pounds a Man is frequent Gratuity,
sometimes more." G. DUNCOMBE, supra note 178, at 218. In Wilks, the court was referring to
"the corporation of Bewdley, which was a trial at Bar by a Worcestershirejury." Andr. at
52, 95 Eng. Rep. at 294. For a printed report of this case see Regina v. Bewdley, 1 P. Wins.
207, 24 Eng. Rep. 357 (Q.B. 1712). In Bewdley, the court reduced the costs allowed by Harcourt, the master. Statements of what Harcourt had originally allowed ranged from 20 guineas per juror, Wilks v. Eames, Andr. at 52, 95 Eng. Rep. at 294 (Page, J.), to 12 guineas per
juror, Wilks v. Eams [sic], Harvard MS 4055(6), fol. 10. In truth, Harcourt allowed each
juror seven guineas. See Regina v. Bewdley, Harvard NB 126 (unpaginated), in which the
bill of costs is stated. The court reduced this allowance to five guineas per juror. See Wilks
v. Eams [sic], Harvard MS 4055(6), fol. 10; Harvard NB 151, fol. 114. According to the bill
of costs, the same allowance was extended to all special jurors appearing, whether or not
they served. Harvard NB 126.
406 Wilks v. Eames, Andr. at 53, 95 Eng. Rep. at 294 (Probyn, J.).
407 It is beyond the range of this study to state all of the particularized rules pertaining
to talesmen. For useful summaries, see 2 J. CHnrr, supra note 40, at 517-21; TmE COMPLEIE
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qualifications were set for talesmen in 1692 at a level half that required for the initial panel of jurors, certain courts and types of
cases excepted. 4 8 The old requirement of an order for a fixed number of talesmen generated delay, especially when there was no assurance that the order would produce a full jury. 40 9 Thus Parlia4 10 in the midment authorized the tales de circumstantibus
1500's,41 permitting deficiencies in jury numbers to be filled from
among the bystanders in court upon the prayer of the plaintiff or
defendant. 41 2 The tales de circumstantibus was not allowed, however, for trials at bar;415 otherwise it was available for special juries,
despite the possible dilution of the quality or expertise represented
by the special jury.
D.

Relation to "Good" Juries

More elusive than the connection between the special jury and
the trial at bar4" 4 is the relationship of the special jury to the "good
jury." In contrast to the "substantial jury, ' 41 5 the expression "good
jury" became a term of art, at least by the early eighteenth century. For example, in the 1727 case of Rex v. Chipping-Norton,1 8
King's Bench granted the defendant's motion "that he might have
supra note 4, at 90-99.
'08 See infra Appendix; see also statute of 4 W. & M., ch. 24, §§ 18-20 (1692).
'10 For an example of a trial put off four times because a full jury was not produced by

JURYMAN,

the original panel and four decem tales (four successive orders for the return of 10 new
jurors as talesmen), see the pleadings in Regina v. Watson, 2 Ld. Raym. 856, 92 Eng. Rep.
72 (Q.B. 1703), reprinted in G. WnLSON, ENTRIES OR PLEADINrS 18-25 (3d ed. Dublin 1785)

(1st ed. Dublin 1767).

410 See supra note 24.

4, See infra Appendix; see also An Acte for certaine Ordinaunces in the Kinges Majesties Domynion and Principalities of Wales, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 26, § 46 (1542-43); An Acte
concerninge thapparaunce of Jurors in the Nisi Prius, 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6, § 3 (1543-44); An
Acte to make uppe the Jurie withe Circumstantibus, where the King and Quenes Majesties

is a Partie, 4 & 5 Phil. & M., ch. 7 (1557-58); An Acte to fill upp Juries De Circumstantibus
lacking in Wales, 5 Eliz., ch. 25, § 1 (1562-63).
412 It is highly improbable that, despite the 1692 requirement, see supra note 408, talesmen impaneled de circumstantibus in ordinary cases were freeholders. Cockburn, in the

chapter on the trial jury in his forthcoming introduction to calendar of assize records,
quotes several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources critical of the tales de circumstantibus because it increased the likelihood that unqualified jurors would be impaneled
and facilitated partisan jury-packing. J. Cockburn, supra note 41.
41S See THE COMPLET JURYMAN, supra note 4, at 93. Lilly noted that if a jury was not
filled for a trial at bar from the original panel, "the Court will order the Sheriff to return a

Decem Tales, which he usually doth of Gentlemen in London having Estates in his County.

Pas. 23 Car. B.R." 2 J. LmLY, supra note 236, at 357 (emphasis in original).
44 See supra notes 316-61 and accompanying text.
4"' See supra notes 275-96 and accompanying text.

410 1 Barnard. K.B. 41, 94 Eng. Rep. 29 (K.B. 1727).
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a good Jury" but denied him a special jury since the Attorney General would not consent to the latter.4 "
Loosely described by Tidd as "a better sort of common
jury, ' 418 a good jury typically was returned by the sheriff pursuant
to a writ of inquiry 4 19 to ascertain the amount of damages owing to
a successful plaintiff. The good jury was not automatic in such
cases; it was impaneled at the plaintiff's request, often after the
recovery of a default judgment.420 The term "good jury" may have
originated in the form of the writ of inquiry, which directed that
the inquest be conducted by "duodecim proborum et legalium
hominum,"4 21 or, twelve good and lawful men. By comparison, the
writ for a common jury called for twelve "free and lawful men of
the neighbourhood," or "free and lawful men of the body of your
2
county.

42

The seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century practice books
do not mention the good jury. Possibly this omission reflects the
local nature of the inquiry before the sheriff in the venue where
the dispute arose, yet even the late eighteenth-century practice
books dealing with sheriffs and undersheriffs are silent on the subject. 423 Nevertheless, in 1720 King's Bench was able to refer to "the
Id. at-41, 94 Eng. Rep. at 29.
2 W. TIDD, supra note 4, at 787 (emphasis in original).
419 A writ of inquiry is
417

418

a judicial writ, issuing out of the court where the action is brought... directed to the
sheriff of the county where the venue is laid; setting forth the proceedings which have
been had in the cause; "and that the plaintiff ought to recover his damages, by occasion
of the premises: But because it is unknown what damages he hath sustained by occasion thereof, the sheriff is commanded, that by the oath of twelve honest and lawful
men of his county, he diligently inquire the same; and return the inquisition into
court."
1 id. at 573 (footnotes omitted).
420 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Malin, 1 C. & M. 237, 238, 149 Eng. Rep. 388, 389 (Exchequer
1832) (stating that the granting of a good jury is at the court's discretion); THE PRAcTIcx
PART OF THE LAW, supra note 29, at 137.
421 E.g., Anonymous, 3 Mod. 112, 112, 87 Eng. Rep. 71, 72 (K.B. 1686) (emphasis in

original). Another common form of the writ in English called for 12 "honest and lawful"

men. See, e.g., R.

BROWNLOW,

supra note 123, at 50, 64, 66, 68; 1 D.

READING, ENGLISH

CLERK'S INSTRUCTOR IN THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS

119 (London 1733); 1 W. TIDD, supra note 4, at 573.
422 J. LILLY, A COLLECTION OF MODERN ENTRIES 675-76 (London 1771). By contrast,
Lilly's examples of the venires in writs of inquiry specify a jury of "good and lawful" men.
Id. at 8, 102. Accord Poole v. Longuevill, 2 Wms. Saund. 282, 286, 85 Eng. Rep. 1063, 1072
(K.B. 1670-71) (venire in writ of inquiry specified a jury of "good and lawful men"). But cf.
Hoskins v. Robins, 2 Wms. Saund. 319, 324, 85 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1122 (K.B. 1671) (jury
awarding damages not designated as "good and lawful men").
423 See, e.g., J. IMPEY, THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF, (London 1786); THE UNDER-SHERIFF
(London 1766).
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common rule for a good jury,"42 and Common Pleas later observed
that "[t]he practice of ordering a good jury existed long before the
passing of the Acts which regulate special juries. '425 Tidd expands
the latter point by noting that the use of good juries at nisi prius
preceded the introduction of special juries.4 26
Several good jury cases not initiated by the writ of inquiry occurred before the statutory endorsement of the special jury in
1730.427 In 1665 King's Bench refused a request for a special jury
in a new trial granted because of an initial verdict that was contrary to the evidence. 42 The court did not want to set an "ill example" by impaneling a special jury whenever a common jury went
wrong, but instead compromised and ordered a good jury. 29 In
1724 the court also awarded a good jury in the retrial of a complex
property dispute.43 0 Further cases include the previously mentioned Rex v. Chipping-Norton3 1 and Viner's report of an unpublished King's Bench decision in 1716 treating both special and
good juries. 3 2
Initially, the consent of the parties was required for a good
jury. In Bishop of Sarum v. Ashe,'43 3 decided in 1710, Justice Powell responded to a motion for a good jury in an action of
4" Rex v. Smith, 1 Str. 265, 265, 93 Eng. Rep. 513, 513 (K.B. 1720).
"
Vickery v. London, B. & S. Coast Ry., 5 L.R.-C.P. 165, 167 (1870). The origin of the
good jury is uncertain. In earlier times, there were circumstances when juries of higher quality than ordinary were impaneled. See supra notes 62-137 and accompanying text. On occasion, these juries would be called "special," but not in a technical sense. See supra note 70.
Similarly, early evidence of what appears to be nontechnical usage of "good jury" phraseology can be found, particularly in the context of oblations. See BERKSHIRE EYRE ROLLS,
supra note 274, at 23 (plea no. 43) ("and meanwhile a good jury is to be chosen and the
writs are to remain with the sheriff"), 380 (plea no. 990) ("Emma gives 20 shillings to have a
good inquest by surety of Robert of Grafton" (emphasis in original)), 387 (plea no. 1011)
("Richard of Dummer (Hampshire)gives 5 marks to have a good inquest by surety of Maurice le Angevin and William of Dummer" (emphasis in original)).
41 2 W. TIDD, supra note 4, at 787 (citing Rex v. Smith, 1 Str. 265, 93 Eng. Rep. 513
(K.B. 1720)).
"7 Later cases suggest that after 1730, the special jury largely supplanted the good jury
except in connection with the writ of inquiry. Indeed, evidence exists that the special jury
displaced the good jury for a writ of inquiry conducted before a judge instead of before the
sheriff. See, e.g., Price v. Williams, 5 Dowl. P.C. 160, 161 (Exchequer 1836).
4"8In Enquest, Br. 30, 1 Keble 864, 864, 83 Eng. Rep. 1288, 1288 (K.B. 1665).
429Id.

Pocklington v. Hatton, 8 Mod. 220, 221, 88 Eng. Rep. *158, 159 (K.B. 1724).
1 Barnard. K.B. 41, 94 Eng. Rep. 29 (K.B. 1727). For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 416-17 and accompanying text.
43221 C. VINEs, supra note 354, at 301 (discussing the manuscript report of Rex v.
Makartney (K.B. 1716)). In Makartney, Chief Justice Parker denied a special jury in a treason trial to preserve the defendant's peremptory challenges. Id.
433Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 291 (Q.B. 1710).
430
431
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scandatum magnatum by stating: "We can't do it; all Rules for
good Juries are by consent.

' 43 4

Some years later, however, King's

Bench pointed out in Rex v. Burridge that "[i]f an affidavit be laid
before the Court of suspicion that there will not be a fair jury, and
the adverse party will not consent to a good jury, we will rule one
without consent.

'43 5

The problem of suspected bias in jurymen

could have been corrected by challenges, but perhaps the alternative of the good jury arose in cases where the suspicions of bias
were not specific enough to sustain particular challenges. This possibility may be reflected in the 1714 case of Dux Leeds v. Hill Morton,56 in which the court granted the rule for a good jury "because
there was a complaint made against the common panel.

4 37

Very little is known about the identity and social standing of
good jurors returned during the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries. 38 Interestingly, absent special cause, motions for good
juries were occasionally denied in London and Middlesex because
"all are presumed to be good there.

' 43 9

As with special juries, the

sheriff undoubtedly used his discretion in tailoring the quality of
the jury to the importance of the case. One illustration is the 1684
writ of inquiry of damages arising out of an action of scandatum
magnatum brought by the Duke of York against Titus Oates. 4
There, the sheriffs and undersheriff of Middlesex returned an inquest jury of fifteen men, consisting of knights, esquires, and gen4I4

Id.

4" Rex v. Burridge, 8 Mod. 229, 229, 88 Eng. Rep. 165, 165 (K.B. 1724) (emphasis in
original). For other reports of this case, see supra note 152.
436 Gilb. Cas. 130, 93 Eng. Rep. 283 (Q.B. 1714).
411 Id. at 130, 93 Eng. Rep. at 283.
488 Later practices are illuminated somewhat by Vickery v. London, B. & S. Coast Ry.,
5 L.R.-C.P. 165 (1870) (indicating that good jurors were usually chosen from the special jury
list).
411 Anonymous, King's Bench Reports, 1714-1715, Harvard MS 1019, at 20. Cf. Jacob v.
Gore, Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard MS 1142, at 68, 101, 112 (Q.B. 1710), where the court
refused a motion for change of venue, rejecting the assertion that a London jury would be
unfit to try a usury case. In Dormer v. Jones, King's Bench Reports, 1714-1715, Harvard MS
1019, at 87, the court granted a motion for a good jury in Middlesex, "this being upon a
Special occasion and otherwise all are presumed good as in London." In Rex v. Makartney
(K.B. 1716), however, the unpublished case discussed in 21 C. VMER, supranote 354, at 301,
Chief Justice Parker denied a similar motion, stating that "they are all good juries in Middlesex, and so in all cases of jurors at ,the bar," id. (emphasis in original). Parker reasoned
further that if he granted a good jury in the important case before him, sheriffs might
wrongly infer that good juries should not be returned in cases of less consequence. Id.
440 Proceedings on a Writ of Inquiry of Damages between his Royal Highness James
Duke of York, in an Action upon the Statute de Scandalis Magnatum, and Titus Oates, 10
State Trials 125 (K.B. 1684).
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tlemen. " Another example is Strange's report of Rex v. Smith,4 2
which reads, in full: "In this cause, and also in another against justices of the peace, the court refused the common rule for a good
jury, because that is often made up of gentlemen who are in the
' 44
commission. 3
How widespread the practice was of impaneling justices of the
peace (men "in the commission") on good juries is not known, but
Rex v. Smith provides evidence that good jurors were above-average citizens. For common inquests, local practice books had long
called for jurors of "good name and fame," sometimes in connection with statutory property qualifications and sometimes in the
abstract.4 4 4 It does not follow that common inquest jurors were
able or trustworthy, for the statutes and other sources suggest a
persistent problem of incompetence and corruption among ordinary jurors." Just as the special jury developed in some measure
as an antidote for this problem in the royal courts, the good jury
appears to have developed into the local counterpart. The two concepts diverged only after the special jury began to acquire its distinct procedural characteristics. Tidd's description of the good jury
as "a better sort of common jury,,446 suggests a qualitative middle
zone between the common and special jury, but no evidence demonstrates that special jurors as a class were superior to good jurors.
CONCLUSION AND EPILoGuE

The present study of the origins of the special jury has, I hope,
illuminated a few of the darkened interstices of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century procedure in the English courts. It has also illustrated the varied and numerous manifestations of the jury as an
institution. Further, as Blackstone's treatment of the unindifferent
sheriff situation indicates,44 7 the struck jury shows how a procedural concept, once familiar, can take on applications completely

"" Id. at 129. After the familiar harangue by Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys, the jury returned the following remarkable verdict: Damages, £100,000; costs, 20 shillings. Id. at 148.
"1 1 Str. 265, 93 Eng. Rep. 513 (K.B. 1720).
4,1Id. at 265, 93 Eng. Rep. at 513.
44 See, e.g., [A. FITZHERBERT], supra note 22, at fol. 30 (references to jurors "of good
name and fame" with specific property holdings for inquiries at sheriffs' tournes), fol. 44
(reference to "men sufficient of inheritance, and of good fame" for escheat inquests).
'41 See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
441 2 W. TrD,supra note 4, at 787 (emphasis in original); see supra text accompanying
note 418.
"
3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *357-58, quoted supra text accompanying note
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unrelated to its original purpose.
The special jury of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries was drawn from a special class of men of above-average
wealth and standing in the community. This practice, beginning as
a custom without statutory mandate, 448 was formalized by Parliament in the County Juries Act of 1825. 44 9 In the early eighteenth
century, however, the special jury was equivalent to the struck
jury, and at least one judge asserted that only a special procedure
set the jury apart from the common jury-that there were no necessary differences in status or wealth between special and common
jurors.4 50

In the late eighteenth century Lord Mansfield frequently used
special juries of experts (merchants). Indeed, only under Lord
Mansfield were all three connotations of the special jury often present.45 ' As the eighteenth century drew to a close under Mansfield's successor, Lord Kenyon, the special jury was still used frequently, but in a more general way, not purposefully drawing upon
the commercial expertise of the jurors. This pattern continued for
many years. Accusations of the packing of special juries, 4 2 however, brought them under the careful scrutiny of reform-minded
Parliaments in the nineteenth century, resulting in additional legislative requirements. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
popularity of the special jury had dwindled, and eventually (in
1949) the device was abolished in England for all except a very
narrow category of cases. 5 3
448 G. DUNCOMBE, 1665 edition, supra note 30, at 73, quoted supra text accompanying
note 229.
44 County Juries Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 50, § 31 (providing for a Special Jurors' List to
be compiled of men who were "described... as Esquires or Persons of higher Degree, or as
Bankers or Merchants"). This requirement did not guarantee that men described as such
were in fact men of above-average wealth or standing, and further nineteenth-century reform efforts featured this problem. An Act to amend the Laws relating to the qualifications,
summoning, attendance, and remuneration of Special and Common Juries, 33 & 34 Vict., ch.

77,

§

6 (1870); H.C. SELECT COMM. ON SPECIAL AND COMMON JuRiEs, supra note 13, at 9, 11,

63, 65, 68, 70.
450 See supra text accompanying note 394.
" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

Not all special juries in Lord Mansfield's
court consisted of merchants. Some were expressly described as juries "of gentlemen," and
others were not described at all. From Lord Mansfield's notebooks (see supra note 13), it is
safe to conclude that most of the special juries for Guildhall sittings in London consisted of
merchants. This may not have been the case for sittings after term at Westminster Hall.
452 See supra note 13.
453 See The Juries Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, ch. 27, §§ 18-19. The preserved exception
was the City of London Special Jury, id. § 19, and that perished in 1971, The Courts Act,
1971, ch. 23, § 42.
The preceding developments will be explored in further work that I am undertaking.
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APPENDIX
STATUTORY PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS FOR JURORS, MAGNA CARTA
TO THE STATUTE OF 3 GEO. 2, CH. 25 (1730)

A half century after Magna Carta, Parliament acted to remedy
perceived abuses by sheriffs who returned unqualified, poor jurors.45 4 Freehold worth twenty shillings per year was required of
each juror serving on petit assizes in his own shire;45 5 double this
amount was required of a juror drawn into a foreign shire.4 56 When
sheriffs' abuses persisted, Parliament increased the requirements
to forty shillings and 100 shillings, respectively, in 1293. 45 7 These
new requirements applied to all types of royal juries except local
juries in cities and market towns. In 1414, to allay false oaths by

poor jurors who "have but little to live upon but by such Inquest, ' 45 8 Parliament extended the forty-shilling requirement to
city and market town juries for all capital criminal cases, real property disputes, and disputes involving personalty worth forty marks
or more. 459 In 1429 the forty-shilling requirement was extended to
inquiries before justices of the peace into forcible entry,46 0 although it was removed as to trials de medietate linguae to relieve
Also to be explored is the experience with special juries in the United States. Many states
adopted the concept. Some state statutes were patterned after the original 1730 statute (An
Act for the better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730)), see, e.g., Act of Apr. 12,
1768, ch. 980, § 19, 7 S.C. ACTS 197, 203 (D. McCord 1840) (amended 1791); others came
later and incorporated features of the nineteenth-century English reform legislation, see,
e.g., MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 103, §§ 36-42 (S.Green 1846). Surprisingly, struck jury procedures
remain alive and well in a few jurisdictions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-122 (1975); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:75-1 to 75-7 (West 1976). The special jury in the United States received
some scholarly attention in the nineteenth century, see H. HIRSCH, A PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON JURIES §§ 857-972, at 249-300 (1879); S.THOMPSON & E. MERRIAM, A TREATISE ON THE
ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES 15-18 (1882), but no encompassing treatment exists. Brief recent passages concerning the special jury for particular states can be
found in M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 155-59 (1977)
(special juries in New York and South Carolina); R. KILBOURNE, LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW

101-05, 155 (1980) (special juries in Louisiana).
1" 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 327-30; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 44, at 569, 621-27.
"4' The Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw., ch. 38 (1285).
456 Id.
457Statutu' de illis q' debent poni in Jur' & Assis' (The Statute of Persons to be put in
Assises and Juries), 21 Edw. (1293).
458 Statute of 2 Hen. 5, Stat. 2, ch. 3 (1414).
41,Id. A mark represented 13 shillings, four pence, or two-thirds of one pound sterling.
460 Statute of 8 Hen. 6, ch. 29 (1429).
-
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61

In time, the freehold requirement became unworkable for
62
London jurors, since nonresidents owned most London freehold.
Thus Parliament enacted in 1512 that jurors in the king's courts
sitting in London 63 were qualified by possession of goods of 100
marks or more in value. 6 4 This substitution of personalty for freehold as the basic jury qualification was extended in 1531 to all jurors except knights and esquires serving on murder and felony
461

Id.

See, e.g., Remarks on the Lord Russell's Trial, by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General in the Reign of William III, 9 State Trials 794. According to Hawles:
[T]here is none who pretends to know anything of the history of England, that will say,
that heretofore the cities were not inhabited mostly by the gentry, and especially the
city of London; partly for luxury, partly for their security, and then there was no want
of freeholders in the cities; but when matters became more quiet, and trade increased,
and made houses in the cities more valuable, then were houses of equal convenience,
and less price, situate in the suburbs, or in the country; gentry by degrees parted with
their houses in the cities to tradesmen for profit, and removed themselves to other
places.
Id. at 797-98. See also Rex v. Russell, 9 State Trials 577, 590 (Old Bailey 1683) (Serjeant
Jeffries) ("[T]is well known, that the ablest people in the city of London have scarce any
freehold in it; for that most of the inheritances of the city of London remain in the nobility
and in corporations.").
463 Both King's Bench and Common Pleas sat in the Guildhall in London.
'" Per le Juries infra Civitatem London, 4 Hen. 8, ch. 3, § 2 (1512). Parliament had
previously enacted a requirement of this type for inquests in London city courts. See An Act
agaynst Perjurye, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 21, § 1 (1495). Reductions of the 40-shilling requirement for
local jury inquests outside London were also enacted. See, e.g., An Act for retornynge of
sufficient Jurors, 1 Rich. 3, ch. 4 (1483-84); An Act that Shreifs shall retorne sufficient Jurors, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 26, § 1 (1495); An Acte agaynst Escheators and Comyssioners for makinge false retornes of Office & Comyssions, 1 Hen. 8, ch. 8 (1509-10).
Despite these statutes, parties occasionally insisted on freehold as a requirement of jury
service. In the trial of Sir John Freind in 1696 at the Old Bailey for high treason, the jury
was drawn from a panel of men of London. Rex v. Freind, 13 State Trials 1, 7 (Old Bailey
1696). During the challenges, one prospective juror stated that he was not a freeholder. He
was acceptable nevertheless to the defendant, but Attorney General Trevor interposed: "If
he have no freehold, we that are for the king will except against him, for I would not have
any body that is not a freeholder serve upon the jury." Id. at 8. See also Rex v. Francia, 15
State Trials 897, 897-98 (Old Bailey 1717) (freehold insisted as requirement for jury service); Rex v. Cook, 13 State Trials 311, 314, 338 (Old Bailey 1696) (juror challenged for lack
of freehold).
Local ordinances for city courts occasionally adopted variations of the statutory property qualifications. See, e.g., An Act of Common Council For the better Regulation of the
Courts of Law in the Guild-Hall London 5 (London 1669), ordaining
[t]hat no person or persons whatsoever be at any time hereafter returned, by any the
Inquests of the Wards of this City, to serve as Jury-man, or Jury-men, either Grand, or
Petty, in the Courts of this City, but such men as either have been, or for time to come
shall be, Subsidy-men, and so taxed in the KING's Book; or, in default thereof, such
other discreet and sufficient persons as shall be equal in Quality and Estate with them
462
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cases in cities and towns.465
As was noted above,466 the property requirement was doubled
to four pounds in 1585, temporarily raised to twenty pounds in
1664, allowed to revert to four pounds in 1677, and raised to ten
pounds in 1692.467 These developments are shown in the following
table, as are the special rules enacted by Parliament for cities and
towns and for other geographic districts (most notably Wales).

466 An Acte that Men in Cities Borowes & Townes which be clerely worth xl £ in goods,
shall passe in triall of murders, 23 Hen. 8, ch. 13, §§ 1-2 (1531-32).
" See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
4"1 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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